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Abstract
In this dissertation, I address two topics in applied microeconomics. First two chapters
deal with the functioning of school admission mechanisms and their eﬀects on student
school choice behavior. Third chapter deals with the question of optimal bankruptcy law
design.
Matching mechanisms play a critical role in the schooling system. They aﬀect the
behavior of students and  through the information they convey  also the behavior of
the schools and the authorities responsible for education policy. In the ﬁrst chapter (joint
with Daniel Münich) we use a computational simulation model to analyze the functioning
of an admission scheme used in the Czech Republic, which can be seen as a prototype of
decentralized, ability-based admission schemes widely used in the world to assign pupils to
upper-secondary schools. Our ﬁndings show large incidence of strategic misrepresentation
of school preferences among applicants, large diﬀerences between revealed and trued
demand, and large incidence of justiﬁed envy in the resulting matching. We point out
several implication for the functioning of schooling systems.
In the second chapter, I empirically study the behavior of students under the Czech
pupil-school matching mechanism. Using district-level data on demand for public gymna-
sia, I ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence that students do not apply to their most preferred schools,
opting rather for a less-preferred, but safer option. Furthermore, using data on individ-
ual student school choices, I also ﬁnd that students with weak socioeconomic background
misrepresent their preferences more often than other students.
In the third chapter (joint with Ondrej Vychodil), we develop a model of a debt
contracting problem under bankruptcy regimes diﬀering by a degree of softness. In the
model, the degree of softness is associated with the extent to which the absolute priority
rule can be violated. We show that when the degree of softness can be set individually for
each project, then the debtor's tendency to excessive risk-taking can be eliminated and
the ﬁrst best solution can be attained. When it is given exogenously by a bankruptcy
law, then a completely tough law results in a lower distortion from the ﬁrst best than a
soft law with a moderate degree of softness.
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Abstrakt
Tato dizertace se zabývá dv¥ma tématy v aplikované mikroekonomii. První dv¥ kapitoly
se v¥nují fungování mechanism· pro párovaní ºák· a ²kol a dopad·m t¥chto mechanism·
na chování student· p°i výb¥ru ²koly. T°etí kapitola se zabývá problematikou bankrotu
podniku.
Mechanismy párování ºák· a ²kol hrají d·leºitou úlohu v systému ²kolství. Ovliv¬ují
chování student· a  prost°ednictvím informací, které generují  také jednání ²kol a
ú°ad· zodpov¥dných za politiku vzd¥lávání. V první kapitole (spole£ná práce s Danielem
Münichem) aplikujeme simula£ní model na analýzu fungování p°ijímacího systému vyuºí-
vaného v eské republice. Tento systém lze povaºovat za prototyp decentralizovaného
a na schopnostech student· zaloºeného mechanismu, které jsou v ²iroké míre pouºívány
ve sv¥t¥ k párovani zák· a ²kol p°i p°echodu na st°ední ²kolu. Na²e výsledky ukazují
vysokou míru strategického zkreslování preferencí, velké rozdíly mezi skute£nou a pro-
jevenou poptávkou po ²kolách a vysokou míru "oprávn¥né závisti" (angl. justiﬁed envy)
ve výsledném spárování. V této kapitole poukazujeme rovn¥º na n¥kolik dopad·, které
by toto mohlo mít na systém vzd¥láváni.
Ve druhé kapitole empiricky studuji chování student· v £eském mechanismu párováni
student· a st°edních ²kol. S vyuºitím dat na úrovni okres· o nabídce a poptávce po
ve°ejných gymnáziích zji²´uji, ºe se studenti nehlásí na jejich preferované ²koly a vybírají si
rad¥ji mén¥ preferované, av²ak jist¥j²í varianty. S vyuºitím dat o volb¥ ²koly invidiualními
studenty dále zji²´uji, ºe studenti s hor²ím socio-ekonomickým zázemím zkreslují své
preference více neº ostatní studenti.
Ve t°etí kapitole (spole£ná práce s Ond°ejem Vychodilem), p°edstavujeme model,
který analyzuje uzavírání dluºnických kontrakt· za p°ítomnosti hazardního boje o záchranu
(angl. gambling on resurrection) v reºimech úpadkového práva li²ících se ve stupni
m¥kkosti. V modelu je stupe¬ m¥kkosti svázan s mírou, do jaké m·ºe být poru²eno
pravidlo absolutní priority. Ukazujeme, ºe pokud lze stupe¬ m¥kkosti stanovit indi-
viduáln¥ pro kaºdý projekt, lze dluºníkovu tendenci k p°ílisnému riskováni zcela elim-
inovat a dosáhnout spole£ensky optimálního výsledku. Pokud je ale stupe¬ m¥kkosti
ur£en exogenn¥ úpadkovým právem, zcela tvrdý zákon muºe vést k men²í odchylce od
optimálního stavu, neº mek£í zákon se st°edním stupn¥m m¥kkosti.
x
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Introduction
1
In this dissertation, I address two important in applied microeconomics. The ﬁrst
two chapters deal with the functioning of school admission mechanisms and their eﬀects
on student school choice behavior. The third chapter deals with the question of optimal
bankruptcy law design.
Pupil-school matching mechanisms play a critical role in the schooling system. They
aﬀect the behavior of students and  through the information they convey  also the
behavior of the schools and the authorities responsible for education policy.
I study a decentralized, ability-based matching mechanism,1 diﬀerent versions of which
are used in many countries, especially in continental Europe.2 The particular version I
focus on is the mechanism used in the Czech Republic to match 9th grade students to
upper-secondary schools. Its key feature is that in each round of the admission procedure,
each student only has "one shot" (can choose a single school to apply to) and if she misses
(ranks below the line of the admitted students), she risks that other schools she likes have
ﬁlled their capacity with other students, leaving her only with choices she does not like.
In the ﬁrst chapter,3 we use a computational simulation model to study the school
application strategies of rational agents under a decentralized, ability-based mechanism.
Our simulations show that there is a signiﬁcant degree of strategic preference misrepre-
sentation among applicants. For a reasonable range of parameters, applying to a school
other than the most preferred one is the optimal strategy for 30%  50% of students. As a
result, revealed demand for the best school (the number of students who actually apply)
is about 50% higher than its capacity, while true demand (the number of students who
prefer the school most) exceeds its capacity by 300%. The situation is the opposite for
schools of lower quality, where revealed demand exceeds schools' capacities, while true
demand is lower than capacity.
In the second chapter, I ask whether under the pupil-school matching mechanism used
in the Czech Republic, students actually misrepresent their preferences. Using district-
level data on demand for public gymnasia  the most over-subscribed type of school  I
ﬁnd that the revealed demand is co-determined by factors, which according to my model
do not aﬀect the true demand. In particular, I ﬁnd that there is a signiﬁcant positive
relationship between the capacity of public gymnasia and the revealed demand for them,
1Individual schools administer the admission procedure themselves (= decentralized) and students'
abilities play a role in the admission decision (= ability-based)
2In the UK and the US, to the contrary, the mechanisms used are typically centralized and ability-
blind.
3Co-authored by Daniel Münich, CERGE-EI
2
even when controlling for potential endogeneity, supporting the preference misrepresenta-
tion hypothesis. Furthermore, using data on individual student school choices, I also ﬁnd
that students with weak socio-economic backgrounds misrepresent their preferences more
often than other students. The most likely explanation for this is that the students from
better-oﬀ families have a chance, if rejected by their most preferred school, to opt-out
from the public school system and do not face the threat of ending up in a particularly
low-quality school.
Several policy implications follow from the ﬁndings in chapters 1 and 2. From the
ex-ante point of view, the mechanism induces signiﬁcant psychic hardships on students
and their parents related to the school application process. Because applying to one's
most preferred school is often not the best strategy, students are forced to strategize and a
wrong decision or bad luck can have severe consequences. From the ex-post point of view,
a phenomenon called justiﬁed envy is widespread.4 According to our results in chapter
1, justiﬁed envy aﬀects approximately 10%  20% of students, depending on parameter
values.
A substantial ﬂaw of the mechanism is that it distorts the school demand informa-
tion. It creates an illusory balance between supply and demand for schools and does not
provide reliable signals to school managers and to government oﬃcials, who make deci-
sions concerning the overall school system, school capacities, and school funding. There
are practically applicable mechanisms, which could be used instead of the mechanism
currently used in the Czech Republic and similar mechanisms used in other countries.
The two best-known examples are the Gale-Shaply matching mechanism5 and the Top
Trading Cycles mechanism.
In the third chapter,6 we deal with the problem of an optimal design of a bankruptcy
law, with particular regard to what should be the degree of softness / toughness of the
law. Most bankruptcy laws in theory adhere to the concept of Absolute Priority Rule
(APR), which states that shareholders should not get any value from the bankrupt ﬁrm
unless creditors are paid in full. In practice, however, many bankruptcy systems enable
violations of the APR, the best-known example being Chapter 11 of the U.S. bankruptcy
code. One stream of research claims that a certain degree of softness (APR violations)
4This means that there is at least one student who ends up in a school which he ranks lower than
some other school, while this other school would admit him over some other student which it actually
admitted.
5This mechanism was used, for example, to replace the well-known Boston mechanism in 2006; see
Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2005)
6Co-authored by Ond°ej Vychodil
3
may, indeed, be beneﬁcial ex-ante for all parties, since it can mitigate the gambling on
resurrection problem. This problem, in short, means that when the ﬁnancial situation
of the debtor starts to deteriorate, she has a tendency to engage in risky endeavors with
some small probability to safe the ﬁrm, but with a high probability to just burn cash and
destroy the remaining value.
We investigate the problem using a theoretical model of contracting between a creditor
and a debtor under asymmetric information. At the time of contracting, both parties
have the same information; the asymmetry arises during the life of the ﬁnanced project
when the debtor learns a signal about the quality of the project, which the creditors do
not receive. The debtor then decides whether to continue the project or to abandon it.
Continuation is optimal when the signal is good, while liquidation is optimal when the
signal is bad. The debtor, however, may decide to continue the project even when the
signal is bad and the creditors, because they do not see (or cannot verify) the signal,
cannot stop him. The softness / toughness of the bankruptcy law is a critical parameter
in determining what strategy the debtor will follow.
We show that a suﬃciently soft bankruptcy law may indeed eliminate the gambling
on resurrection problem, but  under a law that is insuﬃciently soft  this problem gets
even worse than under a completely tough law. We also show that the possibility of
veriﬁcation can as well eliminate the problem, either partly or fully, depending on its
cost.
We see two practical issues with the soft law. First, although the suﬃciently soft law
outperforms the completely tough one, it can be very diﬃcult to ﬁnd the optimal degree
of softness for a given economy  there is no one-size-ﬁts-all solution both in terms of
diﬀerent projects and diﬀerent creditor types.7 Hence it might seem reasonable for the
policy maker to fully preserve APR, rather than trying to ﬁnd the optimal degree of APR
violation. Moreover, could the optimal degree be found, it might still be impossible to
reach it in practice. Even the best-known example of a clearly soft law, Chapter 11, is
empirically documented to be substantially tougher than the optimal degree of softness
found in our paper.8
7In the paper, we assume for simplicity only one creditor. In practice, however, there are typically
multiple creditors with diﬀerent levels of seniority and, thus, diﬀerent optimal degrees of softness for
each of them.
8In our paper, we ﬁnd that to have the desirable eﬀects on debtor behavior, the law has to enable the
debtor to retain between 40% and 50% of the bankrupt ﬁrm value. Empirical studies of Chapter 11 of
the U.S. bankruptcy code show that in reality this value ranges between 0% and 26%.
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Chapter 1
The impact of decentralized, ability-based
school admission mechanisms on eﬃciency,
equity, and quality of educational outcomes
Co-authored by Daniel Münich
Abstract
Pupil-school matching mechanisms play a critical role in the schooling system. They aﬀect
the behavior of students and  through the information they convey  also the behavior
of the schools and the authorities responsible for education policy. In this paper, using a
computational simulation model, we analyze the functioning of an admission scheme used
in the Czech Republic as a prototype of decentralized, ability-based admission schemes
widely used in the world to assign pupils to upper-secondary schools. Our ﬁndings show
a large incidence of strategic misrepresentation of school preferences among applicants,
large diﬀerences between revealed and true demand, and large incidence of justiﬁed envy
in the resulting matching. We point out several implications this could have for the
functioning of schooling systems.
Keywords: pupil-school matching, matching mechanisms
JEL classiﬁcation codes: C78, D60, I20
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1.1 Introduction
School admission mechanisms are indispensable components of each schooling system.
Such mechanisms represent sets of more or less formal rules matching applicants to schools
based on applicants' preferences for individual schools and schools' priorities over appli-
cants. Resulting pupil-school matching outcomes are taken as given in numerous strands
of the existing literature. In particular, the last decade saw great progress in describing
skills production processes,1 understanding the role played by the selectivity of schooling
systems in the transmission of socio-economic inequalities,2 and estimating the impact of
schools on the labor market3 and other outcomes.4
There is rich empirical evidence that educational outcomes are co-determined by
pupils' and schools' characteristics.5 However, the actual functioning of the admission
mechanism itself has not been given much attention yet. But as we argue, the actual
setup of a school admission scheme can have serious equity and eﬃciency implications.
Moreover, admission schemes generate valuable information about the educational de-
mand/supply gap. As desirable functioning of school-choice based schemes is conditional
on well informed agents  parents and their children  imperfect or biased information gen-
erated by ill-shaped admission mechanisms could hamper their functionality.6 Moreover,
on the supply side, biased information about demand can lead to suboptimal managerial
decisions of individual school and governmental schooling administrators. Finally, com-
plex admission schemes requiring sophisticated strategizing can disadvantage applicants
with weak family support.
A great deal of empirical evidence on the functioning of school admission mechanisms
comes from the US and the UK. Most common there are centralized-ability-blind (CABl)
admission mechanisms. Centralized administration consists of centralized collection of
information on applicants' preferences for schools and of centrally set priority rules deter-
1See Krueger (1999), Cabrales, Calvo-Armengol, and Pavoni (2008), Zax and Rees (2002), McMillan
(2004)
2See Hanushek and Luque (2003), Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2005), Fernandez and Rogerson (2001),
Nechyba (2006)
3See Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne (2001)
4See Glewwe (2002), Bils and Klenow (2000)
5See great ongoing debate on the role of class-size and peer eﬀects (Hanushek vs. Krueger), litera-
ture on school tracking and transmission of intergenerational inequalities (e.g., Krueger (2003), Rivkin,
Hanushek, and Kain (2005), Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004), Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2005)).
6Recent studies on this are by Epple and Romano (1998), Rouse (1998), Nechyba (2000), Adnett and
Davies (2000), Machin and Stevens (2004), Davies, Adnett, and Mangan (2002), Hoxby (2000), Clowes
(2008), Greene and Kang (2004), Grosskopf et al. (2001), Hsieh and Urquiola (2003), Merryﬁeld (2008)
and Hastings and Weinstein (2008).
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mining the priorities of applicants for individual schools. Since priority rules commonly
preclude inclusion of a pupil's personal traits like study aptitude and other skills into the
admission criteria, such mechanisms are called ability-blind. Our work contributes to the
existing literature analyzing decentralized, ability-based (DABa) matching mechanisms
which are widespread within continental Europe.7 In this family of mechanisms, there is
little or no inter-school coordination, and an applicant's personal traits are an important
component of priorities. Inspired by a prototype of DABa mechanisms employed in the
Czech Republic, we explore its key properties. While various implementations of DABa
mechanisms can be found throughout Europe, we call the particular version which we
analyze the Czech mechanism.8
In the Czech mechanism, admission priorities are set by individual schools commonly
based on an applicant's performance in the school's own test. The exact procedure is that
students ﬁrst select a school to apply to in the ﬁrst round and then sit down for a test
on a centrally speciﬁed date. The schools then decide, based on the test results, which
students to admit / reject. The rejected students proceed to the second round where the
procedure should be repeated, though in practice the second round is already less rigorous.
Having incomplete and imperfect information about their own admission chances  since
admission testing happens only after applications are submitted  applicants are restricted
in the number of schools they can apply to. By building a behavioral model of applicants
and using quantitative computational simulations, we identify properties of the Czech
mechanism and compare the matching outcomes it generates to those generated by other
stylized mechanisms.
Our simulations of the Czech mechanism show that there is a signiﬁcant degree of
strategic preference misrepresentation among applicants. For a reasonable range of pa-
rameters, applying to a school other than the most preferred one is the optimal strategy
for 30%  50% of students. Due to this, revealed excess demand for the best schools is
about 50% while true demand exceeds capacity by 300%. The situation is the opposite for
schools of lowest quality, where revealed demand exceeds schools' capacities, while true
demand is lower than capacity. We document that the degree of strategic misrepresen-
tation depends on the degree of uncertainty, which depends on the degree of perception
7Ability-based mechanisms are also used in the US college system.
8The Czech mechanism considered here as a prototype of DABa mechanisms assigns almost a hundred
thousand ﬁfteen-year old applicants to thousands of high schools in the Czech Republic each year.
Examples of other countries that use a similar mechanism are Austria, Croatia, Hungary, Poland and
Slovakia.
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error of one's own qualiﬁcations. Finally, we document that diﬀerent parameters and
choice of admission mechanism can have sizeable eﬃciency and equity implications.
We put the issue of matching into a broader perspective and review the related litera-
ture in section 1.2, describe our simulation model in section 1.3, and present our ﬁndings
in section 1.4. Broader implications of our ﬁndings, possible setbacks, and policy issues
are discussed in section 1.5.
1.2 Background and framework
The pupil-school matching problem is a special case of two-sided matching between het-
erogeneous agents.9 Diﬀerent cases of two-sided matchings have been studied in various
ﬁelds. Spontaneous matching between workers and jobs is one important determinant in
models explaining employment and wage patterns.10 Another strand of literature employs
the concept of a matching function to account for labor market frictions, i.e. interaction
and simultaneous existence of unemployed and vacant jobs.11 There, the matching func-
tion - a concept similar to the notion of production function in the theory of ﬁrm - is
a tool capturing the extraordinary complex spontaneous interaction processes. Closely
related to our topic is the matching of school graduates to speciﬁc jobs (professions).
Thoroughly studied was the matching of medical interns to hospitals in the UK and US12
Another rich strand of literature explores the principles of matching on marriage
markets13 or in the house allocation problem where houses represent indivisible goods
rationed among agents.14 Many other examples of two-sided matching can be found.15
1.2.1 Properties of pupil-school matching mechanisms
Matching of pupils to schools - admission - is experienced by everyone several times in
life; ﬁrst as a student, and later as a parent. The process is frequently perceived as a
quest for a desirable school or college. In their seminal study, Gale and Shapley (1962)
(GS) described the matching of applicants to colleges as a mechanism design problem.
9See Roth and Sotomayor (1990)
10See Jovanovic (1984), Postel-Vinay and Robin (2004), Moscarini (2005).
11See Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Albrecht and Vroman (2002), Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
and Galuscak and Munich (2007).
12See Roth (1984a), Roth and Xing (1994), Roth (2002), Roth (1990) and Roth (1991)
13Roth (1985)
14See Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (1999) or Ergin (2000)
15Kidney exchange studied by Roth et al. (2004), Housing market by Shapley and Scarf (1974).
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Various theoretical investigations followed. We provide a brief overview of the established
terminology we use while details can be found in Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003) and
Chen and Sonmez (2006).16
In the following, each student has preferences over schools and students have priorities
within each school. Student assignment mechanism is a procedure leading to a particular
matching for each school choice problem, where matching is an assignment of students
to school seats such that each student is assigned just one seat and the capacity of no
school is exceeded. Two types of mechanisms are distinguished: school-choice and school-
admission mechanism. In the former one, students optimize choosing schools based on
their own preferences, while the priorities of students within schools are externally set and
not subject to optimization. In the latter case, priorities are also the outcomes of schools'
optimizing behavior. In the latter case, too the welfare of both sides matters. Under
certain conditions, the diﬀerence between school-choice and school-admission mechanisms
has no impact on the essence of the matching problem.
Justiﬁed envy in matching appears if student i prefers school s to her actual assign-
ment while student j assigned to school s has a lower priority at this school than does
student i.17 A mechanism eliminates justiﬁed envy if it always leads to matching which
eliminates justiﬁed envy. Elimination of all cases of justiﬁed envy in the ﬁnal matching
corresponds to pairwise stability property in school-admission problem.
A matching is Pareto eﬃcient if there is no alternative matching which would assign
each student to a weakly better school and at least one student to a strictly better
school. In other words, matching is Pareto eﬃcient if no student can be made better oﬀ
without making some other student worse oﬀ. Note that Pareto eﬃciency is deﬁned from
the perspective of students' welfare only. A mechanism is Pareto eﬃcient if it always
selects a Pareto eﬃcient matching. Note that while Pareto eﬃciency relates possible
gains between subsets of applicants, justiﬁed envy takes into account both priorities and
preferences. As we point out later, there could be a trade-oﬀ between Pareto eﬃciency
and the elimination of justiﬁed envy.
The matching mechanism is strategy-proof if no student can beneﬁt by unilateral
misrepresentation of preferences (i.e. dominant strategy is incentive compatible). Mis-
16For a literature on pupil-school matching, see also McVitie and Wilson (1970), Roth (1982), Roth
(1984b), Roth (1989), Roth (2008), Roth and Sotomayor (1990), Roth and Vande Vate (1990), Roth and
Vande Vate (1991), Roth and Rothblum (1999)
17The notion of justiﬁed envy corresponds to the concept of stability in school-admission models.
Interpreting school preferences as school priorities, the notion of stability translates into the notion of
justiﬁed envy.
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representation of preferences appears if at least one applicant can beneﬁt from unilateral
misrepresentation of her own school preferences.
As we clarify in detail, another distinguishing feature of matching mechanisms is
whether or not applicants' personal traits, like study aptitude or qualiﬁcations, co-
determine preferences and priorities.18 Mechanisms where applicants' qualiﬁcations de-
termine priorities  ability-based mechanisms  tend to increase economic and social
inequalities due to sorting of students into schools of heterogeneous quality and due to
the peer eﬀect, if present (see Nechyba (2006)). In some countries such schemes are viewed
as merit-based and desirable. In other countries, the prevailing view is that applicants'
study aptitudes are, to a great extent determined by social and economic environment
rather than individual merit. In the latter case, on equity grounds, governments impose
legal restrictions on the use of personal traits in admission, the freedom of individual
schools to set own admission criteria is quite limited, and admission criteria are set by
local or central authorities.
Ability-blind schemes are widespread in the US and the UK. The negative side eﬀect
of such arrangements is that they can have an adverse impact on competition among
schools, which some consider an important disciplining device (see McMillan (2004)).
This is the intention of proponents of school-choice programs  schemes based on per-
pupil public funding, where schools have strong incentives to attract pupils by providing
educational services of higher quality.19 Furthermore, there can be a trade-oﬀ between
equity and productive eﬃciency, as addressed by Adnett, Bougheas, and Davies (2002)
and Machin and Stevens (2004).
1.2.2 Existing pupil-school matching mechanisms
Diﬀerent admission schemes are used at diﬀerent schooling levels and by diﬀerent school
types.20 Most existing schemes have developed spontaneously or were designed with no
account of mechanism design theory.
Research on existing admission mechanisms is still rare. Existing studies focus on
a few cases, mostly centralized and ability-blind mechanisms in the US and the UK.
18One can also ﬁnd mixed arrangements which allow schools to select a proportion of applicants based
on ability or aptitude and requiring them to admit the rest by criteria other than those based on the
cognitive skills of applicants.
19Survey studies like Wilie (1998) or Ladd and Fiske (2003) conclude that competitive pros are small
while equity losses are large.
20Extraordinary high variation in admission schemes is documented in the UK by West, Pennell, and
Noden (1998), West, Hind, and Pennell (), and White et al. (2001).
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There, a mechanism used in the Boston region till 2005 was thoroughly examined.21
The Boston mechanism is a centrally processed, ability-blind school assignment where
school priorities of pupils are based on factors like walking distance, school attendance by
senior siblings, special medical or social needs of the student, etc.22 Ergin and Sönmez
(2005) pointed out serious ﬂaws of the Boston mechanism: (i) it does not eliminate
justiﬁed envy23, (ii) it is not Pareto eﬃcient24, (iii) it is not strategy proof.25 These
ﬂaws have serious consequences: (a) the justiﬁed envy of applicants and their parents
creates grounds for legal disputes. This is particularly so in public schools as it casts
doubts on the realm of justice. (b) Built-in incentives to misrepresent school preferences
together with incomplete and imperfect information carry serious psychic costs given that
actual school assignment could have life-long implications. (c) Strategic misrepresentation
of applicants' preferences generates biased information about demand at the level of
individual schools, school types and regions. This can lead to ineﬃcient allocation of
public resources and poor managerial decisions at the school and central levels. (d) The
need for strategic application can harm some demographic groups of applicants.
In 2005, based on critical arguments (i)-(iii), the matching mechanism in the Boston
area was replaced with a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism, the princi-
ples of which were originally proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) and used for decades
21See Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2005), Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2006) and Ergin and Sonmez (2006). For a
study of the mechanism used in the New York City see Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, and Roth (2009).
22In the Boston mechanism, applicants are assigned to public schools by centrally controlled procedure.
Each applicant submits own school preference (ranking) list. Then, students are ordered by priority rules
deﬁned by several criteria. Assignments are done in a series of rounds. In the ﬁrst round, only schools
on the top of preference lists are considered and matched according to priority rules. Assignments to
particular school are terminated when its capacity is ﬁlled. In the second round, second-top choices of
still unassigned applicants are considered. This process is repeated until all applicants are matched. In
the Boston mechanism, skills of applicants and economic and social family background translate into
matching only indirectly, through residential mobility. See seminal theoretical work on this issue by
Tiebout (1956). Further theoretical developments can be found e.g. in Epple and Romano (1998),
Benabou (1996) and empirical examinations by Rosenthal (2003) and Gibbons and Machin (2006)
23The origin of these ﬂaws in the Boston mechanism can be presented by an intuitive example. Assume
that applicants do not misrepresent their school preferences. Consider applicant i who had put her most
preferred school on the top of her preference list and was not admitted to this school in the 1st round
due to capacity limit. If all slots in her 2nd most preferred school j were ﬁlled by applicants already
in the 1st round (by applicants listing school j on top of their lists), it could be the case that some
applicants admitted to school j have lower priority in this school than applicant i not admitted to this
school (justiﬁed envy). The ﬂaw of the Boston mechanism is that assignments realized in early rounds are
not temporary but terminal. Incidence of justiﬁed envy creates incentives for applicants to misrepresent
their school preferences, placing less preferred schools higher on their preference lists.
24There exists another matching in which the utilities of all students are weakly higher and the utility
of at least one student is strictly higher.
25The optimal strategy of the students is not to reveal their true preferences. If students were, somehow,
made to reveal their true preferences, the Boston mechanism would be Pareto eﬃcient.
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to match medical interns to hospitals in the US.26 Using detailed records on actual stu-
dents' choices and assignments, Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2006) provide empirical evidence
of the incidence of sophisticated strategic behavior among parents under the old Boston
mechanism. They convincingly show that the new mechanism substantially simpliﬁed
the strategic choices of parents and improved matching outcomes.
The common ﬂaw is that these mechanisms create incentives such that strategic deci-
sions are superior to the revelation of true school preferences. Rare non-US empirical case
is described by Balinsky and Sönmez (1999) studying centralized college admission based
on standardized testing across Turkey. Identifying serious deﬁciencies of this mechanism,
they propose an alternative mechanism with superior properties: strategy proofness and
fairness.
The theoretical literature oﬀers another CABl strategy-proof mechanism called top
trading cycles mechanism (TTC). It assigns applicants in the order of their priorities but
allows them to trade the schools for which they have highest preferences if mutually ben-
eﬁcial (Pareto improving) trade is possible.27 Contrary to the GS mechanism, the TTC
mechanism is Pareto eﬃcient but does not eliminate justiﬁed envy. Which of these two
mechanisms is more appealing depends on whether policy makers prefer Pareto eﬃciency
or the absence of justiﬁed envy.
If priority orderings of students are the same across schools or do not exist, the
TTC mechanism reduces to a serial dictatorship mechanism (SD). In the SD mechanism,
students are ranked in random order (random serial dictatorship) or in the order of test-
scores (deterministic serial dictatorship28) and choose their favorite school among schools
with remaining slots. The SD mechanism produces Pareto eﬃcient matching with respect
to the order in which applicants choose a school. When priorities are given by test scores,
the deterministic SD mechanism also eliminates justify envy but random SD does not.29
26This mechanisms also belongs to the family of centralized ability blind mechanisms - CABl
27The TTC mechanism was employed to assign over 400 students in the after-market in New York
City's High School match. See Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003) for a detailed outline of the TTC
mechanism designed for school-choice purpose. Pais and Pintér (2008) provide experimental results
in which the TTC mechanism slightly outperforms the GS mechanism in terms of both eﬃciency and
percentage of truthful revelations.
28Serial dictatorship mechanism is currently used to sort pupils into high schools in Turkey. Students
are assigned to available slots in their most preferred schools in the order given by test scores (nation-
wide, standardized).
29Random lotteries are a component of numerous mechanisms in the US. Motivated by the New
York City High School supplementary matching where large fraction of high schools employ a lottery
to order students instead of setting priorities, Pathak (2006) compares random serial dictatorship and
TTC mechanism with random priority and shows that a random serial dictatorship is equivalent to top
trading cycles with random priority.
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Real implementation of admission schemes confronts peculiarities deviating more or
less from their pure theoretical counterparts described above. A comprehensive typol-
ogy of pupil-school matching mechanisms has not yet been developed, and there is no
systematic survey of real mechanisms used.
1.2.3 Ability-based decentralized matching
The mechanism we investigate assigns almost one hundred thousand ﬁfteen-year-old stu-
dents to upper-secondary schools in the Czech Republic each year.30 Pupils can freely
apply to any school they wish and inter-district school choices are not restricted. Each
school administers its own admission test and results determine the students' priorities
within the school.31 The fact that student priorities are determined by admission tests
means that they are not known at the time of school choice decision, creating a risk for
the students. Admissions proceed in a number of rounds and timing is coordinated by the
central government. In the ﬁrst round, the applicant is allowed to submit an application
to just one school of her choice.32
Unﬁlled slots remain at schools which experience a demand below their capacity in
the ﬁrst round. The schools which face excess demand typically ﬁll most of their seats.
One might expect that, given the properties of the mechanism, schools could behave
strategically and keep certain amount of seats unﬁlled for the second round, in which
they could win high-ability students who were rejected by their ﬁrst-round schools. This,
however, is not the case. The schools appear to be highly risk-averse and rather than
running the risk of not being able to ﬁll the capacity, they tend to accept everybody
who exceeds some minimum threshold. This behavior of the schools is depicted in ﬁgure
1.1. The horizontal axis shows the ratio of ﬁrst-round applicants to capacity; value above
1 means excess demand. The vertical axis then shows the ratio of students admitted
in the ﬁrst round to capacity. It is clear from the chart that those schools which have
enough applicants typically ﬁll most of their capacity in the ﬁrst round. Thus, most seats
30It corresponds to the transition from junior high school to high school in the US system.
31In the following, we use term priorities for schools and preferences for applicants.
32The actual mechanism used in the Czech Republic has subsequently been amended and from the
year 2009 students are allowed to submit 3 applications in the ﬁrst round. However, strong restriction
on the number of schools applicants can apply for is still very common. Slovakia has a very similar
system. In Croatia applicants apply to one school but admissions are not based on test scores. In the
US, restriction to three schools applies in Columbus Student Assignment mechanism. There, priorities
for schools among applicants are determined by random lottery. The random element resembles the
imperfect knowledge of applicants about their own study aptitude in the Czech mechanism. For details
see Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003).
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Figure 1.1: Students admitted in the ﬁrst round vs. applicants in the ﬁrst round
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available in the second round are from schools, which faced lower demand in the ﬁrst
round.
The admission procedure is eﬀectively ﬁnished in the second round. All applicants
are served because the total capacity of schools exceeds the number of applicants.
The Czech mechanism belongs to the family of decentralized-ability-based (DABa)
mechanisms. It diﬀers from the thoroughly studied centralized-ability-blind (CABl)
mechanisms, such as the well known Boston mechanism, in four ways. (1) In CABl
mechanisms, pupils' intellectual qualiﬁcations do not play any direct role because they
cannot be incorporated into priority rules.33 In the Czech mechanism, on the contrary,
applicants' qualiﬁcations are a key determinant of priorities of applicants within individ-
ual schools. (2) In CABl mechanisms, schools do not have the discretion to set their own
priority rules; these are set externally by the schooling administration. In contrast to
this, the Czech mechanism gives individual schools large autonomy to adopt their own
priority rules. (3) In CABl mechanisms, assignments are processed centrally. In the Czech
scheme, the matching procedure is decentralized to the level of individual schools and the
central government coordinates only the timing of admission rounds. (4) In the Czech
mechanism, admission test scores are not nation-wide standardized but school speciﬁc.34
33There, racial and ethnic quotas are imposed on priority rules. See Chen and Sonmez (2006) for a
detailed analysis of controlled choice models.
34There are legal restrictions requiring equal treatment of applicants in the sense that an applicant
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Features (3) and (4) of the Czech mechanism imply that applicants and their parents
choose the school to apply to with imperfect and incomplete information. At the moment
of submitting an application, applicants have only imperfect information about their
true qualiﬁcations. Applicants perceive their own qualiﬁcations mainly through grades
obtained at the preceding lower-secondary schooling level and through comparison to
peers in a class. Comparability of grades as a qualiﬁcation measure across schools is
limited. Moreover, when submitting an application to a particular school, applicants
have imperfect knowledge about the total number of applicants for that school and of
their qualiﬁcations. Applicants form expectations based mainly on past years' evidence.35
Contrary to CABl mechanisms, DABa mechanisms have been given little attention
in the literature. But the general perception is that the Czech system is highly selective
on ability as well as social (and in some regions also ethnic) background of pupils.36 At
the same time, compared to the UK and to the US, social segregation is mitigated by
the extraordinarily low residential mobility and notably lower socio-economic inequalities
in the society. Residential migration motivated by school quality is rare. The authors'
own experience and frequent commentaries in the media supply convincing anecdotal
evidence that the Czech mechanism is not strategy proof. Opinions like the following
appear frequently in the media when the annual application deadline approaches: "The
rule of one application in the ﬁrst round is stressful especially for parents. The major
problem is that parents are not sure which schools will still have open slots in the second
round in the case their child would fail in the ﬁrst round, . . . "37
Not being strategy proof, the Czech mechanism is neither Pareto eﬃcient, nor does it
with better admission test scores has priority in admission. Most schools use written exams and some
also add an oral examination or interviews.
35See Hastings and Weinstein (2008) on the role of available information in school choice.
36The Czech schooling system sorts ﬁfteen-year old pupils to schools of three very diﬀerent types.
There are apprentice schools, vocational schools and gymnasia schools enrolling 40%, 40%, and 20%
of the 15-year old age cohort, respectively. Apprentice schools oﬀer a profession-speciﬁc curriculum
with a large share being manual training. Vocational schools oﬀer a curriculum for speciﬁc professions
(technical, business administration, social services) but the component of manual training is minor.
Vocational schools diﬀer a lot by ﬁelds, quality, and the degree of oversubscription. Gymnasia schools
oﬀer a general curriculum (standard components of the curriculum at gymnasium are mathematics,
foreign languages, IT, ﬁelds of natural sciences, and arts) which is rather homogeneous across schools.
Most gymnasia schools have been oversubscribed for decades and are perceived as a preparatory stage for
future studies at a college. Most schools are public, tuition-less, jointly ﬁnanced by central and regional
governments (non-public schools, private and church, enroll less than 10 percent of pupils). Information
about individual schools is available at relatively low cost through a centrally managed internet-based
information system. Information is provided on school facilities, admission requirements, characteristics
of students enrolled, college admission rate, over-subscriptions in previous years, etc.
37MF Dnes daily newspaper, November 28, 2005 from the article "Stra²ák jedné p°ihlá²ky na S z·stal
i letos" [The nightmare of one application for upper-secondary school remains].
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eliminate justiﬁed envy. Despite this, schooling ministry oﬃcials do not recognize the high
incidence of preference misrepresentation and argue in favor of the existing system: "Most
children who had self-esteem and applied to schools they wanted to made a good choice.
Nine out of ten children got admitted to the school they have applied to. According to the
analysis of the ministry, admission chances of children are not lowered by the mechanism
and the ministry is not preparing any reform."38
We show that the Czech mechanism creates strong incentives for strategic misrep-
resentation of preferences which precludes Pareto eﬃciency and elimination of justiﬁed
envy. We explore the scope of strategic behavior for a wide range of uncertainty in the
admission process and heterogeneity among applicants. We also explore equity and ef-
ﬁciency implications of the admission scheme and compare matching outcomes to those
hypothetically achieved by a deferred-acceptance mechanism, which is strategy-proof and
eliminates justiﬁed envy.
1.3 Computational model
While the existing literature oﬀers a good account of the properties of stylized matching
mechanisms, these properties do not necessarily capture peculiar features of real mecha-
nisms. The extraordinary complexity of spontaneous matching processes and involvement
of a high number of independently acting agents makes it impossible to ﬁnd analytical
solutions when investigatingthe mechanism's properties and matching outcomes. There
are two alternative methodological approaches: laboratory experiments and numerical
simulations. Experiments are run in laboratory settings with real agents mimicking real
situations.39 While the advantage of experiments is that they provide evidence based on
the decisions of real agents, it is diﬃcult to simulate comprehensively real conditions in
artiﬁcial laboratory settings. Moreover, the number of agents involved in experiments is
very small and the marginal costs of experimental rounds are high.
The alternative approach we rely on are numerical simulations. To our knowledge,
this is a novel approach to school-choice problems, not applied in the literature so far.
Specifying the optimizing behavior of agents, the advantage of computer simulations is
that they enable us to model complicated matching process and determine matching
38MF Dnes daily newspaper, September 22, 2005 from the article "Zm¥ny v p°ijíma£kách nebudou"
[Admission scheme will not change].
39For an example of experimental approach see Chen and Sonmez (2006) or Pais and Pintér (2008).
16
outcomes that would not be possible to obtain using analytical methods. Another ad-
vantage of simulations, especially compared to experiments, is that the number of agents
and number of runs for various setups is constrained only by computational time. The
usual shortcoming of simulations is that the optimizing behavior of agents as deﬁned by
a researcher does not necessarily comply with the behavior of real agents.
Nevertheless, the simulation approach allows us to analyze various setups of admission
mechanisms and vary the parameters to reﬂect uncertainty and heterogeneity among
applicants. This provides insight on the impact on (i) equity in terms of allocation
of heterogeneous talents to heterogeneous schools, (ii) eﬃciency in terms of aggregate
production of skills, and (iii) biases in generated demand/supply gap indices.
As outlined in section 1.2, the Czech mechanism is a prototype of DABa mechanisms.
We build our computational model to resemble a real situation. Some simpliﬁcations are
made to secure clarity of exposition but they do not aﬀect key patterns in the results ob-
tained. The model allows us to simulate strategic application decisions of a large number
of heterogeneous pupils who have imperfect information about their own qualiﬁcations
and incomplete information about the application behavior of other applicants.
1.3.1 Heterogeneous applicants and schools
We consider set of n applicants I = {i1, i2, ..., in} described by a vector of true qual-
iﬁcations, A = {A1, A2, ..., An} distributed iid ∼ N(100, σ). Qualiﬁcation represents
an applicant's general aptitude for study, i.e. her capacity to acquire further skills in
a school. Ex-ante, before her application is submitted and qualiﬁcation is tested, the
applicant knows her qualiﬁcation imperfectly, perceived qualiﬁcation, A˜i deﬁned as
A˜i = Ai + ²i (1.1)
where ²i is perception error iid ∼ N(0, σ²). The actual value of the error and true qual-
iﬁcation is revealed ex-post through an admission exam.40 Ex-ante, E(²i|A) = 0. The
perception error accounts for imperfect information41 and contributes to the uncertainty
in the admission process. This uncertainty is greater in systems without nation-wide stan-
40We make a simplifying assumption that even though the test is school speciﬁc, it reveals the true
qualiﬁcation of the student. A centralized test would be better in this respect, but at least the school-
speciﬁc test compares the pupils from diﬀerent elementary schools and is objective in this sense.
41The perception error also captures uncertainties in passing admission exams.
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dardized skills testing such as the Czech one.42 We assume that distribution parameters
of Ai, its mean and variance σ, are known to applicants ex-ante, such that σ² ≤ σ.
There is set of schools S = {s1, s2, ..., sm} characterized by quality, Q = {Q1, Q2, ..., Qm},
and capacity, C = {C1,C2, ..., Cm}, vectors with non-negative elements Qs > 0, Cs > 0
∀s. We assume that school capacities are equal or greater than the number of applicants
m∑
j=1
C
j
≥ n (1.2)
School quality represents the production capacity of educational technology employed
by the school to upgrade a student's true qualiﬁcation into productive skills, Π, i.e.
labor market rental price of skill productivity. In the following we call Π individual
productivity. Deﬁned in this way, Π also captures pupil-school match speciﬁc features
like heterogeneous skills, school curricula, school commuting preferences of applicants,
heterogeneous skills demanded by local labor markets etc. What we abstract from in the
explicit modelling, however, are the eﬀects of peer quality.43 Although incorporating peer
eﬀects into the model might be of interest, this would create a much more complicated
strategic game with multiple equilibria, for the analysis of which our simulations approach
would not be applicable.44
Following the standard approach in the literature, we assume that applicants making
their application decisions maximize the expected value of Π.45 Applicants form their
true school preferences according to individual productivities obtained from individual
schools deﬁned in additive form46 as
Πij ≡ QjAi + ωij = Qj(A˜i − ²i) + ωij (1.3)
42This is the case of the Czech Republic not having nation-wide standardized examinations.
43For discussion of peer eﬀects on students' performance is see, for example, Markman et al. (2003).
44In a stable environment, accounting for peer eﬀects would most likely not change the results sub-
stantially. Accounting for peer eﬀects might be especially useful when there are some external shocks to
the system. In this case, a critical mass of students might change their school preferences, which could
lead to a diﬀerent equilibrium.
45A more general speciﬁcation would consider applicants as productivity maximizers and present value
of the stream of future earnings would enter as an argument. Our approach is advantageous in the sense
that productivities have monetary expression and can be summed into aggregate productivity measures.
46An additive speciﬁcation is commonly used in the literature. For example, Chen and Sonmez (2006)
use additive utility function composed from three components accounting for school quality, proximity,
and school random factor. Our speciﬁcation does not consider school quality as a separable factor but a
factor entering through interaction with study aptitude.
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Figure 1.2: Timing of the application process
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where ωij represents school preference heterogeneity component.47 Speciﬁcation 1.3 de-
termines the truly preferred ranking of all schools by each pupil. Note that in the ab-
sence of school preference heterogeneity, applicants would rank schools merely according
to school qualities and rankings of all pupils would be the same, depending only on
school quality Q. The presence of school preference heterogeneity allows for equally
qualiﬁed pupils having diﬀerent true school preference lists.48 We assume that ωij is
iid ∼ uniform[−intu, intu]49 with actual values known by applicants ex-ante. Note that
school preference heterogeneity is more important determinant of true school preferences
among applicants with lower perceived qualiﬁcation.
The ex-ante expected productivity to be obtained at school j by student i is
E(Πij|A˜i) = QjA˜i + ωij (1.4)
Pupils make application decission based on a complete set of m values {E(Πij), j =
1, ..,m} and corresponding admission probabilities. The timing of the application process
is depicted in ﬁgure 1.2.
47School quality also accounts for rigor of the school curriculum, determining education value added in
interaction with student's qualiﬁcation. Deﬁned in this way, equally qualiﬁed students enrolled by two
schools of diﬀerent quality will obtain diﬀerent value added. On the other hand, low-qualiﬁed pupil in
lower quality school can achieve value added higher than identically qualiﬁed pupil in high quality school.
This speciﬁcation allows for optimizing matching between pupils' qualiﬁcations and schools' qualities.
48Note that in a Π − A space, ω and Q represent intercept and slope of the Π − A locus. Let us
consider an individual choosing from two schools 1 and 2 with heterogeneous school preferences ω2 < ω1,
and schools such that Q1 < Q2 (school 2 has higher quality). Under these conditions, pupil's preferred
school depends on her perceived qualiﬁcation A˜. For low values of A˜, she will prefer school 1 over 2, but
for suﬃciently high A˜ she will prefer school 2 over 1. In other words, the gain of low qualiﬁed pupil from
attending high quality school 2 is not suﬃcient to compensate her for relatively low school preference
heterogeneity ω2.
49Note that iid assumption implies ω⊥A.
19
1.3.2 School choice
In the Czech system, an applicant submits an application to just one school in the ﬁrst
round.50 Applicants not matched in the ﬁrst round are matched in the second round
to schools with remaining open slots. These slots are due to short demand in the ﬁrst
round. Let Ψ = {ψ1, ψ2, ... . . . , ψn} describe a strategy proﬁle where ψi = j means that
student i applies to school j. The actual admission outcome is determined by the true
qualiﬁcations of applicants which are revealed by an admission exam.51 Given school's j
capacity Cj and access demand Nj > Cj, the ex-ante admission probability of applicant
i at school j is given by the probability that her true qualiﬁcation Ai exceeds the true
qualiﬁcation of a marginally admitted applicant  the pupil with the lowest qualiﬁcation
(i.e. Pr(Ai > ACj) where ACj is the qualiﬁcation of a marginally admitted applicant to
school j). Note that in case of under-subscription, Nj < Cj, all applicants to school j are
admitted with certainty. Applicants determine probabilities of admission to individual
schools conditional on particular strategy proﬁle Ψ. Conditional admission probabilities
can be expressed as
pij(Ψ) = Pr[Ai > ACj(Ψ)] = 1− Φ[
ACj(Ψ)− A˜i
σ²
] (1.5)
where Φ(.) is standard normal c.d.f. Note that admission probability depends not only
on a student's perceived qualiﬁcation A˜i, but also on the application decisions of other
pupils accounted for by Ψ. Assuming risk neutrality, ex-ante productivity expected from
school j by applicant i, given proﬁle Ψ, is
piij = pij(Ψ)E(Πij) + [1− pij(Ψ)]E(Πim) (1.6)
The additive term on the right represents fall-back productivity obtained in case of re-
jection. If rejected, the applicant obtains productivity E(Πim) in the least demanded
school.
Summing up, applicants apply to schools oﬀering them the highest ex-ante expected
productivity so that ψi = argmaxj(piij). This in turn, according to (1.6), depends on
(i) applicants' ex-ante productivities E(Πij) and arguments of Πij, (ii) the probability of
50The legal limit of just one application only corresponds to the case of inﬁnite costs of a 2nd applica-
tion. Chade, Lewis, and Smith (2006) study a school admission model incorporating positive but ﬁnite
marginal application costs.
51We assume that schools seek to ﬁll their capacity with the very best students.
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passing the admission line pij(Ψ), and (iii) ex-ante fall-back productivity obtained in the
least demanded school, E(Πim).
In line with reality, we assume that priority rules give higher priority to applicants
with higher qualiﬁcations. This implies homogeneous priorities across schools. To ﬁnd
the resulting matching of this school choice game, we are looking for a Nash equilibrium
strategy proﬁle (NESP). The NESP is a strategy proﬁle, ΨN , such that ex-ante all ap-
plicants prefer their current choices given the choices of all others so that ψi ∈ ΨN . Even
if an analytical solution to NESP exists, ﬁnding it would be extraordinarily cumbersome
due to the high number of heterogeneous applicants. Instead, we ﬁnd the NESP by an
iterative computational approach. This enables us to explore the sensitivity of matching
outcomes to various parameterizations of the model.
Let us conclude this section with a note on two simplifying assumptions we have made
to facilitate the modelling and to focus on the key issues. The ﬁrst concerns the automatic
fall-back option for students rejected in the ﬁrst round, which we have assumed to be
the school of type 4. We believe this is a plausible simpliﬁcation of reality, since the
good schools typically ﬁll most of their seats in the ﬁrst round. As shown in table ??, in
the school year 2004 / 2005, the percentage of students admitted in the ﬁrst round was
90% for Gymnasia, 74% for Vocational schools and 39% for Apprentice schools. Since
the Vocational schools category includes both good-quality and low-quality schools, the
average may be misleading. It is therefore interesting to note that for 56% of these
schools, the percentage of students admitted in the ﬁrst round was 90% or above.
The other simplifying assumption is that of risk-neutral students. Introducing a com-
mon level of risk aversion for all the students would not change the overall picture. It
would only increase the the mismatch between the true and the revealed demand and
would, thus, make our case even stronger. Our analysis, therefore, under-estimates the
impact of the Czech mechanism on students' behavior. An interesting question is how
diﬀerent levels of risk aversion among students would aﬀect their behavior and the out-
comes of the admission procedure. Although we do not include risk aversion in our model,
we can get an insight regarding the eﬀect of risk aversion by looking at the perceived vs.
true qualiﬁcation. Low risk aversion would make a student bid more aggressively for his
most preferred school; high perceived relative to true qualiﬁcation has the same eﬀect
(see ﬁgure 1.12 in section 1.4).
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Figure 1.3: Students' true and perceived qualiﬁcations
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1.3.3 Model description
Model parameters
In this section, we describe our computational model simulating the school-choice be-
havior of applicants. We generate a population of applicants who are characterized by
their true and perceived qualiﬁcations, and school preference heterogeneity distributed
orthogonally so that Ai ⊥ ²i ⊥ ωij. Figure 1.3 on page 22 provides an example of such a
population. We consider the supply side represented by four schools j = 1, . . . ..., 4, each
characterized by quality-capacity pair (Qj, Cj). The relative school capacities approxi-
mately correspond to the actual overall capacities in the Czech Republic, with gymnasia
(typically the best schools) accounting for approx. 15% of the capacity, vocational schools
for 50% of the capacity and the apprentice schools for the rest. The school qualities are
chosen without a corresponding empirical benchmark in such a way that the worst school
does not add anything to the starting qualiﬁcation of a student, while the best school
doubles it. The other schools are in between these two values.52 See table 1.1 for details.
To summarize, we generate:
• Population of n = 1000 applicants,
52The deliberate choice of school qualities can be considered a weakness, but the results would not
change fundamentally if we assume diﬀerent ratios; only the degree of misrepresentation (and other
phenomena studied) would be diﬀerent.
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Table 1.1: Model structure of the secondary education market
School Type Capacity Quality
Gymnasium 150 2
Vocational A 250 1.6
Vocational B 250 1.3
Apprentice 350 1
• Each of the applicants has true qualiﬁcation Ai, perception error ²i, and school
preference heterogeneity components ωij. In the basic setup of the model we as-
sume ability Ai is normally distributed with mean 100 and standard deviation 20;
perception error ²i is normally distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation 20;
and preference heterogeneity component ωij is normally distributed with mean 0
and standard deviation 50.
• Population of j = 1, . . . ..., 4 schools,
• with capacities Cj > 0 so that
∑m
j=1Cj = n and qualities Qj such that Q1 > Q2 >
Q3 > Q4 > 0.
Equilibrium ﬁnding algorithm
Our algorithm ﬁnding the NESP, as deﬁned in section 1.3.2, proceeds as follows:
• We choose initial strategy proﬁle (SP) such that all applicants apply to the lowest
quality school (j = 4).53
• For a given SP, we ﬁnd the best response of the ﬁrst applicant  school choice that
yields her the highest expected ex-ante productivity in (1.6) given the choices of
others  and we modify the corresponding element of the SP.
• We repeat the previous steps for all applicants.
• We repeat the previous two steps until no applicant modiﬁes her school choice. The
resulting SP fulﬁlls the properties of the NESP.
53The choice of a particular initial strategy proﬁle or of the order that the students make choices has
no eﬀect on the NESP found.
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1.4 Results
In this section, we investigate the properties of the Czech pupil-school matching mecha-
nism described in section 1.3.2 using the computational model described in section 1.3.3.
We review key quantitative patterns of resulting matchings and compare them to those
generated by the GS mechanism. We select the GS mechanism as the benchmark be-
cause of its desirable properties and because of its relative simplicity and applicability
in practice. It should be noted that if priorities are homogeneous across schools  as is
the case of the Czech system  matchings generated by the strategy-proof TTC and GS
mechanisms are the same.
First, we explore the incidence of strategic preference misrepresentation, comparing
matchings obtained by the Czech mechanism and the GS mechanism. Second, we explore
distributional outcomes and eﬃciency and equity trade-oﬀs. Examination of the eﬀect of
variance in the school preference heterogeneity component are relegated to the Appendix.
Implications of our ﬁndings, including policy ones, and possible shortcomings of our
approach are debated in section 1.5.
1.4.1 Sorting of applicants to schools
The analysis is performed for plausible values of σ = 20, σ² = 20, and σω = 50.54
Compared are matchings produced by the Czech mechanism and the GS mechanism.55
Resulting distributions of students by their true qualiﬁcations within our four schools are
depicted in the four panels of Figure 1.4. For each decile of true qualiﬁcations, bar pairs
compare the number of students enrolled under two mechanisms. The Czech mechanism
obviously leads to higher within-school heterogeneity of true qualiﬁcations. As can be
seen in the top-left panel, in the Czech mechanism the best school (j = 1) admits a group
of less qualiﬁed students who, under the GS mechanism, would be sorted to school j = 2.
Correspondingly, the Czech mechanism sorts some relatively highly qualiﬁed pupils - those
who would be sorted to school j = 1 by the GS mechanism - to lower quality school j = 2.
This pattern of upward promotion of less qualiﬁed applicants and downgrading of more
54The particular choice of standard deviation values is not critical for the conclusions, which remain
valid for any plausible values as we show later in the sensitivity analysis.
55When calculating the matching under the GS mechanism, we assume students make their choices
based on true qualiﬁcations, e.g. after taking a common test. This is quite realistic, given that the GS
mechanism needs to be centrally administered, so a common test would be a natural part of the process.
However, assuming choices based on perceived qualiﬁcations would only change the results little, by
changing preference rankings of some students.
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Figure 1.4: Qualiﬁcation of students by schools
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qualiﬁed applicants appears also on the margin of schools j = 2 and j = 3. Admission
outcomes of both mechanisms diﬀer only slightly in school j = 4 (lowest quality school).
Clearly, promotion and downgrading eﬀects in the Czech mechanism contribute to higher
within-school variance of true qualiﬁcations.
1.4.2 Misrepresentation of preferences
Strategic behavior of applicants leads to misrepresentation of school preferences. Appli-
cants intentionally misrepresent their preferences if they apply to schools that are not at
the top of their true preference list according to their perceived qualiﬁcation and school
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preference heterogeneity component. Preference misrepresentation has important equity
and eﬃciency implications, which we outlined in section 1.2 and discuss further in section
1.5.
The degree of preference misrepresentation in the NESP) of our model is documented
in ﬁgures 1.5 and 1.6. Figure 1.5 shows the incidence of strategic choices comparing true
and revealed preferences.56 On the horizontal axis, we sort applicants into decile groups
in ascending order according to their perceived qualiﬁcations. For each decile pairs of
bars are presented: the left bar shows the average quality of schools applicants prefer the
most, while the right bar shows the average quality of schools applicants in given decile
actually apply to. Diﬀerent heights of neighboring bars indicate the degree of preference
misrepresentation among applicants.57 Misrepresentation is negligible in the top decile
and is higher among less qualiﬁed pupils. This is because applicants with lower perceived
qualiﬁcation face a higher probability of rejection at their most preferred school and are
more cautious about applying to oversubscribed schools. Note that a rejection implies
that the applicant ends-up in a fall-back school (j = 4).58 The perceived risk of this
outcome leads some applicants to misrepresent preferences and bid for other than their
ﬁrst best option. This secures them a high probability of admission to their second best
school.
Figure 1.6 shows supply-demand gaps comparing revealed and true demand to ca-
pacities of individual schools. At the highest quality school (j = 1), both the revealed
and true demand exceed the school capacity, but the true demand by signiﬁcantly more
so (the revealed by 60%, the true by more than 300%). In other words, while 63% of
all applicants prefer the highest quality school (j = 1), only 24% actually apply to this
school. At both schools of medium quality (j = 2, 3) revealed demands exceed school
capacities which exceed true demands. The lowest quality school, (j = 4), faces both
true and revealed demand notably below its capacity.59
56In our terminology, revealed preferences are those revealed in the application process by actual
applications submitted. True preferences are those perceived by applicants based on simple comparison
of Π′js. neglecting admission probabilities.
57Recall that although there is a tendency to prefer the higher-quality schools, the individual preference
orderings may diﬀer due to ωij .
58This is because, in our model, all the other schools face excess demand in the ﬁrst round. In reality,
there will be more schools available after the ﬁrst round, but not the high quality schools. Therefore, we
believe this assumption is a plausible simpliﬁcation of reality.
59The positive number of applications to the lowest quality school is due to positive school preference
component ω in the case of some applicants - where it is high enough to compensate for low school
quality Q. Also note that the revealed and true demands for this school are equal. This is because the
school ranks at the top of the applicants' true preference list and admission to this school is certain.
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Figure 1.5: Students' preferences over
schools
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Figure 1.6: School demand
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Discrepancies between true and revealed demand conﬁrm a large degree of preference
misrepresentation among applicants in the Czech mechanism. The incidence of strategic
behavior of applicants leads to an illusory balance between supply and demand at the
level of individual schools.60
An interesting question in this context is what happens if the school capacities change,
in particular when the capacity of the most demanded school increases, while the mech-
anism to assign students to schools remains the same. We have examined a scenario in
which the capacity of school 1 (the top quality school) gradually increases from 150 to
499, while the capacity of school 4 (the lowest quality school) decreases correspondingly.61
The results are shown in ﬁgure 1.7. True demand (white bars) is stable, ﬂuctuating only
slightly due to random eﬀects. Revealed demand (grey bars) increases along with capac-
ity (black bars). This is intuitive: the higher capacity of school 1 encourages students,
who prefer it most but who did not apply before due to the low probability of admis-
sion, to apply under the new circumstances. The revealed demand, however, increases
at a lower rate than capacity, resulting in a decreasing relative (and also absolute) gap
between those two. This is also intuitive, since the utility of the additional applicants is
60Misrepresentation of preferences has two components. The ﬁrst is due to the strategic behavior of
applicants, the second is due to the imperfect information of applicants about their own qualiﬁcations.
To distinguish their relative role, we generated matching by the Czech mechanism but not allowing for
strategic misrepresentation of preferences by applicants. As a result, applications for other than most
preferred schools are due to imperfect information about their own qualiﬁcation by individual applicants.
In plausible range of σ², the extent of non-strategic misrepresentation is small and results are available
upon request.
61The total capacity of these two schools is 500, which we always maintain (we don't change the
capacity of schools 2 and 3). For technical reasons, we were not able to reduce the capacity of school 4
to 0, but had to stop at 1, which is also why the maximum capacity of school 1 is 499.
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Figure 1.7: Impact of increase in school 1 capacity
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lower than the utility of those who already applied under lower capacity. For them to
apply, the probability of admission has to increase, which means the relative gap between
revealed demand and capacity has to decrease.
1.4.3 Perception error
As introduced in section 1.3.1, perception error ²i reﬂects the imperfect information of the
applicant about her own qualiﬁcation. We replicated simulations for diﬀerent variance
of perception error measured by perception error ratio, r = σ²/σ. The case of r = 0
corresponds to perfect certainty about qualiﬁcation so that ²i = 0 (implying A˜i = Ai),
corresponding to the availability of nation-wide standardized testing of qualiﬁcations. In
this case, misrepresentation of preferences is caused purely by strategizing behavior on the
side of applicants and imperfect information about one's own qualiﬁcations plays no role.
Growing r implies more uncertainty among applicants about their own qualiﬁcations.
The case of r = 1 corresponds to very high variance in perception error compared with
the variance of qualiﬁcations in the whole population, (σ² = σ). We present results for r
in the range of plausible values [0, 1].
Figure 1.8 shows the impact of perception error ratio on the aggregate incidence of
preference misrepresentation. In the left panel, the upper proﬁle depicts the proportion of
all applicants who are admitted in the 1st round. In the case of perfect certainty (r = 0),
all applicants predict admission outcome perfectly, fully eliminate the risk of rejection and
apply in such a way that all of them are admitted in the 1st round. Growing uncertainty
decreases the proportion of applicants being admitted to about 70% for higher values
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of r. The bottom proﬁle shows the share of applicants who apply to their truly most
preferred school. This proportion is increasing with r since growing perception error
causes some applicants to bid for their most preferred school where they get rejected
afterwards. This incentive to overbid is the strongest for low-qualiﬁcation students whose
opportunity costs of rejection are lower. Secured admission at the lowest-quality school
and non-zero probability of admission at a higher quality school creates incentives for
some low-qualiﬁcation applicants to consider a risky strategy.
The right panel of ﬁgure 1.8 compares application and admission outcomes under the
Czech and the GS mechanisms. While under the Czech mechanism, students are forced to
strategize, i.e. "lie" about their true preferences, they have no incentive to do so under the
GS mechanism  the best strategy here is to truly state the preferences. We also assume
that under the GS mechanism, students know their true qualiﬁcations (or, equivalently,
that there is some sort of nation-wide testing), whereas under the Czech mechanism,
students only know their perceived qualiﬁcations, which are subject to perception error.
The upper proﬁle in the right panel of ﬁgure 1.8 depicts the proportion of applicants
admitted to the same school in both mechanisms. This proportion is declining from
100% for r = 0 to about 75% for r = 1. Therefore, when students perfectly know their
qualiﬁcations, the Czech mechanism produces the same result as the GS mechanism. This
can be understood in the following way: The GS mechanism guarantees each student
admission to the best school available for him (eliminates justiﬁed envy). When, under
the Czech mechanism, students perfectly know their qualiﬁcations and the distribution
of both qualiﬁcation and school heterogeneity component in the population, they are
able to determine the best available school themselves and apply to this school directly.62
Of course, the assumption of perfect knowledge of the true qualiﬁcation and of the two
population distributions will not be met in reality.
The bottom proﬁle of ﬁgure 1.8 shows the proportion of applicants who, under the
Czech mechanism, apply to the same school they would be assigned to by the GS mech-
anism. In other words, it shows the percentage of students who correctly understand
which is their best available school. This ratio also starts at 100% in the case of perfect
certainty but declines steeply and for r = 1 only every second applicant applies to the
school he would be assigned by the GS mechanism. Note that in the Czech mechanism
under perfect certainty, the proportion of pupils applying to the school they prefer most
62This is in line with Ergin and Sönmez (2005) who show in their Theorem 1, that the set of Nash
equilibria in this game corresponds to the set of stable matchings under the given preferences.
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Figure 1.8: Variance of qualiﬁcation perception error and revealed/true school demand
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is very small (the left panel of ﬁgure 1.8). This is because applicants with qualiﬁcations
below the threshold given by the capacity of their most preferred school know ex-ante
that they would not be admitted. The discrepancy between revealed and true prefer-
ences is the highest in the case of perfect certainty. Perfect certainty (r = 0) means
higher misrepresentation of preferences, but also better elimination of justiﬁed envy.
The impact of perception error on preference misrepresentation for applicants with
diﬀerent qualiﬁcations is shown in ﬁgure 1.9. We plot the demand for school quality,
depicted as revealed over true school quality ratio, dRT ,63 against r for each quintile of
true qualiﬁcations.
Except in one singular case, the ratio dRT is diﬀerent from one in the whole range of r
for all qualiﬁcation quintiles. This conﬁrms that the Czech mechanism always suﬀers with
misrepresentation of preferences. Values of dRT being smaller than one indicate that in the
Czech mechanism applicants on average apply to a school of lower quality than they truly
prefer. The case of r = 0 represents the case of full certainty about one's own qualiﬁcation.
Here, discrepancies between true and revealed demand for quality are caused purely by the
63In particular, dRT is deﬁned as a ratio of the average quality of schools applicants apply for and the
average quality of schools truly preferred.
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Figure 1.9: The eﬀect of qualiﬁcation noise  revealed over true preferences
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strategic behavior of applicants. In this case, the overall misrepresentation of preferences
is the highest but varies across qualiﬁcation groups. Applicants in lower qualiﬁcation
quintiles apply to schools which are on average of lower quality than applicants truly
prefer. The highest discrepancy between true and revealed quality demand appears in
the lowest qualiﬁcation quintile. This is because applicants in this quintile perceive
lowest probability of admission to their most preferred school given their low qualiﬁcation
determining admission priorities. In the top qualiﬁcation quintile, all applicants apply to
the highest quality school which is also at the top of their preference list.
Uncertainty (r > 0) increases the incidence of non-strategic misrepresentations among
applicants but the direction of misrepresentation is not uniform across qualiﬁcation
groups. In the top qualiﬁcation quintile, growing information imperfections decreases
the revealed demand for quality. This is because some highly qualiﬁed applicants under-
estimate their true qualiﬁcation and consider an application to their most preferred school
too risky. At lower quintiles, imperfect information has the opposite eﬀect, increasing
the demand for quality. This is because some applicants overestimate their qualiﬁcation
and admission chances at the school they prefer more. For r > 0.5, the incidence of
non-strategic misrepresentation remains almost unchanged.
Figure 1.10 depicts the impact of perception error on revealed demand at the level
of individual schools. On the vertical axis, we plot the revealed demand over school
capacity ratio. In the case of perfect certainty, revealed demand for the each individual
31
school is equal to its capacity and all applicants are admitted in the 1st round. Growing
uncertainty leads to swiftly dropping demand for lowest quality school (j = 4) below its
capacity. This drop is due to the increasing number of low-qualiﬁcation applicants with
higher positive perception error. Some of these pupils apply to school j = 3 as they
perceive non-zero probability of admission there and Πi3 > Πim.64 Their opportunity
costs of bidding higher are low because they can always secure Πim, productivity gain
in lowest quality school (j = 4).65 Dropping demand for school j = 4 necessarily causes
growing excess revealed demand at other schools. The excess demand is growing with
the perception error but at a diminishing rate. Note that true demand for the highest
quality school (j = 1) is four times higher than its capacity, while revealed demand is
higher only by 1.8 times. This reveals a strong discrepancy between observed and true
demand from the best school.
Figure 1.11 depicts the impact of perception error on revealed/true demand ratio at
the level of individual schools. In the case of perfect certainty, the revealed demand
exceeds the true demand almost 10 times at the lowest quality school; the ratio then falls
dramatically with growing uncertainty. The picture is more stable for the higher-quality
schools, with the ratio ﬂuctuating between 3 and 4 for most values of r in the case of
the third-best school, rising from 1 to 1.6 with growing r for the second-best school, and
staying far below 1 for all r values for the best school.
Figure 1.12 shows the impact of diﬀering perception error (which, as discussed above,
can also be interpreted as risk aversion) on the matching outcomes for individual students.
Students have been divided into quintiles by their true qualiﬁcation and within each
quintile a relationship between (i) noise to ability (risk aversion) and (ii) the utility
obtained from the school where the student was admitted has been examined. We ﬁnd
that diﬀering levels of perception error (risk aversion) among students have no systematic
eﬀect on the utility from matching outcomes. In some cases, the aggressive strategy pays
oﬀ and the students with higher perceived ability / lower risk aversion is admitted to the
school of his choice, whereas in other cases, he is rejected and ends up in the lowest-quality
school.
64Note that piim is the expected productivity obtained from the least quality school.
65We assume that when faced with two strategies yielding the same expected productivity a student
will choose the strategy with higher probability of being admitted. Thus, when a student has zero
probability of being admitted to a school diﬀerent from the fourth school he will apply to the fourth
school directly even though he would end up there anyway.
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Figure 1.10: The eﬀect of perception error on excess demand
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Figure 1.11: The eﬀect of perception error on revealed/true demand ratio
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Figure 1.12: Eﬀect of perception error on matching outcomes for individual students
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1.4.4 Eﬃciency
In this section we investigate and compare the aggregate eﬃciency of matching outcomes
under the Czech and the GS mechanism. As pointed out in section 1.2, the GS mechanism
is strategy-proof,66 it eliminates justiﬁed envy but is not Pareto-eﬃcient. The Czech
mechanism is not strategy-proof and therefore is not Pareto-eﬃcient either. The notion
of Pareto-eﬃciency deﬁned in section 1.2 is not a useful concept for our purposes.67 We
need to assume a cardinal utility  or, in our particular case, productivity  allowing to
sum up across all the students and compare the aggregate measure.68 The measure we
use is
Π =
n∑
i=1
Πi. (1.7)
66See Roth (1982).
67It does not enable us to compare two mechanisms, which both either are or are not Pareto eﬃcient.
68The productivity Π can also be understood as a student's future earnings potential, a measure of
welfare, and the eﬃciency comparisons can then also be interpreted as welfare comparisons. On the other
hand, the link to future earnings might in practice be more complicated and non-linear. If, for example,
the labor market has the nature of a tournament, then ﬁrst place yields a much higher prize than the
second one, although the diﬀerence in productivity may be small. Making this assumption would also
change the strategic behavior of the students, making them more willing to take risky bets. A proper
analysis of welfare impacts of the mechanisms should also take into account the disutility due to the
justiﬁed envy of students who ended up in a bad school, although, under a diﬀerent strategy, they could
have been admitted to a better school.
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Figure 1.13: Impact of perception error on eﬃciency
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representing the arithmetic sum of individual ex-post realized productivities 1.6. Note
that formula 1.7 contains actual realizations of productivities, Πi and not ex-ante expecta-
tions pii. Also note that 1.7 contains individual speciﬁc school heterogeneity components,
which means that the productivities are not determined only as a product of a student's
ability and the school quality, but also reﬂect the heterogeneous preferences of students
for diﬀerent types of schools.
Figure 1.13 shows the impact of perception error variance on the aggregate eﬃciency.
On the vertical axis, we plot the percentage diﬀerence of (1.7) in the Czech and the
GS mechanism. In the case of perfect certainty, both mechanisms exhibit the same
aggregate productivity, which is in line with the above observation that in this case all
the students apply to and are admitted to the schools they would be assigned to under the
GS mechanism. Increasing perception error makes the Czech mechanism slightly more
eﬃcient than the GS one. Although the percentage diﬀerence in aggregate eﬃciency
between the two mechanisms is minor, it points to an important feature.
The diﬀerence in eﬃciencies is driven by two eﬀects having opposite impacts on the
eﬃciency of the Czech mechanism. The ﬁrst eﬀect (matching eﬀect) makes the GS
mechanism more eﬃcient because it leads to a higher degree of positive matching between
true qualiﬁcations of pupils and school qualities. Better positive matching is due to the
absence of strategic behavior in the GS mechanism. The second eﬀect is due to the
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Figure 1.14: Productivities of students by schools
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heterogeneous preference component, ωi which determines productivities (and therefore
school preferences of individual applicants) but does not determine admission since this
depends on qualiﬁcation only. To explain, consider two applicants a and b, both preferring
school s the most,69 having identical perception error, somewhat diﬀerent qualiﬁcations
(pupil a is only slightly less qualiﬁed than pupil b), and substantially diﬀerent school
preference components such that
Aa − Ab < 0, ωa,s − ωb,s À 0, and ²a = ²b, (1.8)
This implies that for suﬃciently high diﬀerence in ω, student a would obtain notably
higher productivity at school j than student b because
Πas − Πbs = [QsAa + ωas]− [QsAb + ωbs] =
= Qs[Aa − Ab] + [ωas − ωbs] ≈ [ωas − ωbs]À 0. (1.9)
The relationship follows due to Aa − Ab being very close to zero. However, the GS
mechanism would more likely enroll pupil b in school s than pupil a due to Ab − Aa > 0
irrespective of ω′s. In the Czech mechanism, where pupils apply strategically, pupil a
is more likely to apply to s than pupil b and is more likely to be admitted to school
s. Therefore, higher productivity of pupil a in school s will more likely be realized
in the Czech mechanism. This eﬀect (cardinality eﬀect) makes the Czech mechanism
more eﬃcient. Note that school preference heterogeneity is not revealed by tests, yet
it is known by the applicant ex-ante. The Czech mechanism does not account for the
school preference heterogeneity directly, but it does so indirectly through the applicant's
strategic behavior.
Although the matching and cardinality eﬀects have an opposing impact on aggregate
eﬃciency and compensate each other, the latter one dominates in our plausible parame-
terizations of r, which makes the Czech mechanism perform slightly better according to
the aggregate productivity measure.70
The distribution of the diﬀerence in individual productivities, broken down by indi-
vidual schools, is depicted in ﬁgure 1.14. Students within each school are ordered by their
69I.e. s = argmaxj(Πaj) = argmaxj(Πbj).
70A potential modiﬁcation to be explored in further research is to assume risk-averse agents and
compare their ex-ante utilities obtained in the two mechanisms. Our hypothesis is that, for reasonable
parameterizations, the GS mechanism would perform better.
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productivity. In school j = 1, the productivity distribution induced by the GS mechanism
is higher than that induced by the current mechanism, but the diﬀerences are small. The
situation is the opposite in schools j = 2 and j = 3 and the diﬀerences are substantially
larger. In school j = 4, the GS mechanism again leads to higher productivity but the
diﬀerences are again small. In terms of the above discussed eﬀect, the matching eﬀect
dominates in schools j = 1 and j = 4 while the cardinality eﬀect dominates in schools
j = 2 and j = 3. Overall, the cardinality eﬀect has a higher absolute impact than the
matching eﬀect.
1.5 Discussion of ﬁndings and conclusions
In the previous section, we thoroughly reviewed properties of the current pupil-school
matching mechanism in terms of quantitative results using our computational model
and we contrasted outcomes to those under the GS mechanism. In this section, we
put identiﬁed properties and quantitative ﬁndings into the broader perspective of their
implications, including policy ones.
One of the key features of a matching mechanism is whether it is strategy-proof.
Strategy proofness allows parents to rank schools in order of their true preferences, sim-
pliﬁes the instructions on how to make a school-choice, does not penalize pupils for
poorly informed and/or poorly strategizing parents, provides school management better
information about the positive or negative demand eﬀects of their managerial decisions,
and supplies school system administrators with better information about demand for in-
dividual schools and the impact of policy changes. Also, policy discussions that have
developed regarding the pupil-school matching mechanisms show that one advantage of
strategy-proof mechanisms is that they level the playing ﬁeld between the strategically so-
phisticated and well-informed and those who may be unsophisticated or poorly informed.
As we stated at the beginning, it follows from the properties of the Czech mechanism
that it is not strategy-proof. However, the level of preference misrepresentation is not
known and it is not clear how signiﬁcant an issue this is in practice. One of our important
ﬁndings, therefore, is that the current mechanism indeed induces widespread misrepre-
sentation of school preferences among applicants. Depending on the chosen parameters,
misrepresentation of preferences is the optimal strategy for 40%  60% of rationally be-
having students.71
71Misrepresentation of a similar kind had been identiﬁed by Chen and Sönmez (2004) (experimentally)
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The large incidence of strategic misrepresentation of preferences has a number of
implications for the functioning of the schooling system as a whole. The number of ap-
plications submitted is the only non-anecdotal aggregate information on demand which
can be compared to the supply of schools and school type capacities. For the sake of
our following argument it is important to recall that the misrepresentation of prefer-
ences we have identiﬁed creates bias in the demand for individual schools toward their
capacities. In particular, according to demand revealed through the number of actual
applications, high-quality schools are seemingly less demanded than they actually are.
Similarly, low-quality schools face a demand higher than they would face would pupils
not apply strategically. In the presence of pupils' strategic behavior, observable demand
quantities do not allow us to distinguish between large and small demand-supply discrep-
ancies and a lack of information on actual demand-supply gaps can harm the schooling
system in various ways.
Within Europe, schools are commonly ﬁnanced by formula-based schemes with quotas
imposed on the number of pupils enrolled by individual schools and school types. Hidden
demand-supply discrepancies make identiﬁcation of poor-performing schools or outdated
school types, and their restructuring or closures, diﬃcult. Consequently, desirable ad-
justments of the schooling system could be slowed down or suspended. In this respect,
Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003), Ergin and Sönmez (2005) and Abdulkadiroglu et al.
(2006) note that for a long time, the Boston mechanism had been defended by its propo-
nents arguing that a high percentage of applicants were granted their ﬁrst choice school.
This argument is false and misleading in not recognizing that many ﬁrst choice schools
are not those most preferred.
The Czech mechanism resembles the Boston one in the sense that proponents of the
scheme stress the high proportion of matches realized in the 1st round. Proponents of the
current scheme do not recognize the large scope of preference misrepresentation. In our
opinion, the current scheme could be an important factor slowing down the restructuring
of the outdated 3-track structure of the upper secondary schooling level in the Czech
Republic. The apparent equilibrium underpinned arguments for insider lobby groups
defending the status quo. By not recognizing the hidden discrepancies, the general public
and policy makers in particular did not pursue the necessary initiative to reform the
upper-secondary level of schooling.
Biases in revealed demand can also adversely aﬀect the decision-making of school man-
and Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2006) (empirically) in the case of Boston mechanism.
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agement. The nature of know-how building in schooling is - as in many other complex
productive processes - an experience of an evolutionary nature. In particular, educational
know-how is formed through a kind of adaptive learning based on a long sequence of par-
tial trials and errors. In this process, revealed demand for a school is important feedback,
enabling management to evaluate the (in)eﬀectiveness of its previous decisions, including
the internal organization of the school, curriculum content, teachers' incentive schemes,
etc. In the presence of school preferences biased toward school capacities, a management
introducing proper or improper components of educational technology cannot receive pos-
itive or negative feedback through revealed demand. The limited sensitivity of revealed
demand to changes in true demand limits the accountability of schools. Overall, misrep-
resentation of school preferences of the kind we identify in the current mechanism can
limit desirable school competition72 and foster stagnation of a schooling system. This
drawback can have a serious adverse impact on the overall quality of the education, espe-
cially in decentralized schooling systems which rely on a high degree of school autonomy
and which stress school-choice principles.
As shown quantitatively in Section 1.4, matching of pupils to schools has equity and ef-
ﬁciency implications. By eﬃciency, we do not mean here the eﬃciency of schools' internal
operations but the eﬃciency consequence of a particular matching between heterogeneous
qualiﬁcations of pupils and qualities of the school as stipulated by equation (1.3). There,
productivity of a school graduate is a product of the pupil's initial study qualiﬁcation
and of school quality. Our quantitative results indicate only small aggregate eﬃciency
diﬀerentials between the Czech and the GS mechanisms, the former doing slightly better.
Since the diﬀerences are marginal and due to the limitations of the chosen measure (sum
of individual productivities), we do not see this result as making a strong case in favor of
the Czech mechanism. However, exploring diﬀerent measures of eﬃciency and conducting
analysis on empirical data can be a possible area for a future research.
Equity, on the other hand, seems to be a bigger concern. In our model, pupils act
rationally: they make no mistakes other than those implied by the imperfect perception
of their own qualiﬁcations. This may not necessarily be so in reality. Recall that in the
Czech mechanism, applicants deal with the probability of admission to each individual
school, while this knowledge is not needed in the GS mechanism. In the Czech system,
some applicants may count on wrong probabilities and follow a sub-optimal strategy.
In this case, the slight productive superiority of the Czech mechanism can disappear.
72See Hoxby (2000) for an argument about the eﬀect of competition on school productivity.
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Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2006) present empirical evidence from the Boston scheme that a
non-negligible proportion of applicants employs incorrect strategies, and it is likely that
erroneously strategizing applicants exist in the Czech mechanism too.
Sub-optimal strategy choices adversely aﬀect future admission to college and labor
market career. This is likely to happen among well-qualiﬁed pupils with weak parental
background due to lack of parental support in the acquisition of information and school-
choice strategizing. In the GS mechanism, pupils have to reveal ordinal preferences of
schools only. In the Czech mechanism, the task is more complicated. One needs to deal
with cardinal preferences and estimate admission probabilities at all accessible schools.
Sub-optimal strategizing is less costly for students from wealthier families since they
can opt out and choose a private school. This is usually not an option for well qualiﬁed
pupils from poor families who cannot aﬀord to pay tuition. Those well-qualiﬁed pupils
end up in a low-quality school. In this respect, the Czech mechanism is most harmful to
smart pupils from socially and ﬁnancially poor families.
There are two more important features of the Czech mechanism worth mentioning
here. Strong incentives to apply strategically may become cumbersome and can cause
trauma and represent non-negligible psychic costs incurred by applicants and their par-
ents. Anecdotal evidence on this phenomena appears in popular media every year during
high-school admission period.
Another phenomena is justiﬁed envy. This formally deﬁned property of a matching
mechanism has its counterpart in real life. In particular, parents and their children
whose admission outcome does not fulﬁll a pairwise stability property can feel they are
treated unfairly. This may lead them to initiate a legal dispute. Our quantitative results
show that in the current mechanism, for reasonable parameter values, between 10-20% of
pupil-school matches does not fulﬁll the pairwise stability condition (these are matches
diﬀerent from those under the GS mechanism). This means that 10-20% of students
prefer another school to the school they are matched to and their qualiﬁcation is higher
than the qualiﬁcation of at least one student admitted to their preferred school.
A natural alternative to the decentralized Czech mechanism is the GS mechanism
with the school priorities determined centrally, based on transparent criteria. It is then
a political decision what exactly these criteria should be, whether only students' study
aptitude, as determined by a central test, or a wider set of criteria with stronger emphasis
on equity objectives. That the GS mechanism is not just a theoretical concept can be
seen by the fact that it has been used for years to match medical interns to hospitals in
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the US. More recently, it has also been successfully applied in the Boston area to replace
the well-known Boston mechanism, which suﬀered from similar ﬂaws as the Czech one.
Any changes to the current system will, however, be very diﬃcult to achieve. This
is obvious from the ongoing debate about standardizing ﬁnal examinations in secondary
schools. Opponents of nation-wide testing warn that it would create a strong push for a
uniﬁed curriculum and would limit diversity. Some also argue that nation-wide testing
would create grounds for the introduction of output based-funding, arguing that reward-
ing output skills instead of skills-added would adversely aﬀect the ﬁnancing of those
schools that enroll low-skill pupils from a weak social background. These concerns will
need to be properly addressed before any change is implemented.
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1.A Appendix  eﬀect of school preference heterogene-
ity component
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Figure 1.15: The eﬀect of heterogeneity component  revealed over true preferences
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In this section we investigate the role played by school preference heterogeneity, cap-
tured by ωij. As described above, we consider ωij ∼ iid N(0, σω). In the initial set-up,
σω = 50. We now vary σω in the range of 0 - 100 and study the eﬀect of the changes in
this parameter on students' behavior.
Figure 1.15 shows the impact of variance in ωij, measured by ratio rω = σω/σ, on
the misrepresentation of school preferences. On the vertical axis we plot the ratio of
pupils, sorted into quantiles by perceived qualiﬁcations, who do not misrepresent school
preferences. For all values of σω, the preference misrepresentation is lower in the case of
students with higher perceived ability. However, increasing σω diminishes the incidence of
preference misrepresentation in all quantiles of pupils. The most sensitive impact appears
in the middle range of rω.
Misrepresentations of preferences translate into diﬀerentials between true and revealed
demand at the level of individual schools. These diﬀerentials are depicted in ﬁgure 1.16.
In the absence of school preference heterogeneity, rω = 0, students' true school preferences
are exclusively determined by the product of perceived qualiﬁcation and school quality,
and the ordinal school preference of all pupils is identical.73 In this border case, nobody
applies to the lowest-quality school, j = 4, because admission to this school is always
a fall-back option. Revealed demand for high quality schools, j = 1, 2, is almost equal
73Note that in this case, school quality is the only variable of choice aﬀecting the productivity of an
individual pupil. Since all pupils choose from the same pool of schools, all pupils prefer the most the
school of the highest quality.
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Figure 1.16: The eﬀect of heterogeneity component  revealed demand over capacity
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to a school's capacities. Recall that school 1 is truly demanded by all pupils and the
diﬀerence between true and revealed demand is extraordinary. High excess demand for
school j = 3 is due to the low qualiﬁcation pupils who bear no risk applying to school 3
instead of school 4.
With increasing variance of school preference heterogeneity, the role of school quality
in the formation of school preferences diminishes and the heterogeneity between revealed
and true demands across schools declines. Note that for high values of rω the lowest-
quality school 4 becomes the most preferred by some pupils. This could be due to its
proximity or to particular taste or local skill match, eﬀects being captured by ω.
The left panel in ﬁgure 1.17 shows the percentage of students admitted to the school to
which they apply and the percentage applying to their most preferred school. The share
of students who are admitted to the same school where they apply only slightly increases
with the increasing heterogeneity component. While this ratio is heavily dependent on
the qualiﬁcation noise, as shown in section 1.4.3, the size of the heterogeneity component
does not have much eﬀect. The ratio of students applying to their most preferred schools,
on the other hand, rises substantially with the increasing heterogeneity component size.
The main reason is that the underlying preferences become more heterogenous and some
students will most prefer some other school than school 1. If this is the case, then applying
to such a school will more often be the best strategy than applying to school 1 was under
the zero heterogeneity component. Based on this ﬁnding, we may say that the greater the
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Figure 1.17: The eﬀect of heterogeneity component  Czech vs. GS mechanism
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heterogeneity of the underlying preferences, the smaller the preference misrepresentation
and the greater the percentage of students, who are admitted to their most preferred
school.
Figure 1.17 shows the impact of school preference heterogeneity on dissimilarity of
outcomes under the current and the GS mechanism. On its vertical axis we depict the
same ratios as ﬁgure 1.10, but on the horizontal axis we plot ratio rω. The left panel
shows that the proportion of pupils who apply to the same school in both mechanisms
(note that in the GS mechanism, all pupils apply to their truly most preferred schools)
is growing fast with growing school preference heterogeneity, from very low proportions
to 70%. This is in line with ﬁndings and interpretations in the previous section which
stresses that the ranking of school qualities is unique but school preference components
are pupil speciﬁc. As preferences become more heterogenous, students, especially those
with lower perceived qualiﬁcation, have higher chances of admission at their top choice
school. This corresponds to a growing, although slowly, proportion of pupils admitted in
the 1st round, as depicted by the upper proﬁle on the left panel.
The right panel of ﬁgure 1.17 compares matching outcomes under both mechanisms.
The upper proﬁle shows that the proportion of pupils matched identically in both mech-
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anisms declines slightly from almost 80% for relatively low values of rω, and increases
afterwards to almost 90% for rω = 1. Shifted down, but of very similar shape is the
locus depicting the share of pupils in the current mechanism applying to the school they
would be admitted to in the GS mechanism. Without school preference heterogeneity,
only about 45% of students would apply to the school they would be admitted to by the
GS mechanism. The proportion is growing with the growing role of school preference
heterogeneity and reaches above 65% for r1 = 100. This indicates that the incidence of
instability in the current mechanism resulting from the growing role of school preference
heterogeneity diminished. In other words, the proportion of pupils who prefer a school
other than their actual match (in the current mechanism) school and whose qualiﬁcation
exceeds the qualiﬁcation of at least one pupil admitted to the former school is decreasing
with school preference heterogeneity.
The impact of school preference heterogeneity on the aggregate productivity is shown
in ﬁgure 1.18. As in ﬁgure 1.13, we present the percentage diﬀerence from the pro-
ductivity achieved in the GS mechanism. The current mechanism outperforms the GS
mechanism for the whole range of values rω, except very small ones. In the absence of
school preference heterogeneity, when all the students have the same ordinal preferences,
the eﬃciency diﬀerence is given solely by the imperfect matching eﬀect74 in the current
mechanism. Increasing variance of school preference heterogeneity makes the cardinality
eﬀect dominate the negative matching eﬀect and the current mechanism outperforms the
GS mechanism in terms of aggregate eﬃciency. The diﬀerence in eﬃciency is very small
in the examined interval of rω.
74Matching of some high-quality students, who were rejected by top schools, to low quality schools.
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Figure 1.18: The eﬀect of heterogeneity component  productivity diﬀerence
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Chapter 2
What determines school demand:
empirical evidence from the Czech Republic
Abstract
Pupil-school matching mechanisms play a critical role in the schooling system. They
aﬀect the behavior of students and  through the information they convey  also the
behavior of the schools and the authorities responsible for education policy. In this paper,
I empirically study a type of decentralized, ability-based matching mechanism, variants
of which are used in several European countries. The variant studied herein is the one
used to match 9th grade students to upper-secondary schools in the Czech Republic.
Using district-level data on demand for public gymnasia, I ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence that
students do not apply to their most preferred schools, opting rather for a less-preferred,
but safer option. Furthermore, using data on individual student school choices, I also
ﬁnd that students with weak socio-economic backgrounds misrepresent their preferences
more often than the other students.
Keywords: pupil-school matching, matching mechanisms
JEL classiﬁcation codes: C12, D60, I20
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2.1 Introduction
The spread of school choice programs in the US in the last decade has attracted the
attention of economists to the mechanisms matching students to schools.1 Once school
choice is enabled, then  except in the improbable case that each school could admit
all the applicants  there must be some mechanism that determines which students will
be matched to which schools. The particular design of such a mechanism is important
because it aﬀects both the outcomes of the matching given the revealed preferences of the
applicants and, as a result, the application choices themselves. Ill-designed mechanisms
can substantially diminish the beneﬁts of school choice.
In this paper I empirically study the mechanism used to match 9th grade students to
upper-secondary schools in the Czech Republic.2 As other European countries use similar
mechanisms, my ﬁndings are likely to have broader relevance. The Czech mechanism is
also similar to the Boston mechanism  in fact, they are both examples of a priority
matching mechanism  so the results presented here can also be related to studies of
the Boston mechanism. In the type of mechanisms discussed herein, school choice does
not actually mean that a student can choose the school where he will study but that he
indicates his preferences; a mechanism is then used to match him to a particular school.
In the Czech mechanism, a student chooses the school where he will take an entrance
examination and the school will then decide whether to admit him or not. If not admitted,
the student can try other schools but, after being rejected by his ﬁrst-choice school, he
may ﬁnd that all the seats at the other good schools are already taken. Therefore, it may
be an optimal strategy for a student to indicate as his ﬁrst-choice school a school diﬀerent
from that he actually prefers most, if the admission chances at his most-preferred school
are low.
My ﬁrst hypothesis assumes that students actually do behave in this way, i.e. that
in the current mechanism they misrepresent their preferences for schools. I study this
hypothesis on the case of demand for public gymnasia, the type of school most suitable
for those intending to continue to university and which faces highest excess demand.
The fact that gymnasia are most over-demanded and that they represent a kind of elite
school in each district makes them a good object for analysis. Indeed, if the preference
1See Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003), Chen and Sönmez (2004), Ergin and Sönmez (2005), Ab-
dulkadiroglu et al. (2005), Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, and Roth (2005), Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2006).
2In the Czech Republic, children typically attend grades 1  9, corresponding roughly to primary and
lower-secondary level in the US and other countries, in one school. The transition to upper-secondary
level means transition to other school, which is why a matching mechanism is needed at this stage.
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misrepresentation hypothesis is correct then it would concern mainly public gymnasia.
My main ﬁnding with respect to this hypothesis is that revealed demand for gymnasia is
signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the capacity of gymnasia, while the true demand should not be
(indicating preference misrepresentation). Increasing the capacity by 1 seat increases the
revealed demand on average by 1.1  1.2 seats. This ﬁnding holds in various speciﬁcations,
in which I control for potential endogeneity of capacity.
My second hypothesis states that students with weaker socio-economic backgrounds
misrepresent their preferences more often than students from well-oﬀ families. In par-
ticular, this means that for a given ability, the lower the social status of a student, the
lower the probability that he will apply to an over-demanded school, even if there is no
tuition. This stiﬂes social mobility by limiting access to a high-quality education for
socially disadvantaged students. In support of my hypothesis, I ﬁnd that an increase in
the per capita income of the family by one standard deviation increases the probability
of applying to a gymnasium by 8.3%. When at least one of the parents has a university
education then the probability of applying to a gymnasium increases by 10%  15%,
everything else held constant.
Given that I ﬁnd indications of preference misrepresentation by students the question
is whether it is a reason for concern. Is it not the small capacity of the most demanded
schools that causes the real problem? Should the relevant authorities, rather than chang-
ing the mechanism, increase the capacity of the most demanded schools suﬃciently such
that all those interested could be admitted?
The message that my results convey is that, although adjusting the capacity to de-
mand is desirable, the matching mechanism will always be important.
One reason is that because capacity adjustments cannot occur instantaneously, there
will always be some over- and under-demanded schools. In these circumstances, the
current mechanism, in combination with the entrance examinations as a way to determine
students' priorities, leads to stressful situations which some students may prefer to avoid
and hence apply to less-demanded schools where they are sure of being admitted. On the
other hand, some of those who take the risk and apply to the highly-demanded schools
will necessarily be rejected and may end up in poor-quality schools. These are the sources
of instability and unfairness in the mechanism which will be present whenever there is
some mismatch between supply and demand.
The mechanism is also important because of the information it provides. In a market
in which there is no price mechanism to convey information, like the upper-secondary
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education market described here, it is crucial to ascertain what kind of information is
provided by the mechanism and used to reconcile demand and supply. It would be desir-
able if the mechanism provided undistorted information about the demand for individual
schools. Without this, it is diﬃcult to tell which schools are truly over-demanded because
some apparently over-demanded schools may simply beneﬁt from the fear of students to
apply to their truly most preferred schools. Having the correct information would provide
better incentives for school principals and teachers to make the school more desirable for
students. Such information would also make a stronger case for extending the capacity at
the over-demanded schools and decreasing it at the less demanded ones. The possibility
of these capacity adjustments would also provide incentives for improving school quality.3
The paper builds on a growing body of literature on the design of school choice
mechanisms which itself emanates from the literature on matching in two-sided markets.
I do not discuss in much detail the basic concepts used in this literature, such as stability
or strategy-proofness. The interested reader is referred to, for example, Dubins and
Freedman (1981), Roth and Sotomayor (1990), Roth (2002) or Roth (2008). The same
holds for the description of individual matching mechanisms which can be found, for
example, in Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003).
The ﬁrst to consider school choice from a mechanism design perspective were Ab-
dulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003). They analyze various mechanisms at work in practice
and compare them with two theoretically superior mechanisms, the Gale-Shapley (GS)
mechanism and the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism. Of the practically used mech-
anisms, special attention is devoted to the Boston mechanism, which is quite similar to
the one analyzed in this paper. Both the GS and TTC mechanisms are strategy-proof.4
The GS mechanism is stable (produces stable matchings) but need not be Pareto eﬃ-
cient,5 while the TTC mechanism is always Pareto eﬃcient but may produce unstable
matchings.6 The Boston mechanism, which is a form of a priority-matching mechanism,
is neither strategy-proof nor is it likely to produce stable and Pareto-eﬃcient matchings.
The Boston, GS and TTC mechanisms have been studied experimentally by Chen
3This eﬀect is analogous to an increase in competition among schools. Hoxby (2000) presents some
evidence using US data that stronger competition among schools leads to higher school productivity.
4Strategy-proofness means that the dominant strategy for students is to submit their true preferences.
5A matching is stable if there is no student-school pair such that the student prefers the school to his
match and has higher priority at the school than some of the actually admitted students.
6Pais and Pintér (2008) compare the TTC, GS and the Boston mechanisms in an experimental setting;
both TTC and GS mechanisms outperform the Boston mechanism, with TTC delivering slightly better
results than GS. Kesten (2004) suggests two new mechanisms that to some degree solve the conﬂict
between stability and Pareto eﬃciency.
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and Sönmez (2004). The experimental results suggest a high rate of preference misrepre-
sentation under the Boston mechanism which leads to signiﬁcantly lower eﬃciency in the
laboratory environment compared to the two competing mechanisms. Ergin and Sönmez
(2005) study theoretically the equilibria of the preference revelation game induced by
the Boston mechanism. Their key result is that under the assumption of perfect infor-
mation the set of Nash equilibria of this game is equal to the set of stable matchings
under the true preferences. Both the theoretical and experimental evidence suggests that
from the studied mechanisms both the GS mechanism and the TTC mechanism perform
better than the Boston mechanism (and similar priority-matching mechanisms used in
practice). In addition, Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2006) present some empirical evidence of
preference misrepresentation under the Boston mechanism, conﬁrming the theoretical
and experimental results. They show, however, that not all the students (their parents)
act strategically and that those who state their true preferences without regard for the
capacity limitations of their favorite schools are likely to be the losers in the school choice
game. In 2005, this evidence persuaded the administration in Boston to replace the
existing mechanism with the GS mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes in more detail the
admission procedure I analyze. Section 2.3 presents a model of the determination of true
and revealed preferences and of true and revealed demand. Section 2.4 describes the data
I use. Section 2.5 analyzes my ﬁrst hypothesis (that there is signiﬁcant preference misrep-
resentation) using the district-level revealed demand for all public gymnasia in the Czech
Republic. Section 2.6 deals with my second hypothesis (that the preference misrepre-
sentation concerns mainly students from lower social backgrounds) using individual-level
data from the PISA project. Section 2.7 discusses the policy implications of my ﬁndings
and concludes the analysis.
2.2 Description of the admission procedure
I study the procedure used to assign 9th grade students to upper-secondary schools in
the Czech Republic. I focus on this transition since this is when most students change
school and must go through the admission procedure.7 The procedure is very simple
7Apart from that, many gymnasia also oﬀer 8-year programs, to which students can transfer from the
6th grade. The number of seats oﬀered is quite limited, so most gymnasia students join after 9th grade.
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to understand.8 Each school is required to hold an admission proceedings. This does
not mean that all schools have to hold entrance examinations; they may choose students
by their elementary school grades or they may simply accept all the applicants if their
capacity allows. Virtually all of the good-quality schools, however, administer an entrance
examination which takes place at a single common date for all schools. A student chooses
in advance a school at which he takes the entrance examination and, based on the results,
the school decides which applicants will be admitted. This admission decision is ﬁnal and
cannot be later repealed by the school.
Students not admitted in the ﬁrst round have another chance in the second round.
Most of the good-quality schools, however, ﬁll most of the available seats in the ﬁrst
round so the chances of admission in the second round are small. With quite a high
probability, a student not admitted in the ﬁrst round will end up in a low-quality school.
The student could have avoided this consequence by applying in the ﬁrst round to a
less-demanded school where the admission chances are higher. This behavior is referred
to as preference misrepresentation and I present some evidence suggesting that it is a
common phenomenon among students.
The studied mechanism is similar to the well-known Boston mechanism. In each
round, the admission decisions are ﬁnal and by not applying to a school in a particular
round, a student loses his priority he would otherwise have at that school in that round.
The determination of priorities in the studied mechanism and in the Boston mechanism,
however, is diﬀerent. In the Boston mechanism, the priorities of all students at all the
schools are in fact known in advance (or they can be established with certainty). They
are determined by factors such as proximity to the school or having siblings attending
the school. The only uncertainty concerns which students will actually apply to which
schools. In the Czech mechanism, the priorities themselves are not known in advance.
They are determined in a single step with the admission-rejection decision which means
that the uncertainty is even higher than in the Boston mechanism.
My data cover four consecutive years from 2002  2005. Eﬀective from 2005, two
changes were made to the admission procedure. Until then, the rules of the procedure
only applied to public schools. The admission procedure to private schools was in fact
unregulated and alongside an application to a public school a student could apply to
as many private schools as he wished. By applying to a private school the student did
8This does not imply that it is easy to determine what should be one's optimal strategy, which, on
the other hand, is highly complicated.
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not lose his priority at a public school and vice versa. After the change, the admission
procedure rules now apply to all schools, both public and private. A student can now
choose a single school for the ﬁrst round, either public or private.
The second change concerns the choice of school (schools) for each round, or rather
the timing thereof. Under the previous rules, a student chose two schools, one for the
ﬁrst round and the other for the second round. When choosing the school for the second
round, the student did not know how many seats (if any) there would be left at this
school after the ﬁrst round. Under the new rules, the student chooses a single school for
the ﬁrst round. Only when not admitted does he choose schools for the second round in
which he may choose more than one school.
While the ﬁrst change made the situation of students relatively worse by restricting
their choice, the second change probably made them better oﬀ by letting them choose
the second-round schools only after the ﬁrst round is over and with the knowledge of
which schools have free seats and how many. The second change is usually interpreted as
reducing choice but, given that schools, for some reason, do not respond by limiting the
number of seats for the second round, this is not correct.9
Neither of the changes, however, essentially changes the nature of the mechanism.
Preventing students from submitting parallel applications to private schools is not likely
to change their behavior. If rejected by their preferred public school, students interested
in getting a seat in a private school are likely to get it, since the private schools are
typically ﬂexible and do not face high excess demand. The possibility to select a school
for the second round only after the ﬁrst round is ﬁnished is really a formalization of
an informal status quo. The second round is already less formal and centralized than
the ﬁrst round. Students who have to participate in the second round (or rather their
parents) usually research which schools still have open seats and how many; then they
may decide to change the ex-ante choice, which is typically feasible.
An appealing feature of the admission procedure (both before and, even more so, after
the modiﬁcation) is that its rules are clear and easy to understand. This, however, is a
fallacy because although the rules are easy to understand, it is very diﬃcult to determine
what one's optimal strategy should be. The problem is that the game induced by the
procedure does not have an equilibrium in undominated strategies, which means that
one's optimal strategy depends on the strategies of the others. The strategy choice is
9The mechanism was further amended in 2009, when students were allowed to submit 3 applications
in the ﬁrst round.
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further complicated because the optimal strategy also depends on a student's ability
(relative to others), which students do not know with certainty.
Administratively, this procedure is quite convenient for the schools. The strict limita-
tion to one application in the ﬁrst round guarantees that no student will have more than
one oﬀer. In addition, the schooling law stipulates that students admitted in one round
cannot participate in further rounds, so the schools are in fact sure that their oﬀers will
be accepted. This means that to ﬁll a certain number of places, schools need not make
more oﬀers, and they have almost perfect control over the number of students who will
enroll at the school.
2.3 Model
This section describes the theoretical motivation for the subsequent empirical analysis.
It captures the basic features of the demand for public gymnasia in the ﬁrst round of the
admission procedure but the framework is more general. I start with an assumption that
if the population in individual districts had the same characteristics, the true (underlying)
demand (the share of 9th grade students that would like to go to a gymnasium) would be
the same. I further assume that the true demand will be higher in districts with a higher
share of a college-educated population. More educated people tend to value education
more and, therefore, given ability and other characteristics, a student is more likely to
prefer a gymnasium (and a college afterwards) to other educational paths if his parents
are themselves college-educated. The true demand should also be higher, everything else
held constant, in districts with a college because the costs of going to college are lower,
more students should be interested in a college education, and, therefore, more students
should prefer gymnasia to other schools.
If students state their preferences truthfully, then the revealed demand (the share of
students that actually apply to gymnasia) is the same as the true demand. If they do
not, as I assume, then it should be higher if true demand is higher but it should also
be aﬀected by additional factors that do not aﬀect the true demand. These factors fall
into two categories  the risk of rejection and the consequences of rejection. For a given
true demand, the risk of rejection decreases with increasing capacity of gymnasia and,
therefore, the higher the capacity the higher the revealed demand should be.10
10This assumes the capacity is exogenous and does not adjust to the true demand. I will discuss this
issue in more detail in section 2.5.
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The consequences of rejection depend on the quality of school to which the rejected
student is eventually admitted. Chances of being admitted to a relatively good public
school in the second round are small because these schools will have all or almost all of
their seats ﬁlled and, therefore, by applying to a school with a high risk of rejection, a
student risks ending up in some low-quality school. Presence of a comparable private
school could provide a good hedging option, at least for students who can aﬀord to pay
tuition. These schools typically ﬁll their seats by the students not admitted to the over-
subscribed public school and, hence, they usually have free seats after the ﬁrst round of
the admission procedure.
Among the available private schools I focus on the role of the private gymnasia. A
private gymnasium represents a competition to the public gymnasia but the public ones
are still preferred by most of the students, not least because there is no tuition. The
"competition" eﬀect decreases the true demand and through it also the revealed demand
while the "hedging" eﬀect leaves the true demand unchanged and increases the revealed
demand. If the "hedging" eﬀect prevails I should see more "aggressive" bidding for the
public gymnasia, i.e. higher revealed demand, in districts with a private gymnasium.
2.3.1 The true demand for gymnasia
I start the formal analysis by deﬁning a function of a student's utility derived from
attending a certain school. Student i in a district j has utility
Uij = U(S,Aij, Eij, Cj, ξij) (2.1)
The utility depends on the type of school a student attends (S), his ability (Aij),
the education of his parents (Eij), whether there is a college in the district j (Cj) and
some other unobserved and random characteristics (ξij). Students with high ability will
on average receive highest utility in gymnasia, while students with low ability will on
average receive highest utility in less demanding schools. Everything else held constant,
students with more educated parents are more likely to value education more and will
receive higher utility from more demanding schools  gymnasia. Availability of a college
in a district means lower costs of college education and higher utility from a gymnasium
(the most suitable secondary school for those attempting to continue in college).
For simplicity, I assume students are risk-neutral. With risk-aversion, the incentive
for preference misrepresentation would be even stronger.
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Denote the utility from a public gymnasium of student i in district j as UGij and that
from any other school S 6= G as USij . The probability that student i in district j will
prefer a gymnasium to other schools can be written as
Pij = P (U
G
ij ≥ max∀S 6=G{USij}) = P (Aij, Eij, Cj) (2.2)
The probability P (. . .) is increasing in all the arguments because UGij is increasing in
all the arguments and, at the same time, the utilities from the other schools are either
decreasing or increasing at a lower rate. Formally, the exact form of this function is given
by the distribution of ξij but the above general formulation is suﬃcient for the purposes
of this paper.
Denote the number of students in the ninth grade (the grade in which students apply
to upper secondary schools) in district j as Nj and the share of students preferring
gymnasium as Dj. Then, I can write
Dj '
∑Nj
i Pij
Nj
(2.3)
Making a simplifying assumption that the distribution of ability of students is the same
across districts (A¯j = A¯), I can write the true demand for gymnasia as a function of the
average values of the remaining variables11:
Dj = D(E¯j, Cj, ξ¯j) (2.4)
where E¯j is the share of university-educated population and ξ¯j represents the average of
the idiosyncratic characteristics of the individuals in district j. The function D(. . .) is
increasing in both E¯j and Cj because the probability P (. . .) is increasing in Eij and Cj.
2.3.2 The revealed demand for gymnasia
Consider the expected utility from applying to a gymnasium (as opposed to studying at
a gymnasium). As I argued in section 2.2, under the analyzed admission mechanism, a
student who would like to study at a gymnasium may still prefer to apply to another,
less attractive school if the probability of being admitted to a gymnasium is low. This
11Although in reality the average utility will not be the same across districts, this does not change
anything about the eﬀects of the other variables and does not aﬀect the validity of the analysis.
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probability depends on various factors but for simplicity assume that it only depends on
the student's ability, true demand for gymnasia, and the capacity of gymnasia12:
piij = pi(Aij, Dj, Kj), (2.5)
where Kj denotes the capacity of gymnasia in district j. The expected utility a student
obtains from applying to a gymnasium, uGij, is
uGij = piijU
G
ij + (1− piij)UAlij , (2.6)
where UAlij denotes the utility from the alternative the student ends up with if rejected
by the gymnasium. Deﬁning the expected utilities uSij from applying to the other schools
in a similar way, the probability that a student applies to a gymnasium is
pij = P (u
G
ij ≥ max∀S 6=G{uSij}) = p(piij, UGij , UAlij ). (2.7)
As one would assume, the probability p(. . .) depends on the probability that he is admit-
ted, the utility he gets if admitted, and the utility he gets if not admitted. The share of
students in a district who will apply to gymnasia, dj, can be written as
dj '
∑Nj
i pij
Nj
. (2.8)
I can again write dj as a function of the factors aﬀecting pij, making the same as-
sumption as above (distribution of ability is the same across districts):
dj = d(Dj, Kj, U¯
Al
ij ) = d(D(E¯j, Cj, ξ¯j), Kj, U¯
Al
j ). (2.9)
The revealed demand dj depends on the true demand Dj, the capacity of the gymnasia,
and the quality of the alternative school for the rejected students. Through the true
demand, the revealed demand depends on the share of college-educated population and
the presence of a college in the district. The function d(. . .) is increasing inDj because the
higher the true demand, the more students should be willing to take the risk of applying
12One could argue that the probability of admission should rather depend on the revealed than on the
true demand. This is certainly the case, but it would result in a circular deﬁnition, since piij will be used
to deﬁne the revealed demand. I am using here the actual demand as an exogenous variable aﬀecting
the probability of admission indirectly, through the revealed demand.
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to a gymnasium. It is increasing in Kj because the higher the capacity the higher the
probability of being accepted and, thus, the higher revealed demand. It is also increasing
in U¯Alj , the utility from the alternative school, because when a student is rejected, his
loss is lower the higher U¯Alj is and he is, therefore, more likely to apply.
In any strategy-proof mechanism, unlike the Czech mechanism, the revealed demand
is the same as the true demand. The revealed demand does not at all depend on school
capacity, since students are not "punished" for not being accepted to their most preferred
school.
2.4 Data
I use two data sets to analyze my two hypotheses. To analyze the ﬁrst hypothesis about
preference misrepresentation in general, I use a data set of school-level information on
upper-secondary schools containing information on school type, location, number of ad-
mitted students, number of applicants and other school-speciﬁc variables. Because stu-
dents in one district represent a natural demand for schools in that district I pool together
the information on schools in each district and create a district-level data set. To analyze
the hypothesis that preference misrepresentation concerns mainly students with weak
socio-economic backgrounds I use an individual-level data set from the PISA project
containing information on students' ability (test results), social status, school attended,
and choice of secondary school.
2.4.1 The school-level data set
The school-level data set was obtained from the Oﬃce for Educational Information (Ústav
pro informace ve vzd¥lávání), an institution collecting and publishing various information
on the educational sector, and it covers all upper-secondary schools in the Czech Republic
(the data are not a sample but represent the whole population of schools). The data form
a panel, covering four consecutive admission procedures to the upper-secondary schools,
namely school years 2002/2003 to 2005/2006. There is one observation for each school
in each year. Apart from information on the admission procedure, there are many other
school characteristics in the data set, most of which I do not use in this paper.
In my analysis, I focus on admission to 4-year public gymnasia.13 I pool together
13Apart from the 4-year gymnasia, there are also 8-year gymnasia, to which some students transfer
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data on all these gymnasia (namely their capacity and number of applicants) within one
district, forming a panel data set where one observation corresponds to a district in a
given year. This means that for each year I have 75 observations, or 300 observations
in total. I pool the data at the district level because within a district, the demand for
individual gymnasia may depend on district- and school-speciﬁc factors I do not observe.
In particular, the district student population forms a natural demand for the district's
schools, while for individual schools within a district, such a natural demand pool is not
possible to identify.14
The dependent variable I use is the relative ﬁrst-round revealed demand for gymnasia
in each district, calculated as the share of all 9th grade students who in the ﬁrst round of
the admission procedure applied to gymnasia on the total 9th grade student population.
I call this variable revealed demand. I only focus on the ﬁrst-round demand because the
chances of admission to a gymnasium in the second-round are very small and students
really interested in a gymnasium usually apply in the ﬁrst round.15 Because of the small
admission chances, second round school choices need not be so carefully contemplated
and they may be driven by some unobserved factors.
The ﬁrst explanatory variable is the capacity of public gymnasia (I further refer to
it as capacity), measured as the share of the ﬁrst-round-admitted students on the total
population of 9th grade students.16 In addition I use further variables identiﬁed as rele-
vant in my model: the presence of a private gymnasium and the proxies for true demand
 the share of college educated population and the presence of a university in a district.
In the case of the share of college educated population, I use data from 2001 for all the
years. This should not be problematic because the potential changes are negligible (the
natural rate of change in this variable is low and the mobility between districts is low as
well). I consider a district to be a university district if a public university is available in
between their 5th and 6th grade. In the ﬁrst 4 grades they oﬀer similar curriculum as the elementary
schools. Their students then gradually continue to the standard 4-year gymnasium program without
having to take the admission exams. Most of the students studying at gymnasia, however, join after 9th
grade for the 4-year program.
14In the metropolitan districts (Prague, Brno, Plzen, Ostrava), the natural demand may be even
broader and may include students from the neighboring districts. To check that this does not signiﬁcantly
distort my results, I have tried speciﬁcations excluding the metropolitan and the neighboring districts
from the data set. The results are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those presented here and are available
upon request.
15The median percentage of those admitted in the ﬁrst round is 91% in 2002, 92.5% in 2003, and 93.3%
in 2004 (in 2005, I only have data on the whole admission procedure).
16The values would be very similar if I used the number of students admitted in both rounds but for
consistency I focus again on the ﬁrst round only.
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it 17.
Table 2.1 in the Appendix summarizes the demand and capacity in individual years.
The ﬁrst panel of the table shows the values for the ﬁrst round, i.e. those I use further in
the analysis, and the second panel, for comparison, shows the values for the whole admis-
sion procedure. The ﬁgures in the table are weighted averages and standard deviations
(in parentheses) where weights are the number of 9th grade students in each district. In
the years 2002-2004 the average number of ﬁrst-round applicants stays almost constant,
between 15.5% and 16.2% of 9th grade students; the number of ﬁrst-round admitted rises
slightly, from 10.7% to 11.4% of 9th grade students. As a result, the (revealed) excess
demand in the ﬁrst round falls from 46.5% to 36.3%. Similarly, the share of applicants to
gymnasia in the whole admission procedure (1st and 2nd round) in 2002-2004 is in fact
constant, at a level around 24%. The share of admitted students in the overall procedure
increases slightly. The overall excess demand falls slightly but less than the ﬁrst-round
excess demand.
For the year 2005 I only have information on the total number of applicants and
admitted students. The share of applicants is 17.6%, the share of admitted students is
13.1%, and the overall excess demand is 32.4%. Because of the change in the admission
procedure the 2005 data are similar in nature to the ﬁrst-round data in the previous years.
The main reason is that in 2005, unlike the previous years, only students not admitted
in the ﬁrst round submitted applications in the second round, so the total number of
applications in the second round is signiﬁcantly lower. Hence, it seems appropriate to
treat the 2005 data in the same way as the data on the ﬁrst rounds in the previous years
and to use them, in some speciﬁcations, together. However the evidence I present is
robust, even without the speciﬁcations using the 2005 data.
2.4.2 The individual-level data set (PISA)
To verify my second hypothesis  that preference misrepresentation is more prevalent
among students with weaker socio-economic backgrounds  I use an individual-level data
set from the PISA project which assesses the abilities of 15-year-old pupils in OECD
countries and several other countries. The data were gathered in 2003, i.e. before the
change in the admission mechanism described above. For the Czech Republic, the data
set includes both 9th grade students (last grade at the lower-secondary level) and 10th
17There are 12 such districts in the Czech Republic.
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grade students (ﬁrst grade at the upper-secondary level) aged 15. Since I am interested
in the school choice behavior of 9th grade students, I only use the corresponding part of
the data set, which leaves me with 5047 observations. The following variables from the
data set are of interest:
• School identiﬁer  a randomly generated number so that I know which students
come from the same school;
• Test scores in mathematics, reading and problem-solving tests that were part of the
project;
• Grades in mathematics, Czech language, foreign language, physics, chemistry, biol-
ogy, and geography taken from the last school report students were given;
• Income of a student's family and number of family members (I am able to calculate
per capita family income);
• Parents' education;
• The choice of school for the ﬁrst round of the admission procedure.
Optimally, I would want to use this individual-level data set to analyze preference
misrepresentation in the school choice instead of the district-level data. Unfortunately,
it is not possible to match the data from the PISA data set with my data on gymnasia
capacity in individual districts since the PISA data set does not include district codes
and the school codes have been replaced by random indicators. I do not know in which
district a student participating in the PISA project lives and hence I am unable to ﬁnd
out either the capacity of the gymnasia in this district or the other explanatory variables.
Table 2.2 in the Appendix shows the choices of secondary school type for the ﬁrst
round of the admission procedure. Most students (51%) apply to vocational schools,
approximately 31% apply to apprentice schools (of which 19% to specializations without
a graduation exam), and approximately 18% to gymnasia (this is similar to the values of
16-17% from the school-level data set).
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2.5 Empirical analysis of revealed demand for gymna-
sia
2.5.1 Derivation of estimable model
In this section I conﬁrm my ﬁrst hypothesis regarding preference misrepresentation in the
demand for gymnasia. The structural relationship I am interested in is:
d = β0 + β1D + β2K + β3GPriv + ², (2.10)
where d is the observed relative demand for public gymnasia (the share of 9th grade
students who applied), D is the relative true demand (the share of students who applied),
K is the relative capacity of the public gymnasia (the share of those admitted), and GPriv
is the dummy variable for the presence of a private gymnasium. ² is the error term which
has zero mean and is uncorrelated with the regressors. If students stated their preferences
truthfully, then hypothesis H0 speciﬁed as β1 = 1, β2 = 0, β3 < 018 should hold. If, on the
other hand, students misrepresent their preferences, H1 : β1 < 1, β2 > 0, β3 > 0 should
hold. The problem is that to estimate equation 2.10 I would need to observe the true
demand D which, of course, I do not.
To avoid the bias due to the omission of the true demand from the regression I use as
proxies the variables that, according to my model in section 2.3.1, should determine the
true demand, namely the share of college-educated population (E) and the presence of a
university in the district (C). The relationship for the true demand is then
D = δ0 + δ1E + δ2C + v. (2.11)
I assume that v has zero mean and is uncorrelated with E,C,K and GPriv. Substituting
into the structural relationship, I obtain the estimable model
d = β0 + β1δ0 + β1δ1E + β1δ2C + β2K + β3GPriv + β1v + ² (2.12)
The error term is now β1v + ² which, according to my assumptions, has mean zero and
is uncorrelated with the regressors; therefore, running OLS on this model should provide
consistent parameter estimates. The inclusion of E and C, which can be viewed as the
18β3 < 0 due to the competition eﬀect of private gymnasia.
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proxies for the true (unobserved) demand, should solve the omitted variable problem.
There is, however, still some risk that the omitted variable problem is not fully solved
by the inclusion of the two proxies. If capacity adjusts to true demand, an unobserved
shock to true demand would also increase capacity, showing up as a causal relationship
from capacity to revealed demand even though there is none. In particular, if the error
term v in equation 2.11 is correlated with K, then running OLS on equation 2.12 pro-
duces an inconsistent estimate of β2. This would also be the case if there were another
omitted variable that correlated with the true demand. Then I could still not rule out the
possibility that the positive coeﬃcient at K does not reﬂect the diﬀerence between true
and revealed demand, but that there is a reverse causality, meaning that higher values
of K are caused by higher true demand. In addition, the proxies for true demand may
also be problematic. Both the share of university-educated population and the presence
of a university can actually aﬀect the capacity of public and private gymnasia through
political pressure and market demand.
Because of these issues, I use two diﬀerent ways to control for the potential endogeneity
and to verify my results. First, I use an instrumental variable regression in which I
instrument for the share of students admitted to gymnasia (K) by the share of students
admitted in the year 1991.19 Since the beginning of the 1990s, due to subsequent shocks,
the demand for gymnasia has evolved diﬀerently in individual districts while the capacity
only partly reacted to this development. The capacity of gymnasia at the beginning of the
1990s should, thus, be determined independently of the demand in the period 2002-2005
and should be usable as an instrument for the capacity in this period. I do not instrument
for the private gymnasium dummy because I lack a good instrument. Because I am not
completely able to control for the possible endogeneity of the private gymnasium variable
and because my hypothesis can also be tested using only the capacity variable, I also
estimate models in which I exclude the districts with private gymnasia. The results of
ﬁxed eﬀects regression can be viewed as further evidence in support of my hypothesis.
Second, I take advantage of diﬀerent rates of change in a district 15-year-old popula-
tion (roughly corresponding to 9th grade students) between 1991 and the period of my
analysis, relative to the change in capacity of gymnasia. In all the districts, the size of
the 15-year-old population fell between 1991 and 2002  2005, but the rate of change
19The instrument contains the total number of admitted students, while the instrumented variable
contains the number of admitted students in the ﬁrst round. This should be unproblematic since more
than 90% of the students are, on average, admitted in the ﬁrst round.
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diﬀered. Also, the capacity of the gymnasia changed at diﬀerent rates. For each district,
I thus deﬁne a Distortion Coeﬃcient in the following way:
DistortionCoefficient =
POP15200X/POP151991
CAPG200X/CAPG1991
. (2.13)
The nominator is the ratio of the size of the 15-year-old population in 2002  2005
to the 15-year-old population in 1991 (for each year in 2002  2005 one value). The
denominator is the ratio of district gymnasium capacity in 2002  2005 to capacity in
1991. I then examine speciﬁcations of the model in which the capacity of public gymnasia
is replaced by the Distortion Coeﬃcient. The higher the value of the Distortion Coeﬃ-
cient, the lower the revealed demand should be because the competition for the available
gymnasium capacity got tougher and, thus, the probability of rejection increased.
2.5.2 Estimation results
Table 2.3 in the Appendix presents the results of the OLS and IV regressions on pooled
data from all districts and all years.20 Because the admission procedure changed in
2005 and in this year I only have data on the overall numbers of applicants and those
admitted, I estimate models both for the period 2002-2004 and for the period 2002-2005.21
The table reports four speciﬁcations: OLS on data from 2002-2004, OLS on 2002-2005,
IV estimation on 2002-2004, and IV on 2002-2005.
In accordance with my hypothesis, all the coeﬃcients are positive and are statistically
signiﬁcant at a 1% level. The coeﬃcients of gymnasium capacity fall within the range
of 1.135 and 1.176, which means that increasing the capacity by 1 seat increases the
revealed demand by more than one applicant. An interesting question is whether the
relationship between capacity and revealed demand stays the same in the whole data
range. The revealed demand should be a concave function of capacity: in districts with
low capacity the relative excess is bound to be higher than in districts with high capacity,
because the marginal applicant in a low-capacity district will derive higher utility from
a gymnasium than a marginal applicant in the high-capacity district and is thus willing
to accept a higher risk of rejection. If the districts in the upper capacity range had high
20I have also run regressions on individual year data. As the results were very similar, I only report
the results obtained using the pooled data.
21As I argued above, the data on the total number of applicants and those admitted in 2005 correspond
in nature closely to the data on the ﬁrst rounds in the previous years. Therefore, in the analysis covering
the whole period I treat them the same as data on the ﬁrst round and stack them together with the data
from the previous years.
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enough capacity, this eﬀect should be observed in the data. To check this hypothesis, I
also run a regression where, besides capacity, I include capacity squared as a regressor.
Should the hypothesis hold, the coeﬃcient of this regressor should be signiﬁcant and have
negative sign. However, in both the 2002  2004 and in 2002  2005 speciﬁcations, the
coeﬃcient is highly insigniﬁcant (p-values 0.516 and 0.712, respectively) and has positive
sign.22 Therefore, it seems that all the districts in the present data set lie in a range,
where the capacity is still low enough to induce the relative excess demand to decrease.
The coeﬃcient at the private gymnasium dummy falls within 0.008 and 0.012, which
means that having a private gymnasium in a district increases the revealed demand for
public gymnasia by between 0.8 and 1.2 percentage points. Given that the revealed
demand is on average around 15% of the student population, the increase is on average
between 5% and 8%. According to my hypothesis, this suggests that the presence of
an acceptable alternative increases the revealed demand for public gymnasia because it
decreases the opportunity cost of rejection. The positive coeﬃcient, however, can also
be due to reverse causality  that the private gymnasia were established in the districts
with the highest true demand for gymnasium education. Although I am not able to rule
this out, one bit of supporting evidence is that the positive coeﬃcient was replicated in
the ﬁxed eﬀects estimation (see below).23
Consistent with my hypothesis, the coeﬃcients of variables representing true demand
are also positive and signiﬁcant. If the share of university-educated population is higher
by one percentage point, the revealed demand for public gymnasia is higher by between
0.178 and 0.218 percentage points. In addition, the presence of a university in the district
increases the revealed demand by between 1.3 and 1.6 percentage points.
As a check, I repeat the procedures reported in table 2.3 on data which exclude all the
districts with private gymnasia, which means I focus solely on the eﬀect of the capacity
of public gymnasia. If private gymnasium capacity were endogenous, this could bias
other results, so I am interested in whether the results can be replicated on districts
without private gymnasia. Table 2.4 in the Appendix shows the results of the modiﬁed
estimations. The coeﬃcients of the capacity variable, those of largest interest, are very
close to those in the basic speciﬁcation with all the districts included; this supports my
22Results are available upon request.
23Yet another explanation for a positive relationship between the presence of a private gymnasium
and the demand for public gymnasia may be improved quality of the public gymnasia. The private
gymnasium represents competition for the public one and may force it to oﬀer a better curriculum, hire
better teachers, etc. For a discussion of school competition, see Hoxby (2000).
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preference misrepresentation hypothesis.
I perform the Hausman speciﬁcation test to compare the results of the OLS and IV
estimation (with the gymnasium capacity in 1991 used as an instrument for capacity in
2002  2005). Neither in the speciﬁcations including all districts nor in those including
only districts without private gymnasia can I reject the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients
are equal.24 Provided the gymnasium capacity in 1991 is a good instrument,25 then
endogeneity does not appear to be a serious issue in this context.
The results of the OLS regression using the Distortion Coeﬃcient instead of public
gymnasia capacity are reported in table 2.5 in the Appendix. In support of my hypothesis,
the coeﬃcient at the Distortion Coeﬃcient is negative and signiﬁcant (in both the 2002
 2004 and 2002  2005 speciﬁcations). This means that in districts with unfavorable
development of student population vs. gymnasium capacity, the revealed demand is lower
than in districts with more favorable development. If students revealed their preferences
truthfully, no such eﬀect could be observed.
The results of the panel data analysis are reported in table 2.6. The ﬁrst two columns
show the results of, respectively, ﬁxed and random eﬀects procedures for the period 2002-
2004. The last two columns show the results of ﬁxed and random eﬀect procedures for
the period 2002-2005. Note that variables that are ﬁxed within each district across the
period fall out of the regression in the ﬁxed eﬀects treatment. Overall, the panel data
analysis conﬁrms my results obtained by running the OLS and IV regressions on the
pooled data. The coeﬃcients of the capacity variable are positive and signiﬁcant in all
the speciﬁcations. Similarly to those obtained by standard OLS and IV regressions, they
are signiﬁcantly larger than one, conﬁrming that the demand is not satiated even in
districts at the high end of the capacity range.26
For both the 2002-2004 and 2002-2005 periods, I perform the Hausman speciﬁcation
test to compare the consistent estimates from the ﬁxed eﬀects procedure with the eﬃcient
(and under the null hypothesis also consistent) estimates from the random eﬀects proce-
dure. The results of these tests suggest that I can use the random eﬀects procedure. In
24When all the districts are included then for the 2002-2004 period I have chi2(4)=0.92 and P-value
= 0.92 and for 2002-2005 period I have chi2(4)=0.43 and P-value = 0.98. When only districts without
private gymnasia are included then for the 2002-2004 period I have chi2(2)=3.09 and P-value = 0.38 and
for 2002-2005 period I have chi2(4)=1.87 and P-value = 0.60.
25In the ﬁrst stage of the IV regression, the coeﬃcient of gymnasium capacity in 1991 is signiﬁcant at
1% level and has a value of around 0.7 in both the 2002  2004 and 2002  2005 speciﬁcations.
26With the exception of the coeﬃcient in the ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation for 2002-2005, which is signiﬁcant
at 10% level, all the other coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at 5% level.
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neither of the periods can I reject the null that the two sets of estimates are the same.27
In table 2.7 in the Appendix, I report the eﬀects of an analysis exploring the eﬀects
of the size of the 9th-grade-student population on the revealed demand. While in the
previous speciﬁcations I normalized both supply and demand by the cohort size, here I
conduct a ﬁxed eﬀect regression of the relative demand (demand / cohort size) on the
cohort size, controlling for capacity. My hypothesis states that, keeping the capacity
constant, larger cohort size means that a smaller percentage of the students will apply. I
conduct the estimation both on data including all the districts and on data including only
districts without a private gymnasium. As expected, the eﬀect of the population size is
negative and signiﬁcant. An increase in cohort size by 100 decreases the revealed demand
(the number of students applying to gymnasia) by between 10.2 students (the speciﬁcation
with all the districts) and 13.5 students (the speciﬁcation with districts without private
gymnasia). This reinforces the results of the IV regression and of the OLS regression with
gymnasium capacity replaced by the Distortion Coeﬃcient, indicating that the observed
relationship between capacity and revealed demand is due to preference misrepresentation
and not due to adjustments of capacity to true demand.
The panel data analysis points in the same direction as the analysis using pooled data.
The results allow me to conclude that there is convincing empirical evidence in support of
my hypothesis of preference misrepresentation. In all the speciﬁcations I consider, I ﬁnd
that revealed demand is aﬀected by factors that should not aﬀect the true demand, which
leads me to conclude that the true and revealed demand diﬀer. These factors aﬀect the
revealed demand in the assumed direction and the coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant.
2.6 Individual application behavior by social status
In this section I examine my second hypothesis, namely that preference misrepresentation
mainly concerns students with weaker socio-economic (SE) backgrounds. Under this
assumption the current admission procedure may limit social mobility by limiting access
to a high-quality education for these students. I show that by holding ability constant,
a student from a SE family or whose parents have lower education is less likely to apply
to a gymnasium.28
27Chi2(2) = 2.4 and P-value = 0.301 for the period 2002-2004; Chi2(3) = 3.29 and P-value = .349 for
the period 2002-2005
28Finding this eﬀect may, however, as well reﬂect diﬀerent preference ordering of individual schools by
the SE students and it does not allow me to conclude with certainty that SE students misrepresent their
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There may be several reasons the SE students are less likely to apply to public gym-
nasia. First, although they may still prefer it to other schools, SE students may actually
value a gymnasium less than wealthier students do. SE students may be less sure about
continuing to university, in which case a good vocational school may be a more acceptable
alternative for them. Second, for a student from a well-oﬀ family a rejection by a public
gymnasium need not be so serious, since the family may aﬀord to pay tuition at a private
gymnasium willing to accept the student. This option may not be available for a student
from a SE family who would thus prefer a less attractive school with higher admission
probability. Third, a lower family social status may lead to lower self-conﬁdence, which
in turn may discourage even a high-ability student from applying to a gymnasium. The
current system sometimes gives rise to cronyism and corruption, the perception of which
alone may discourage students from SE families to apply.
In terms of my model of section 2.3.2, these factors can be interpreted as variables
entering the expected utility derived from applying to a gymnasium uGij and the prob-
ability of applying to a gymnasium pGij. If a SE student values gymnasium less than a
well-oﬀ student does, it means that his true utility from studying at a gymnasium is
lower, which also lowers the expected utility from applying and, thus, the probability of
applying. Lower self-conﬁdence decreases the (perception of) the student's probability
of being admitted piij. The unavailability of the private gymnasium option means lower
alternative utility UAlij .
I use the probit estimation to determine the eﬀect of a student's ability (measured
by grades in school and the test scores in the PISA project) and his socioeconomic
characteristics (family income and parental education) on the probability of applying to
a gymnasium.
Overall, I estimate 8 speciﬁcations. As the dependent variable in all the speciﬁcations I
use the binary variable whether or not a student applied to a gymnasium. In speciﬁcation
(1), I use as explanatory variables the following:
• Average grades from the last school report. School grades represent the main in-
formation on study aptitude for the student and his parents. Although the scale is
the same in all the schools, the criteria diﬀer across schools, which means that the
information may be distorted. Students were divided into 4 categories by average
preferences more often than do wealthier ones, especially given my hypothesis that students with more
educated and richer parents will value education more. Although I am not able to rule out the diﬀerent-
preferences eﬀect completely, I present some evidence suggestive of the preference-misrepresentation
eﬀect.
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grades in all the study subjects: average between 1 and 1.5 (1 is the best mark in
the Czech Republic), 1.5  2, 2  2.5, and > 2.5. The ﬁrst category was omitted.
• Average test score from the three PISA tests (mathematics, reading and problem-
solving)
• The per capita family income; the PISA data set reports family income which I
divide by the number of family members, counting both adults and children.
In speciﬁcation (2) I use math grades and math test scores instead of the average
grades and average test scores from all the study subjects. Speciﬁcations (3) and (4)
are, respectively, the same as speciﬁcations (1) and (2), with the diﬀerence that dummies
for parental education have been added. Parents were divided into three groups by
the highest attained educational level: parents with apprentice school or elementary
school,29 parents with upper-secondary school ﬁnished by graduation, and parents with
a university diploma. Speciﬁcations (5)  (8) are like speciﬁcation (1)  (4) but with the
school dummies included. In all the speciﬁcations, average test scores and income were
normalized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation in order to
obtain marginal eﬀects in terms of standard-deviation change.
Results of the probit estimation  the marginal eﬀects on the probability of applying
to a gymnasium  are reported in table 2.8 in the appendix. Results of speciﬁcation (1)
show that the eﬀect of income is positive and signiﬁcant. An increase in the per capita
income of the family by one standard deviation increases the probability of applying to
a gymnasium by 8.3%.
Having average grades between 1.5 and 2 decreases the probability of applying to
a gymnasium by 17.6% compared to the omitted group with average grades between 1
and 1.5; average grades between 2 and 2.5 decreases the probability by 24.1%, and an
average higher than 2.5 by 22.2%. A change in the average score in the three tests by
one standard deviation (when evaluated at the mean test score) changes the probability
by 10.2% (see row 6 in table 2.8). Both the school grades and the test score results are
signiﬁcant in determining whether the student applies to a gymnasium.
Using math grades and math test scores I obtain similar results (see speciﬁcation
2 in table 2.8). The omitted category is a grade of 1 from math. Having a grade of
2 decreases the probability of applying by 13.9% and having a grade of 3 or worse by
29In the Czech Republic, elementary school also includes the lower-secondary level.
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30.4%. Holding the grade constant, a change in math test score by one standard deviation
changes the probability by 8.4%. The eﬀect of income in this speciﬁcation is also positive
and signiﬁcant although slightly smaller in magnitude: one standard deviation in per
capita family income changes the probability of application by 7.1%.
When I include parental education as an explanatory variable (speciﬁcations 3 and
4), the eﬀect of income decreases in magnitude but remains positive and signiﬁcant. The
educational dummies are signiﬁcant by themselves and are quite large in magnitude.
When at least one of the parents has a university education then the probability of
applying to a gymnasium increases by 10%  15%, everything else held constant. In this
case, the fact whether parents have graduated from an apprentice school (or less) or a
secondary school does not make much diﬀerence.
In speciﬁcations 5  8 I control for school dummies.30 First, I observe that the eﬀects
of average grades and, although less so, math grades are larger. For example, a student
with average grades between 2 and 2.5 is now 37.7% less likely to apply to a gymnasium
than a student with average grades between 1 and 1.5, whereas without controlling for
school dummies, the diﬀerence was only 24.1%. The reason is that, given average grades,
students from better schools are more likely to apply to a gymnasium and the true
(within-school) sensitivity to grades is thus larger than the sensitivity obtained when all
the students are pooled together.
Family income also has a larger eﬀect when controlling for school dummies.31 A change
by one standard deviation in income changes the probability of applying to gymnasium
by 8.3% in speciﬁcation (1) and by 5% in speciﬁcation (3); the values are 14.5% and
11.1% in speciﬁcations (5) and (7), respectively. It is possible to explain this diﬀerence
consistently with my hypothesis in that the observed eﬀect of income is due to higher
preference misrepresentation among the students from a weaker social background and
not due to diﬀerent preference ordering of these students, although this need not be the
only possible explanation.
The argument is similar as for grades. First note that controlling for individual schools
also means controlling for districts. Students from a district with higher gymnasium ca-
pacity (relative to true demand) will be more likely to apply to a gymnasium, given
30Because of the low number of observations, the school dummies are not jointly signiﬁcant in speciﬁ-
cations 5 (chi2(64) = 50.09, Prob > chi2 = 0.8983) and 7 (chi2(64) = 49.26, Prob > chi2 = 0.9128). They
are, however, signiﬁcant in speciﬁcations 6 (chi2(97) = 168.21, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000) and 8 (chi2(97) =
167.26, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000).
31This holds only in the speciﬁcation using average grades and average scores; when using math grades
and math scores, the coeﬃcients remain almost the same.
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family income, than students from a district with lower gymnasium capacity. In a rela-
tionship between income and probability of applying, controlling for districts means that
each district will have a diﬀerent intercept and the coeﬃcient in the true (within district)
relationship between income and probability will be higher.
A similar argument could be made for parental education which also has higher co-
eﬃcients in speciﬁcations (5) and (7) than in speciﬁcations (1) and (3).32 While having
parents who completed secondary school decreases the probability of applying by 15.5%
without controlling for school dummies, it decreases the probability by 20.7% when I
control for school dummies.
Table 2.9 in the Appendix shows the ﬁtted probabilities from a probit estimation that
a student with given characteristics will apply to a gymnasium. In this table, students
are divided into groups by parental education and, respectively, math grades, math test
scores, average grades, and average test scores. This table shows that for students in
the same ability group, parental education plays a crucial role. For example, when I
look at math grades, a student with grade of 1 and at least one of the parents having
a university education, has a probability of applying to a gymnasium of 0.675; parents
with a secondary school education decreases the probability to 0.446; and apprentice or
elementary school decreases it further to 0.340.
2.7 Discussion and conclusion
This paper presents an empirical evidence for two hypotheses, namely that the current
admission procedure encourages students to misrepresent their preferences for schools,
and that this preference misrepresentation more often concerns students from weaker
socioeconomic backgrounds. In this ﬁnal section I oﬀer, on the one hand, some ideas
about what kind of development in students' and schools' strategies might be expected
if the procedure stays in its current form and, on the other hand, some suggestions for
reform of the procedure.
Let me begin with recent trends in the behavior of schools and students. There seems
to be a parallel between their behavior and the behavior, described in Roth (1991), of
agents in other two-sided markets which use a non-centralized or an unstable matching
mechanism. The parallel consists in the tendency toward unraveling, i.e the process of
32The diﬀerence is again signiﬁcant only in speciﬁcations with average grades; with math grades, the
coeﬃcients are practically the same.
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moving back the dates when matches are eﬀectively agreed upon. The context in Roth
(1991) is one of new physicians and surgeons being matched to hospitals; unraveling
means that the date when matches are agreed upon occurs long before the completion of
the study and moves still further to the back. The oﬃcial matching mechanism is then
used only to formalize the previously agreed matches.
A similar tendency has slowly emerged in the studied context. Indeed, some schools
devised a way to sidestep the limitation to a single application. A school holds a "re-
hearsal" entrance examination before the deadline for submitting applications, formally
to allow students to ﬁeld-test their abilities. In reality, there is a common understand-
ing between the school and the students that this is a real exam and the school uses it
to select applicants. The school then also holds some form of entrance examination on
the nation-wide standardized date, but for those who succeeded at the "rehearsal" this
is just a formality. The advantage for those rejected is that they did not waste their
oﬃcial application on the single shot they have in the oﬃcial admission procedure. As
the "rehearsal" exam enables a school to choose the best students ahead of time, one can
expect that the other schools will react similarly. More and more schools will likely use
this strategy by administering "preliminary" examinations at ever earlier dates.
Unraveling is a consequence of the instability of the oﬃcial mechanism. By agreeing
on matches earlier, students and schools may achieve a matching with better properties
than the one produced by the oﬃcial mechanism but this matching is not likely to be
optimal. For example, if the match is agreed too far ahead, neither schools nor students
may know with certainty what their preferences will be at the time the match is to be
consummated. The problem could be solved by introducing a stable mechanism. This
is supported by the empirical evidence in Roth (1991) who shows that in markets that
introduced a stable mechanism, unraveling was curtailed and high voluntary participation
in the mechanism was achieved. One such mechanism is the Gale-Shapley (GS) matching
mechanism, which the Boston school administration recently decided to use.
There are two concerns regarding the implementation of the GS mechanism. Admin-
istratively, the system could be more demanding than the current system, mainly because
schools would have to be able to rank more students than they do now. This could be
solved in one of two ways. Either a student would have to take an entrance exam at all
the schools by which he would like to be considered, which is in fact the same as when
applying to university,33 or a common test, something like the SAT in the US, would be
33The similarity concerns only the possibility of the choice of multiple schools; Czech universities do
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taken by all students and the schools would produce the rankings based on the results
of this test. Students would also have to rank all the schools at which they would like
to be considered, but since most students have some preference ordering for the schools,
this should not be a problem. The additional administrative costs need not be high and
given the importance of the secondary-school choice they are certainly worth taking.
The other concern is more fundamental and deals with the possibility of separation
of the best students in the best schools. Under the current system it typically happens
that some less talented students (who mustered the courage and were lucky) end up in a
high-quality schools while some highly talented students end up in a worse school. In the
GS mechanism, the variance of students' abilities within a single school would most likely
decrease and the highly talented students would be more likely to cluster together. The
mixing of students with diﬀerent talents is viewed by some as advantageous because of the
potentially positive peer eﬀects. Although some mixing may be a legitimate aim, it could
be achieved in a way which is more transparent, less unfair, and which does not induce
preference manipulation. Quite simply, the over-demanded schools would be required to
assign a certain share of their seats by lottery, while the rest would be assigned using the
centralized matching mechanism.
not use any centralized mechanism.
75
2.A Appendix  tables and regression results
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Table 2.1: Demand for and capacity of gymnasia (school data)
First Round Total
Year Applicants Admitted Excess Applicants Admitted Excess
2002 0.157 0.107 1.465 0.235 0.120 1.953
(0.061) (0.038) (0.245) (0.097) (0.044) (0.338)
2003 0.162 0.116 1.378 0.240 0.129 1.849
(0.067) (0.040) (0.225) (0.098) (0.046) (0.305)
2004 0.155 0.114 1.363 0.233 0.126 1.835
(0.059) (0.036) (0.230) (0.095) (0.041) (0.342)
2005 NA NA NA 0.168 0.127 1.301
NA NA NA (0.073) (0.045) (0.201)
Source: Oﬃce for Educational Information (UIV). "Applicants" and "Admitted" are
the shares of applying and admitted students on the population of 9th-grade students.
"Excess" is the ratio of applying to admitted students. The values in parenthesis are
standard deviations. Observations are weighted by the number of gymnasia in each
district.
Table 2.2: Secondary school applications, 1st round (individual data)
Secondary School Number of Applicants Per cent
No Application 14 0
Apprentice School w/o Graduation 972 19
Apprentice School with Graduation 585 12
Vocational School 2592 51
Gymnasium 884 18
Total 5047 100
Source: PISA. The sample includes all the 9th grade students in the PISA sample
with the exception of students of 8-year gymnasia
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Table 2.3: Demand for public gymnasia (OLS and IV)
OLS-02-04 OLS-02-05 IV-02-04 IV-02-05
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capacity 1.205∗∗∗ 1.159∗∗∗ 1.213∗∗∗ 1.204∗∗∗
(.040) (.035) (.090) (.082)
Private gym. in district .012∗∗∗ .008∗∗∗ .012∗∗∗ .008∗∗
(.004) (.003) (.004) (.003)
Share Uni. Educ. .215∗∗∗ .299∗∗∗ .211∗∗∗ .282∗∗∗
(.045) (.041) (.053) (.049)
University Distr. .014∗∗∗ .012∗∗∗ .014∗∗∗ .011∗∗∗
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Const. -.012∗∗ -.017∗∗∗ -.012 -.019∗∗∗
(.005) (.004) (.007) (.007)
Obs. 225 300 216 288
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; * signiﬁcant at 10% level. The dependent variable is
the share of ﬁrst-round applicants to gymnasia on the population of 9th grade students. The explanatory
variables are the share of students (on the population of 9th grade students) admitted to gymnasia in
the ﬁrst round of the admission procedure (Capacity); the share of university educated population in
a given district (Share Uni. Educ.); dummy for a university being present in the district (University
Distr.); and dummy for a private gymnasium present in the district. Observations are weighted by the
number of 9th grade students in respective districts. In the IV speciﬁcations, the Capacity variable is
instrumented by the capacity from 1991.
Table 2.4: Demand for public gymnasia (OLS and IV, districts without private gymna-
sium)
OLS-02-04 OLS-02-05 IV-02-04 IV-02-05
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capacity 1.222∗∗∗ 1.167∗∗∗ 1.077∗∗∗ 1.075∗∗∗
(.037) (.033) (.101) (.088)
Share Uni. Educ. .436∗∗∗ .479∗∗∗ .579∗∗∗ .572∗∗∗
(.122) (.112) (.172) (.154)
University Distr. -.004 -.002 -.004 -.002
(.004) (.004) (.005) (.004)
Const. -.033∗∗∗ -.033∗∗∗ -.031∗∗∗ -.032∗∗∗
(.011) (.010) (.012) (.010)
Obs. 181 239 172 227
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; * signiﬁcant at 10% level. The dependent variable
and the independent variables (with the exception of the dummy for private gymnasia which falls out)
are as in table 2.3 and so are the weights and the instruments.
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Table 2.5: Demand for public gymnasia (OLS using distortion coeﬃcient)
OLS-02-04-DistC OLS-02-05-DistC
(1) (2)
Distortion Coeﬃcient -.078∗∗∗ -.081∗∗∗
(.006) (.006)
Private gym. in district .012∗ .008
(.006) (.005)
Share Uni. Educ. .553∗∗∗ .633∗∗∗
(.074) (.066)
University Distr. .021∗∗∗ .022∗∗∗
(.007) (.006)
Const. .165∗∗∗ .159∗∗∗
(.010) (.009)
Obs. 216 288
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; * signiﬁcant at 10% level. The Distortion Coeﬃcient
is deﬁned in the following way: (POP15200X/POP151991)/(CAPG200X/CAPG1991), where POP15year
stands for the size of 15-year-old population in the respective year and CAPGyear stands for the capacity
of public gymnasia in the respective year. The higher the value of the coeﬃcient, the tougher the
competition for public gymnasia became since 1991 and the higher the distortion to the true demand.
Table 2.6: Demand for public gymnasia (ﬁxed and random eﬀects)
Fixed-02-04 Random-02-04 Fixed-02-05 Random-02-05
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capacity 1.122∗∗∗ 1.176∗∗∗ 1.060∗∗∗ 1.125∗∗∗
(.062) (.001) (.052) (.001)
Private gym. in district -.004 .012∗∗∗ .004 .008∗∗∗
(.021) (.0001) (.021) (.0001)
Share Uni. Educ. .228∗∗∗ .313∗∗∗
(.002) (.001)
University Distr. .014∗∗∗ .012∗∗∗
(.0001) (.0001)
Const. .072∗∗∗ -.010∗∗∗ .075∗∗∗ -.015∗∗∗
(.024) (.0002) (.022) (.0002)
Obs. 225 225 300 300
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; * signiﬁcant at 10% level. The dependent variable
and the independent variables are as in table 2.3 and so are the weights. Results of the Hausman
speciﬁcation test for ﬁxed versus random eﬀects procedure: Chi2(2) = 0.49 and P-value = 0.781 for the
period 2002-2004; Chi2(2) = 1.7 and P-value = 0.427 for the period 2002-2005.
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Table 2.7: Changes in population size (ﬁxed eﬀects)
OLS-All OLS-No-Private
(1) (2)
Capacity .630∗∗∗ .946∗∗∗
(.050) (.063)
Cohort Size -.102∗∗∗ -.135∗∗∗
(.024) (.032)
Const. .275 .197∗∗
(.258) (.078)
Obs. 225 181
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; * signiﬁcant at 10% level. The dependent variable is
the share of ﬁrst-round applicants to gymnasia on the population of 9th grade students. The independent
variables are the absolute capacity and the size of the student population.
80
Ta
bl
e
2.
8:
In
di
vi
du
al
ap
pl
ica
tio
n
be
ha
vi
or

m
ar
gi
na
le
ﬀe
ct
sf
ro
m
pr
ob
it
es
tim
at
io
n
Sp
ec
iﬁ
ca
tio
n
Ex
pl
an
at
or
y
Va
r.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
Av
g.
M
ar
k
1.
5-
2
-0
.1
76
-0
.1
71
-0
.1
88
-0
.1
86
(0
.0
32
)
(0
.0
32
)
(0
.0
50
)
(0
.0
50
)
Av
g.
M
ar
k
2-
2.
5
-0
.2
41
-0
.2
37
-0
.3
77
-0
.3
68
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.0
45
)
Av
g.
M
ar
k
≥2
.5
-0
.2
22
-0
.2
14
-0
.3
12
-0
.2
93
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.0
36
)
(0
.0
37
)
M
at
h
M
ar
k
2
-0
.1
39
-0
.1
33
-0
.1
49
-0
.1
43
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
19
)
M
at
h
M
ar
k
≥3
-0
.3
04
-0
.2
93
-0
.3
25
-0
.3
16
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
19
)
Av
g.
Sc
or
e
0.
10
2
0.
09
9
0.
09
9
0.
10
5
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
38
)
(0
.0
37
)
M
at
h
Sc
or
e
0.
08
4
0.
07
5
0.
07
5
0.
06
7
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
11
)
In
co
m
e
0.
08
3
0.
07
1
0.
05
0
0.
05
0
0.
14
5
0.
06
5
0.
11
1
0.
04
7
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
35
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
35
)
(0
.0
09
)
P.
Ed
uc
.L
ow
-0
.1
20
-0
.1
27
-0
.1
66
-0
.1
18
(0
.0
39
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
60
)
(0
.0
20
)
P.
Ed
uc
.M
ed
.
-0
.1
55
-0
.1
02
-0
.2
07
-0
.1
10
(0
.0
41
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
64
)
(0
.0
20
)
Sc
h.
D
um
m
ies
N
O
N
O
N
O
N
O
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
Y
ES
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
54
4
24
27
54
4
24
27
39
9
23
28
39
9
23
28
G
ra
de
s
ar
e
ta
ke
n
fro
m
th
e
la
st
sc
ho
ol
re
po
rt
gi
ve
n
to
a
st
ud
en
t.
Th
e
av
er
ag
e
m
ar
k
is
th
e
av
er
ag
e
fro
m
th
e
fo
llo
wi
ng
su
bj
ec
ts
:
M
at
he
m
at
ics
,C
ze
ch
La
ng
ua
ge
,F
or
eig
n
La
ng
ua
ge
,P
hy
sic
s,
Ch
em
ist
ry
,B
io
lo
gy
an
d
G
eo
gr
ap
hy
.S
tu
de
nt
sa
re
di
vi
de
d
in
to
4
ca
te
go
rie
sb
y
av
er
ag
em
ar
k,
th
eo
m
itt
ed
ca
te
go
ry
is
th
e
on
e
wi
th
be
st
av
er
ag
e
m
ar
k
(1
-1
.5
).
Te
st
sc
or
es
ar
e
ta
ke
n
fro
m
th
e
PI
SA
te
st
s.
Th
e
av
er
ag
e
sc
or
e
is
th
e
av
er
ag
e
of
m
at
h,
re
ad
in
g
an
d
pr
ob
lem
so
lv
in
g
te
st
sc
or
es
.
Bo
th
m
at
h
an
d
av
er
ag
e
te
st
sc
or
es
ar
e
no
rm
al
ize
d
by
su
bt
ra
ct
in
g
m
ea
n
an
d
di
vi
di
ng
by
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n.
In
co
m
e
is
th
e
pe
rc
ap
ita
fa
m
ily
in
co
m
e,
no
rm
al
ize
d
in
th
e
sa
m
e
wa
y
as
te
st
sc
or
es
.
Pa
re
nt
s
we
re
di
vi
de
d
in
to
th
re
e
ca
te
go
rie
s
by
th
eir
m
ax
im
um
ed
uc
at
io
na
ll
ev
el:
un
iv
er
sit
y
(h
ig
h)
,
se
co
nd
ar
y
sc
ho
ol
wi
th
gr
ad
ua
tio
n
(m
ed
iu
m
),
an
d
ap
pr
en
tic
e
or
ele
m
en
ta
ry
sc
ho
ol
(lo
w)
.I
ft
he
ed
uc
at
io
n
di
ﬀe
re
d
be
tw
ee
n
th
e
tw
o
pa
re
nt
s,
th
e
ed
uc
at
io
n
lev
el
of
th
e
m
or
e
ed
uc
at
ed
pa
re
nt
wa
st
ak
en
as
re
lev
an
t.
Th
e
"h
ig
h"
ca
te
go
ry
wa
so
m
itt
ed
.
81
Table 2.9: Probability of applying to gymnasium
Parental Education Parental Education
Math Mark Low Medium High Low Medium High
1 0.340 0.446 0.675 0.311 0.445 0.670
2 0.137 0.227 0.433 0.121 0.213 0.428
3 0.020 0.040 0.111 0.019 0.039 0.107
School Dummies Yes Yes Yes No No No
Parental Education Parental Education
Math Test Score Low Medium High Low Medium High
> 1 0.300 0.397 0.640 0.269 0.389 0.629
0  1 0.139 0.221 0.404 0.129 0.208 0.405
−1  0 0.054 0.111 0.236 0.053 0.109 0.232
< −1 0.030 0.046 0.082 0.019 0.041 0.079
School Dummies Yes Yes Yes No No No
Parental Education Parental Education
Average Mark Low Medium High Low Medium High
1-1.5 0.474 0.512 0.801 0.374 0.435 0.746
1.5-2 0.196 0.208 0.532 0.108 0.152 0.434
2-2.5 0.046 0.035 0.109 0.018 0.022 0.116
>2.5 0.007 0.029 0.023 0.006 0.011 0.053
School Dummies Yes Yes Yes No No No
Parental Education Parental Education
Avg. Test Score Low Medium High Low Medium High
> 1 0.618 0.516 0.724 0.437 0.441 0.703
0  1 0.186 0.231 0.578 0.119 0.199 0.477
−1  0 0.098 0.118 0.241 0.058 0.084 0.201
< −1 0.009 0.050 0.155 0.003 0.010 0.091
School Dummies Yes Yes Yes No No No
The ﬁgures in the tables are ﬁtted values from the probit regression. The
parental education categories are the same as in table 2.8. The math test
score and average test score categories divide the students into groups
by average deviation distance from mean. For example, category >1
includes students with test score by more than 1 standard deviation
better than average.
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Chapter 3
Bankruptcy Regimes and
Gambling on Resurrection
Co-authored by Ond°ej Vychodil
(Previous version published in February 2006 as CERGE-EI Working Paper No. 290)
Abstract
We develop a model of a debt contracting problem under bankruptcy regimes diﬀering
by a degree of softness. In the model, the degree of softness is associated with the extent
to which the absolute priority rule can be violated. We show that when the degree of
softness can be set individually for each project, then the debtor's tendency to excessive
risk-taking can be eliminated and the ﬁrst best solution can be attained. When it is
given exogenously by a bankruptcy law, then a completely tough law results in a lower
distortion from the ﬁrst best than a soft law with a moderate degree of softness.
Keywords: corporate bankruptcy, debt contracts, ex ante eﬃciency
JEL classiﬁcation codes: G33, K12, K39
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3.1 Introduction
A question often debated among bankruptcy scholars is whether ﬁrm value in bankruptcy
should be divided in accordance with the absolute priority rule (APR). In particular, the
issue is whether it is optimal that shareholders receive some payoﬀ only after all the
creditors have been paid in full. In the bankruptcy literature,1 bankruptcy laws are
usually divided into tough and soft, depending on how a ﬁrm's management is treated.
But because providing the management with a favorable treatment is usually associated
with more APR violations, we use the categories tough and soft to denote whether
the law enables APR violations (soft law) or prevents them (tough law).
In this paper, we analyze the debt contracting problem in the presence of gambling on
resurrection, i.e. debtor's excessive risk taking in the situation of privately observed high
probability of ﬁnancial distress, under diﬀerent bankruptcy regimes.2 We ﬁrst show that
if the degree of softness can be determined endogenously, i.e. agreed upon between the
debtor and the creditor, the ﬁrst-best solution can always be attained. In reality, however,
this is not possible due to the multiplicity of creditors with diﬀerent seniority levels, for
each of which the optimal degree of softness would be diﬀerent. We then examine the
situations, in which, as in practice, the degree of softness is given exogenously by the
bankruptcy law. A suﬃciently soft law can eliminate the debtor's moral hazard problem
and leads to optimal investment level, though at the cost of higher interest rates. Under
a law that is insuﬃciently soft, however, this moral hazard problem gets even worse than
under a completely tough law. We also show that the gambling on resurrection argument
for soft law is further weakened if a possibility for creditors to verify the ﬁrm's situation
is introduced.
In the literature, one may ﬁnd arguments both in favor of soft law and tough law.3 In
line with the claim of Hart (2000) that there is no one size ﬁts all solution in bankruptcy
1For an up-to-date survey of the economic literature on both personal and corporate bankruptcy see
White (2007). In our paper, we deal with corporate bankruptcy only.
2The debtor's gambling on resurrection is necessarily accompanied with misreporting (not confessing
the observed situation to creditors). Infamous examples of such cooking of books prior to the failure
include the cases of Enron's top management prior to the company's bankruptcy, or Mr. Bernard
Madoﬀ within his Ponzi scheme of about $ 50 bn. On the sovereign level, one may argue about the
Greek government's alleged misreporting on its ﬁscal situation. A clear example from economies that
have transformed from plan to market within the last two decades is the behavior of the top management
and some shareholders of Investicni a Postovni Banka few years prior to the third largest Czech bank's
failure in 2000 which costed Czech tax payers about $ 8 bn.
3For a summary of some pros and cons of soft and tough bankruptcy laws see Knot and Vychodil
(2005).
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legislation, one may say that each of these pros and cons is of diﬀerent relevance and
strength in diﬀerent countries.4
One of the ex ante eﬃciency arguments for soft law has been the gambling on resurrec-
tion hypothesis, which states that under APR, debtors tend towards excessive risk-taking
and delaying bankruptcy ﬁling once they privately observe that they are on the verge of
bankruptcy. Violation of APR is believed to suppress this type of moral hazard problem
by giving shareholders a positive payoﬀ even though the creditors are not paid in full.
In this paper, we show that this is not generally valid and should thus be viewed with
caution.
The most discussed example of a law enabling APR violations has been Chapter 11 of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code of 1978. Although de iure APR is supposed to hold in Chapter
11, vast empirical evidence has been collected to support the hypothesis that de facto
APR is violated in bankruptcy cases under Chapter 11.5 After a bankruptcy ﬁling, the
automatic stay prevents creditors from further debt collection eﬀorts, the management
has an exclusive position to present a plan of reorganization, and the consent of a class
of creditors with the plan can be replaced, under the cram down procedure, by a court
decision. These are just examples of rules that enable the management to enforce APR
violations on the creditors. Certainly, the U.S. case is just one of many and we can
observe very diﬀerent bankruptcy laws around the world with diﬀerent degrees of APR
violation.
There are several papers similar to our paper. In the model of Bebchuk (2001) the
APR violations increase the distortions of management's decision-making in favor of
risky projects (they worsen the gambling on resurrection problem). In our model, too,
we observe this eﬀect for certain parameter values. Unlike Bebchuk, however, we ﬁnd
that under diﬀerent parameter values a soft law can actually eliminate the gambling on
resurrection problem and lead to optimal investment level. The law, however, needs to
be soft enough to have this eﬀect.6
4Some authors explicitly studied various country-related speciﬁc factors that should be taken into
account when designing an optimal bankruptcy law. For instance, Baird and Rasmussen (2002) and
Baird and Rasmussen (2003) stress the importance of capital structure and the functioning of asset
markets, Berkovitch and Israel (1998) emphasize information structure, while Lambert-Mogiliansky,
Sonin, and Zhuravskaya (2003) and Biais and Recasens (2002) study the eﬀects of corruption among
judges.
5See, e.g., Franks and Torous (1989), Eberhart, Moore, and Roenfeldt (1990), LoPucki and Whitford
(1990), Weiss (1990), Bebchuk and Picker (1993), Franks and Torous (1994), Betker (1995), Longhofer
and Carlstrom (1995), Weiss and Wruck (1998), Carapeto (2000).
6The diﬀerence between our model and Bebchuk's comes from the fact that Bebchuk assumes the
project characteristics are given ex ante and are private information of the ﬁrm. In Bebchuk's model,
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Another related paper is Bester (1994). In Bester's model, the low state automatically
implies default, while in the high state the debtor can either repay or default strategi-
cally. Thus the high-type debtor might pretend to be a low-type and the creditor cannot
distinguish between ﬁnancial and strategic default. In our model, instead, we focus on
the situation of the low-type pretending to be the high-type and of the creditor's lowered
ability to distinguish between success-driven continuation and gambling on resurrection.
Finally, in the model of Povel (1999), the debtor also receives a private signal on the
project's type, unobservable by creditors, and decides either to ﬁle for bankruptcy or
continue running the ﬁrm. Nonetheless, in Povel's model the debtor, in addition, chooses
her eﬀort level between the initial ﬁnancing period and receiving the signal. The main
idea of that model lies in the trade-oﬀ between incentives to invest eﬀort and incentives
to reveal private information about the project's type. Soft bankruptcy law worsens the
former while improving the latter. In our model, we assume away the eﬀort choice and
show that even the pure eﬀect of the law's softness on incentives to reveal true information
is twofold. Under some circumstances, softening bankruptcy law strengthens the debtor's
motives for gambling on resurrection and misreporting.
The model we present in this paper is, we believe, both realistic and tractable. In
general, it draws the connection between ﬁnancial contracting and bankruptcy law. More
speciﬁcally, it allows  among other things  for inspecting the links between bankruptcy
law design, credit rationing, company's misreporting, cost of monitoring, proﬁtability of
projects, and size of ﬁrms. An important part of the paper are simulations showing, for
each of the bankruptcy regimes, the sensitivity of the individual variables to parameter
changes.
The paper is structured as follows. The following section describes the setup of the
model and deﬁnes contracts and strategies. Section 3.3 analyzes the benchmark situation
when the degree of softness of bankruptcy law is speciﬁed endogenously in the contract.
In the fourth section we treat the degree of softness as an exogenous parameter and
analyze the eﬀects of diﬀerent values of this parameter on investment level, interest rate
and strategy choice. Section 3.5 introduces the possibility for the creditor to verify, with
a certain cost, the debtor's report. The sixth section considers what happens when we
allow the parties to renegotiate the contract in period 1. Section 3.7 concludes.
once the project is started, there are no more decisions concerning its characteristics. On the other
hand, we assume that the project's characteristics are common knowledge at the time when the project
is ﬁnanced. Only after that, the debtor privately learns information about how the project's chances to
succeed changed and may choose a risky or a safe strategy.
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3.2 The model
3.2.1 Setup
We study a relationship between a debtor, who owns a ﬁrm,7 and a bank. We assume
the debtor is both the ﬁrm's owner and its manager and has limited liability. The debtor
has an opportunity to undertake a proﬁtable project and needs ﬁnancing from the bank
in order to do so. Bank credit is the only source of ﬁnancing for the debtor.8 The initial
investment in the project is determined by both parties. During the life of the project the
debtor receives private information about the probability of the project's success. The
information may be either good or bad. The project's characteristics are such that it is
optimal to continue if the information is good (the probability of success is high) and to
quit if the information is bad (the probability of success is low). The incentives of the
debtor, however, may be to continue the project even if the information is bad.
The project, if successful, can bring β(K) whereK is a non-negative initial investment.
We assume a particular form of β(K), namely β(K) = B ln (K + 1) where B > 0. Note
that β(0) = 0, β′(K) > 0, and β′′(K) < 0. The decreasing returns imply that there is an
optimal level of investment, one at which the marginal beneﬁt equals the marginal cost.
An important property of diﬀerent bankruptcy regimes that we examine is whether they
induce the optimal investment level. The whole investment K is ﬁnanced by debt which
means that the debt level equals the size of investment. In exchange for the provided
ﬁnancing, the bank is promised to obtain (1 + r)K at the end of the game, unless the
ﬁrm goes bankrupt. We assume the risk-free interest rate is zero. The credit market is
competitive which means that, in equilibrium, the bank's expected proﬁt will be zero and
the debtor of the ﬁrm will capture all the surplus from the relationship which also means
that the debtor's expected proﬁt is a perfect measure of the social gain from the project.
The relationship extends over three periods. In period 0 a credit contract is signed and
investment is realized. The contract speciﬁes the principal K, the interest rate r, and the
strategy to be followed in period 1. In period 1 the debtor receives private information
about the state of the world, either truthfully or untruthfully reveals it to the creditor,
and decides on a further strategy  either continue running the project (strategy SC) or
quit the project (strategy SQ). In period 2 outcomes are realized and returns divided
7Under a ﬁrm we understand primarily a collection of assets used in a particular business.
8This assumption is common in existing models on ex ante eﬀects of a bankruptcy law and does not
limit the validity of the model's implications.
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according to the contract and, in the case of bankruptcy, according to the bankruptcy
law.
There may be two states of the world in period 1, the good state (H) and the bad state
(L), with probabilities p and (1− p), respectively, where 0 < p < 1. If the debtor decides
to quit the project (strategy SQ), a recovery value γK, where 0 < γ < 1, is obtained with
certainty, no matter whether the state of the world is H or L. If the debtor decides to
continue the project (strategy SC) in state H, the project continues and yields the good
outcome, B ln (K + 1), with certainty. However, in state L, strategy SC results in the
good outcome, B ln (K + 1), only with probability pi, and in the bad outcome, 0, with
probability 1− pi, where 0 < pi < 1. For a project that had been ﬁnanced in period 0 we
must have B ln (K + 1) > γK, otherwise the project would always be liquidated in period
1 and would have never been ﬁnanced in period 0. Therefore, if the debtor observes that
the state of the world is H, she continues the project for sure. The only decision node
regarding the choice between strategy SC and strategy SQ is thus in state L.
The ﬁrm's value before the start of the project is V > 0. This can be thought of as
the value of the assets the ﬁrm possesses and that may serve as collateral.
Throughout the paper, besides providing analytic derivations of optimal contracts
under diﬀerent legal and institutional setups, we illustrate these contracts by simulations
on a numerical example with parameters given as p = 0.6, pi = 0.2, γ = 0.65, and
V = 1, unless stated otherwise. Graphical representations of these simulations are given
in Appendix 3.A.2.
3.2.2 Contracts and strategies
Both the debtor and the bank are risk-neutral agents who maximize their expected proﬁts.
A strategy Si ∈ {SC , SQ} is the debtor's decision whether to continue (SC) or quit (SQ)
the project in state L. A contract is a triple {K, r, Si} ∈ <2+ × {SC , SQ}. The bank
lends the ﬁrm K in period 0 and the debtor promises on behalf of the ﬁrm to repay
(1 + r)K in period 2. The debtor also commits to follow strategy Si in period 1 if state
L occurs. Denote the debtor's and the bank's expected proﬁt in period t as Ft(K, r, Si)
and Gt(K, r, Si), respectively, where t = 0, 1.
A contract {K, r, Si} is incentive compatible if in period 1  when the debtor decides
whether to quit or continue  F1(K, r, Si) ≥ F1(K, r, Sj), i 6= j. A contract is feasible if
it is incentive compatible and G0(K, r, Si) ≥ 0. The debtor's maximization problem has,
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thus, the following form:
max
(K,r,Si)∈<2+×{SC ,SQ}
F0(K, r, Si) (3.1)
s.t.
F1(K, r, Si) ≥ F1(K, r, Sj), i 6= j, (3.2)
G0(K, r, Si) ≥ 0. (3.3)
In period 1 the debtor privately learns the state of the world, reports it to the creditor,
and chooses between strategies SC and SQ. The creditor cannot observe the state of the
world, but only observes the choice of strategy.9 If the period 1 state of the world is H,
there is no moral hazard as continuation (SC) is the optimal strategy for both the debtor
and the creditor. Thus, if state H occurs, the project continues smoothly to period 2. If
the period 1 state is L and the contract requires the debtor to follow SQ, then, for certain
levels of K and r, the debtor has an incentive to misreport (i.e., report state H) and to
follow SC .
This is where our model diﬀers from the previous literature, which usually deﬁnes
a good state as a realization of high cash ﬂows which the debtor can divert instead of
paying to the lender.10 There the principal-agent problem is particularly salient in the
good state. Our model explores the case  more common in reality, we believe  in which
the moral hazard problem occurs in the bad state, in which the debtor is tempted to
continue and gamble on resurrection, while the optimal solution is to quit.
A crucial parameter of our model, in addition to those deﬁned above, is the degree
of softness of bankruptcy law, α, satisfying 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. This parameter determines the
fraction of the residual value of a bankrupt ﬁrm that is captured by the debtor. Thus,
α = 0 means completely tough law and the higher the value of α the softer is the law.
Bankruptcy laws do not specify α explicitly and it is, therefore, not possible to ﬁnd its
value directly in the laws themselves. α is rather a consequence, sometimes unintended,
of the way a law is written and applied by the courts. An important factor aﬀecting α
is whether the law enables for reorganization and under what circumstances. Whereas
in liquidation, most bankruptcy laws ensure (at least on the paper) full adherence to
9Formally, the assumption that the report will be made by the debtor seems redundant, but it will
become utilized later in the treatment with veriﬁcation. In fact, here we assume that the debtor can
report untruthfully without any risk of detection because the cost of veriﬁcation is inﬁnitely high.
10See, e.g., Bester (1994), Berglof and von Thadden (1994), Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), Hart and
Moore (1998), and Berglof, Roland, and von Thadden (2003).
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the absolute priority rule (APR), deviations from APR are typically possible in reorga-
nization, which means that the equity holders can retain part of the value even though
the creditors are not repaid in full. Another factor aﬀecting α is the way the control of
the bankruptcy process is split between the debtor, the creditors and the court. When
the debtor retains some control, she may be able to capture some value even though she
should receive nothing according to strict interpretation of the law.
Even though α cannot be found directly in the bankruptcy law, there is some empirical
evidence concerning its value. A number of studies have estimated the size of deviations
from the APR under the U.S. Chapter 11 (reorganization chapter), typically measured
 following Franks and Torous (1989)  as the amount paid to equity divided by the
amount distributed to creditors under the reorganization plan. This measure, denoted
as ∆APR, slightly diﬀers from the degree of softness α, which represents the share of
the amount paid to equity on the total amount paid to equity and creditors. Thus, to
translate ∆APR to α, one needs to use α = 1
1+ 1
∆
. Using this transformation it can be
stated that, for example, Eberhart, Moore, and Roenfeldt (1990) found an average degree
of softness in their sample of 7.0%, ranging from 0% to 26.5%, while Betker (1995) saw
it in another sample at 2.8%.11
In the following two sections, we solve the model for two diﬀerent setups: one in which
α is determined endogenously within the contract (section 3.3) and another in which α
is given exogenously by the law (section 3.4).12
As we will show below, the setup with α speciﬁed endogenously weakly dominates,
in terms of social welfare, the setup with α speciﬁed exogenously in the bankruptcy law.
The reason is that the law will necessarily ﬁx α at some constant level, which will not be
optimal for most of the projects in the economy. Within the boundaries of this paper,
it would, therefore, be better to leave it on the parties to specify the degree of softness
themselves, setting it at a level optimal for the project in question and avoiding the
application of the law altogether.13 The law, however, exists also for other reasons than
specifying the ratio, in which the value is divided between the debtor and the creditor(s).
11In terms of ∆APR, the estimate of an average deviation from the APR by Eberhart, Moore, and
Roenfeldt (1990) was 7.5%, ranging from 0% to 36%, while that of Betker (1995) was 2.9%. A summary
of similar empirical observations can be found in White (2007).
12For a discussion of the possibility of voluntary contracting for the violation of APR in the case of
bankruptcy, see Povel (1999) and Schwartz (1998).
13Specifying the exactly optimal α in a contract is, however, not possible either. This is, among
others, due to complex and constantly changing debt structure (multiple creditors with diﬀerent senior-
ities), changing values of underlying parameters and impossibility to measure some of the underlying
parameters.
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Its main function is to provide a collective framework for the resolution of a ﬁrm's debts
in a situation when its assets are less than its liabilities and, as such, it also determines
the rules for the division of the ﬁrm value, i.e. specifying the degree of softness.14
3.3 Endogenous choice of the degree of softness
Assume, ﬁrst, that the contract in period 1 speciﬁes α in addition to the principal (K),
the interest rate (r), and the strategy (Si). When α is endogenous, then α, K and r will
always be set at such levels that the debtor prefers the socially optimal strategy SQ in
state L because this maximizes his expected proﬁt. The debtor's maximization problem
then is
max
K≥0, r≥0, 0≤α≤1
p[V +B ln (K + 1)− (1 + r)K]+
+(1− p)max {V + γK − (1 + r)K;α(V + γK)}
(3.4)
s.t.
ICC: max {V + γK − (1 + r)K;α(V + γK)} ≥
≥ pi[V +B ln(K + 1)− (1 + r)K] + (1− pi)αV,
(3.5)
PC: p(1 + r)K + (1− p)min {(1 + r)K; (1− α)(V + γK)} −K ≥ 0. (3.6)
When designing the contract, the debtor maximizes her expected payoﬀ formulated
in the maximand. With probability p, state H will occur in period 1 and the project will
continue till period 2. Then the debtor retains the value of the ﬁrm's assets (independent
of the project) and the project's upside payoﬀ and is able to repay the whole debt.15
With probability (1− p), state L occurs and the debtor quits the project. Depending on
what yields her higher payoﬀ, she chooses between out-of-bankruptcy liquidation, which
gets her full value of the ﬁrm minus the value of the debt, and ﬁling for a bankruptcy
14The main justiﬁcation for the law's existence is muting creditors' incentives to race to be the ﬁrst
to collect. As White (2007) puts it: "When creditors realize that a debtor ﬁrm might be insolvent, they
have an incentive to race against each other to be ﬁrst to collect. This is because, as in a bank run, the
earliest creditors to collect will be paid in full, but later creditors will receive nothing. The race to be ﬁrst
is ineﬃcient, since the ﬁrst creditor to collect may seize assets that the ﬁrm needs for its operations and,
as a result, may force the ﬁrm to shut down. Early shutdown wastes resources because the piecemeal
value of the ﬁrm's assets may be less than their value if the assets are kept together and the ﬁrm sold as
a going concern."
15Note that if the occurrence of state H had not implied full repayment in period 2, the creditor would
not have been willing to lend in period 0.
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reorganization, which frees her from the full debt repayment and gets her fraction α of
the total remaining ﬁrm's value.
Obviously, the debtor's payoﬀ after quitting the project, both from out-of-bankruptcy
liquidation and from bankruptcy reorganization, must be higher than her expected proﬁt
from continuation. The incentive compatibility constraint (3.5) assures that the debtor
will never gamble on resurrection in state L. The gamble would have got him the upside
payoﬀ with probability pi and fraction α of the ﬁrm's assets with probability (1 − pi).
Since α is endogenous, the contract sets it at such a level that incentivizes the debtor
to choose the ﬁrst best strategy, SQ, in state L. Such α can always be found as the
creditor is willing to accept higher α when compensated by a higher interest rate. From
the creditor's participation constraint (3.6) we can see that in the extreme case of α = 1,
the interest rate would reach r = 1−p
p
.
Let us ﬁrst consider what the ﬁrst best solution looks like. The maximization problem
in this case is
max
K≥0
V + pB ln(K + 1) + (1− p)γK −K (3.7)
and the ﬁrst best level of K is
KFB =
pB
1− (1− p)γ − 1. (3.8)
KFB is the level of K that generates the highest surplus. Because the debtor has all
the bargaining power and captures all the ex ante surplus, she would like to set K = KFB.
This will, therefore, be the optimal level of K with α and r adjusted to satisfy the ICC
(3.5) and PC (3.6). Because the debtor's maximization problem does not lead to a unique
solution for α and r  higher α implies higher r, but the optimal level of K and the ex
ante expected proﬁts of the debtor and the creditor remain the same  we assume that
they are both set to the minimum level still satisfying the constraints. If α = 0 and
r = 0 satisfy the ICC for K = KFB, then these are the optimal values. Whether this is
possible depends on the model parameters. In particular, consider parameter B, which
can be thought of as the project's upside or proﬁtability, and denote the maximum value
for which α = 0 and r = 0 is compatible with the ICC as B1. With these assumptions
and notation the solution to the debtor's maximization problem can be shown to take on
the values stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The solution to the debtor's maximization problem with endogenous
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determination of α is
Ken =
pB
1− (1− p)γ − 1 = K
FB,
ren =
 0 if B ≤ B1,1−p
p
[
1− (1− α∗)V+γKFB
KFB
]
otherwise,
α∗ =
 0 if B ≤ B1,V+pB ln(KFB+1)−[1−(1−p)γ]KFB
V+
p+(1−p)pi
pi
γKFB
otherwise,
S = SQ. (3.9)
The main point of the previous proposition is that when the degree of softness can
be determined freely in the contract, the ﬁrst best solution (level of investment and the
optimal strategy choice) can always be attained. When the project is not too proﬁtable
(B < B1), a completely tough law (α = 0) will produce the ﬁrst best solution. The debtor
is never tempted to continue the project in the bad state and the creditor is always repaid
in full, which means he is willing to accept r = 0. When, on the other hand, the project's
proﬁtability exceeds a certain threshold (B ≥ B1), the debtor needs to be incentivized
to liquidate the project in the bad state by receiving a fraction of the ﬁrm's residual
value. The creditor is not always repaid in full and needs to receive positive r in order
to satisfy his participation constraint. The threshold B1 depends positively on the ﬁrm's
value V and the degree to which the project assets can be re-deployed elsewhere (γ).
It depends negatively on the probability of the good state (p) and on the probability
of project success in the bad state (pi). The negative dependence on p results from the
dependence of KFB on p: higher p leads to higher KFB, which increases the value of the
project and makes it more tempting for the debtor to continue in the bad state.
In Appendix 3.A.2 we demonstrate the dependence of K, α and r on the model's
parameters. The optimal investment K is linearly increasing in the project upside pa-
rameter B. α and r are discontinuous functions of B. They both equal zero as long as the
ICC (3.5) can be satisﬁed for K = KFB, r = 0, α = 0; they both jump up discontinuously
when this is no longer possible.
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3.4 Exogenously given degree of softness
The framework developed in the previous section allows us to analyze bankruptcy laws
with various degrees of softness. In this section, we assume that α is given exogenously.
We begin with the tough law case where α = 0 and continue with the analysis of the soft
law case where α > 0.
3.4.1 Tough bankruptcy law
Under the tough law regime, α is exogenously set to 0, which means that the debtor
receives nothing whenever the creditor is not paid in full. Only the choice of K and r in
period 0 can be used to aﬀect the debtor's decision on which strategy to choose in period
1. For the extensive form representation of the game under tough bankruptcy law see
Figure 3.1 in Appendix 3.A.1.
There are two possible situations. First, the level of K is such that the debtor prefers
SQ in state L. In this case the debt is riskless and r = 0. The reason is that for such
a contract to be feasible the debtor must obtain some payoﬀ after quitting the project
which, given α = 0, also means that the bank will be repaid in full. Given that the debtor
can credibly commit to strategy SQ, the maximization problem becomes
max
K≥0
{V + pB ln (K + 1) + (1− p)γK −K} (3.10)
s.t.
ICC: V + γK −K ≥ pi[V +B ln (K + 1)−K]. (3.11)
Second, the level of K is such that the debtor prefers SC in state L, which means
that full repayment is no longer guaranteed (the project fails with probability 1 − pi)
and, hence, r will be positive to compensate the bank for the risk. Because of the credit
market competitiveness and the risk-neutrality assumption, the interest rate will only
ensure that the bank will just break even in expected terms and its expected proﬁt will
be zero. Given that the debtor prefers strategy SC in state L, the maximization problem
becomes
max
K≥0,r≥0
{[p+ (1− p)pi][V +B ln (K + 1)− (1 + r)K]} (3.12)
94
s.t.
PC: [p+ (1− p)pi](1 + r)K + (1− p)(1− pi)V −K ≥ 0. (3.13)
In the former maximization problem, the participation constraint would be redundant
as the creditor gets repaid for sure and is willing to lend at a riskless interest rate. On the
other hand, in the latter problem, the incentive compatibility constraint is not needed
because the contract involving SC becomes optimal only when the distortion associated
with satisfying the ICC for SQ is so large that it becomes too costly to deter the debtor
from the choice of the risky strategy SC . Such a contract will automatically involve
r > 0.16
We denote the contracts that solve the two problems as {KTQ, 0, 0, SQ} and {KTC , rTC , 0, SC},
respectively. The superscript T stands for tough law and the subscripts Q and C for,
respectively, quitting and continuation. The debtor decides which of the two types of
contract to oﬀer to the creditor. Thus she compares her ex ante payoﬀ from the contract
{KTQ, 0, 0, SQ} with that from the contract {KTC , rTC , 0, SC}.
Quitting the Project in the Bad State
When the optimal contract is the one involving quitting in state L, then the problem
given by (3.10) and (3.11) can be solved in the following way:
• As long as the ICC (3.11) is not binding for K = KFB, the ﬁrst best can be
implemented: {K, r, α, Si} = {KFB, 0, 0, SQ}.
• When the ICC (3.11) is binding for K = KFB (KFB, is too large for SQ to be
incentive compatible), we need to decrease K below its ﬁrst best level to KTQ given
by
(γ + pi − 1)KTQ − piB ln (KTQ + 1) + (1− pi)V = 0. (3.14)
Although the solution cannot be obtained in the closed form, it can be shown that
∂KTQ
∂V
> 0;
∂KTQ(pi)
∂pi
< 0;
∂KTQ(B)
∂B
< 0;
∂KTQ
∂p
= 0. (3.15)
16This can be shown as follows. Suppose the debtor can repay the bank in full even after the project
fails and there is only V left. The debtor thus remains in the residual claimant position in all the
situations that may occur which rules out the gambling on resurrection type of moral hazard. Absent
this type of moral hazard, the debtor would always choose the socially optimal strategy, which is SQ.
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Thus, under the tough law, given strategy choice SQ,
KTQ =
{
pB
1−(1−p)γ − 1 = KFB if (3.11) is not binding,
KTQ given by (3.14) < KFB otherwise.
(3.16)
Continuing the Project in the Bad State
When the optimal contract involves project continuation in state L, we can derive the
following solutions to the problem given by (3.12) and (3.13):
KTC = [p+ (1− p)pi]B − 1 = KFBC < KFB, (3.17)
rTC =
1− [p+ (1− p)pi]
p+ (1− p)pi
(
1− V
[p+ (1− p)pi]B − 1
)
> 0 (3.18)
where KFBC is the ﬁrst best K given that the project is always continued in period 1. In
this case, the investment level is smaller than the ﬁrst best level and there is always a
positive interest rate.
Optimal Contract under Tough Law
Ex ante the debtor decides which of the two types of contract to oﬀer to the creditor.
Thus she compares her ex ante payoﬀ from the contract {KTQ, 0, 0, SQ} with that from
the contract {KTC , rTC , 0, SC}. The debtor will prefer the latter contract to the former, iﬀ
[p+ (1− p)pi][V +B ln (KTC + 1)− (1 + rTC)KTC ] >
> V + pB ln (KTQ + 1) + (1− p)γKTQ −KTQ.
(3.19)
If the debtor could always commit to SQ in the contract, she would prefer this strat-
egy ex ante and set the investment level to K = KFB which would maximize her ex
ante expected payoﬀ. However, for parameter values such that ICC (3.5) is violated for
K = KFB, the debtor would not honor the commitment. Thus, in order to make the
commitment to SQ incentive compatible, we need to have KTQ < KFB, which leads to a
debtor's proﬁt smaller than the ﬁrst best social gain. If this dead-weight loss becomes
large enough, it is no longer optimal to decrease K any further. At this point, giving
the debtor incentives to choose SQ becomes more costly than accepting the choice of SC .
This means that SC becomes the optimal strategy with investment level K = KTC and
interest rate r = rTC .
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We now examine howKT , rT and the strategy choice evolve when we change the upside
of the project, B, holding the other parameters  p, pi, γ, V  constant. To facilitate the
analysis, we use a special notation for two particular values of B. As deﬁned already in
section 3.3, B1 denotes the level of B at which ICC (3.5) becomes binding for K = KFB,
i.e., the level at which the ﬁrst best is no longer achievable under tough law. Now we
denote B2 the level of B at which the costs of inducing the debtor to choose SQ equal the
costs of choosing SC over SQ, i.e., for B > B2 the optimal contract assumes continuation
of the project in state L. It can be shown that B1 ≤ B2. Referring to these two thresholds,
we can describe the dependence of KT on B.17
Proposition 2. Under the tough law,
KT =

pB
1−(1−p)γ − 1 = KFBQ = KFB if B ≤ B1,
KTQ given by (3.14) < KFB if B1 < B ≤ B2,
[p+ (1− p)pi]B − 1 = KFBC < KFB otherwise,
rT =
 0 if B ≤ B2,1−[p+(1−p)pi]
p+(1−p)pi
(
1− V
[p+(1−p)pi]B−1
)
otherwise,
STi =
{
SQ if B ≤ B2,
SC otherwise.
Proposition 2 divides the projects under tough law environment into three categories.
First, for projects whose upside relative to the ﬁrm's value is rather small (B < B1),
the ﬁrst best amount of K can be lent by the creditor, since the debtor can credibly
commit to liquidate the project in the bad state and repay the creditor in full. In this
case, the debtor is able to cover the whole loss from the ﬁrm's residual value V and,
therefore, acts in a socially optimal way, liquidating the project in the bad state. Second,
for projects with medium upside relative to the ﬁrm's value (B1 ≤ B < B2), if lent the
ﬁrst-best amount, the debtor would prefer to continue the project, because the vision
of the project succeeding, however unlikely, is attractive enough for him to gamble on
resurrection. K has to be decreased to make the quitting strategy more attractive (see
Figure 3.7 in Appendix 3.A.2), which means the debtor can only obtain debt ﬁnancing
below the eﬃcient scale. Third, for projects with upside too high relative to the ﬁrm's
value (B2 ≤ B), it is not eﬃcient to deter the debtor from continuing by reducing the
17Note again that we are interested only in those situations when KFBQ > 0 and the socially optimal
strategy is SQ.
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invested amount. The best available solution is to accept ex ante that the project will
continue regardless of the state of the world and reﬂect the risk of less-than-full repayment
at a higher interest rate.
For projects in the second and third category, the problem with gambling on resur-
rection in the bad state arises due to the fact that the ﬁrm's value V is assumed to be
ﬁxed. The problem could be eliminated if the ﬁrm's value could be increased suﬃciently,
relative to the size of the project. This could be done by increasing equity ﬁnancing.
Therefore, in countries with functioning capital markets, the ex ante ineﬃciencies of the
tough law are less of an issue because when facing such a project the debtor could raise
new capital to bring the resulting leverage ratio to an acceptable level.18
The dependence of K on B is illustrated in Figure 3.8 in Appendix 3.A.2. Figure 3.9
then illustrates the debtor's expected proﬁt in period 0 as a function of B. As we assume
the credit market to be perfectly competitive, the debtor's expected proﬁt represents the
whole social surplus generated by the project.
3.4.2 Soft bankruptcy law
Having analyzed the moral hazard problem in a regime of tough bankruptcy law in
section 3.4.1, we now move to a regime of soft bankruptcy law characterized by α > 0.
This regime enables the debtor of a bankrupt ﬁrm to always keep a fraction of the ﬁrm's
value, even if the creditors are not paid in full. In other words, the soft law enables
violation of APR.
An often-cited example of a soft bankruptcy law is the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, es-
pecially its reorganization chapter, Chapter 11. There is substantial evidence that the
APR is often violated in Chapter 11 cases. Longhofer and Carlstrom (1995), for exam-
ple, survey the existing empirical literature on APR violations and ﬁnd, based on that
literature, that in a sample of large corporations with publicly traded securities, APR
violations occur in 75% of reorganizations.
We model the soft law by assuming exogenously given α > 0 (the extensive form
representation of this game is shown in Figure 3.2 in Appendix 3.A.1). As before, we
are particularly interested in the eﬀects on the debtor's strategy choice in state L and,
implicitly, on the level of investment K and interest rate r.
18A testable hypothesis would be that in countries with tough bankruptcy laws, we should observe
lower leverage ratios and also lower real interest rates.
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The diﬀerence from the case of α = 0 analyzed in section 3.4.1 is that if the debtor
gambles on resurrection in state L and this gamble fails, she still keeps fraction α > 0
of the ﬁrm's remaining value. Thus her expected payoﬀ from continuation is larger by
(1− pi)αV , which is added to the right hand side of ICC (3.11). To induce her to choose
SQ in state L for K = KFB and r = 0 the following modiﬁed ICC must hold:
V + γKFB −KFB ≥ pi[V +B ln(KFB + 1)−KFB] + (1− pi)αV. (3.20)
In this case, by increasing the payoﬀ from continuation in the bad state, the soft law
makes the gambling on resurrection more attractive.
For K = KFB and r = 0 to be the solution, the value kept by the debtor after out-
of-bankruptcy liquidation and full repayment must be larger than what she could obtain
from ﬁling for bankruptcy, i.e., the following must hold
V + γKFB −KFB ≥ α(V + γKFB). (3.21)
If the condition of having both (3.20) and (3.21) hold is violated, the solution with
K = KFB and r = 0 cannot be achieved. It may still be possible to achieve a solution
with K = KFB and r > 0, provided α is high enough to induce the debtor to choose SQ,
i.e., provided that
α(V + γKFB) ≥ pi[V +B ln(KFB + 1)− (1 + rS)KFB] + (1− pi)αV, (3.22)
where rS is given by solving the bank's participation constraint (holding with equality)
as
rS =
1− p
p
[
1− (1− α)V + γK
FB
KFB
]
. (3.23)
In this case, as in the case with endogenous α, the debtor obtains a large enough share
of the pie to induce him to act in the socially optimal way and to liquidate the project
in the bad state. The bank, although not repaid in full in state L, is willing to ﬁnance
the project at the socially eﬃcient level because it is compensated by a higher payoﬀ in
state H.
When the project upside given by B is high and the law's degree of softness given by
α is low (both (3.20) and (3.22) are violated), the ﬁrst best cannot be achieved for the
given α. The situation is then similar to the one under tough law. The optimal contract
99
{KS, rS, Si} will be determined as the solution to one of the following maximization
problems:
1. Quitting in state L. In the optimal contract, r = 0 and the investment K is such
that the debtor prefers SQ in state L so that the creditor gets repaid in full. The
maximization problem then becomes
max
K
p[V +B ln(K + 1)] + (1− p)(V + γK)−K (3.24)
s.t.
V + γK −K ≥ pi[V +B ln(K + 1)−K] + (1− pi)αV. (3.25)
The optimal K is obtained by solving (3.25) held with equality, i.e., KS is given by
(γ + pi − 1)KS − piB ln (KS + 1) + (1− α)(1− pi)V = 0. (3.26)
2. Continuation in state L. K and r are such that in the bad state the debtor
prefers to continue the project. The maximization problem becomes:
max
K,r
[p+ (1− p)pi][V +B ln(K + 1)− (1 + r)K] + (1− p)(1− pi)αV (3.27)
s.t.
[p+ (1− p)pi](1 + r)K + (1− p)(1− pi)(1− α)V −K ≥ 0. (3.28)
Here, the optimal investment isK = [p+(1−p)pi]B−1 = KFBC < KFB. The optimal
interest rate is positive and is obtained by substituting KFBC in the participation
constraint (3.28) holding with equality.
When deciding which of the two possible contracts described above is the best, the
debtor compares the expected payoﬀs from each, i.e., the values of the objective function
at the optimal solution, and chooses the one with the highest payoﬀ.
We now summarize the above derivations in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Under the soft law with exogenously given α, the optimal levels of K and
r are determined as follows.
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• If (3.20) and (3.21) hold, KS = KFB, rS = 0, SSi = SQ.
• If (3.20) and (3.22) hold but (3.21) does not hold, KS = KFB, rS is given by (3.23),
and SSi = SQ.
• If neither (3.20) nor (3.22) hold, then the ﬁrst best is not attainable and K < KFB.
The debtor will decide between a contract involving quitting in the bad state (case
1 above) and a contract involving continuation in the bad state (case 2 above),
depending on which of the contracts yields her higher expected proﬁt in period 0.
The key conclusion of the soft law analysis is that if the law is not soft enough (if the
constraint (3.22) is violated), it further worsens the gambling on resurrection problem
observed under tough law by making the continuation strategy in the bad state more
attractive for the debtor. The consequence is higher ineﬃciency given by the higher
diﬀerence between the feasible (KS) and the optimal (KFB) investment level. If, on the
other hand, the law is soft enough (if the constraint (3.22) holds), then the debtor behaves
in the socially optimal way, liquidating the project in the bad state. The practical question
is when the law is soft enough. For the parameters here, this is the case for α = 0.5,
meaning that the debtor would have to retain 50% of the ﬁrm's value in bankruptcy.
Compared to the empirically observed values of the degree of softness under Chapter 11
 which range from 0% to 26.5%, with an average below 10% (as discussed in section
3.2.2)  this seems to be unrealistically high. If such a high level cannot be achieved in
practice, then tougher law will produce better results.
3.5 Possibility of veriﬁcation under tough law
In this section, we explore the possibility of creditors' veriﬁcation of the ﬁrm's information
about the state of the world in period 1. We focus on the tough law setup (α = 0) and
introduce a new parameter to the analysis  the cost of veriﬁcation, c. Veriﬁcation oﬀers
another instrument, besides those explored in previous sections, to solve the gambling on
resurrection problem and, possibly, to improve eﬃciency. We will show under what con-
ditions it will be used and what beneﬁts it brings. For the extensive form representation
of the game, see Figure 3.3 in Appendix 3.A.1.
As discussed before, the debtor would like to commit to the socially eﬃcient strategy,
SQ, ex ante because this would enable him to obtain ﬁnancing in the amount KFB and
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would maximize the debtor's expected payoﬀ. However, since the state of the world is
the debtor's private information, such a commitment would not be credible if ex post,
in state L, the debtor would prefer SC . Previously we assumed that the only ways to
solve this problem were to reduce K below the optimal level or to use APR violation to
incentivize the debtor to choose the safe strategy. In this section we instead introduce
the possibility that the bank is able to verify, at a certain cost, the debtor's report of the
state of the world and, thus, make sure that the debtor liquidates the project in the bad
state.
If the debtor reports state H, the bank can decide to verify this information, which
costs it c. We assume a perfect monitoring technology is used: If the bank decides to
verify, it will learn the true state with certainty. If it ﬁnds the state is H, nothing happens
and the project continues to period 2. If it uncovers misreporting, i.e., if it ﬁnds that the
state is L, it will take control of the business and obtain the lesser of full payoﬀ (1+ r)K
and the ﬁrm's entire value V +γK. We denote q the probability that the bank will decide
to verify the state of the world reported by the debtor. We also assume that following
the discovery of misreporting, the debtor obtains nothing even if the bank is paid in full.
This reﬂects the fact that the bank is in control and it will not exert any eﬀort to obtain
value in excess of (1 + r)K.
Note that without this punishment assumption, partial veriﬁcation (q < 1) would
never be suﬃcient to induce the debtor to choose SQ in situations in which she, without
veriﬁcation, would prefer SC . This is simply because she could never do worse by lying
than by truth-telling. Full veriﬁcation (q = 1) would always be necessary in this case.
Note also that the cost of veriﬁcation, although paid by the bank, will eventually be borne
by the debtor. This is because we assume a competitive credit market, which means that
the bank's expected proﬁt is zero under all circumstances and the whole surplus goes to
the debtor. The veriﬁcation cost cuts into this surplus.
Depending on the parameter values, the optimal solution for {K, r, Si} and q can take
four diﬀerent forms:
1. No Veriﬁcation, First Best, {KFB, 0, SQ} and q = 0. After borrowingK = KFB
at r = 0, the debtor chooses SQ in state L even without veriﬁcation. Veriﬁcation is
unnecessary and will not be used. Note that this is the case of B ≤ B1.
2. No Veriﬁcation, First Best not Attainable, {K < KFB, 0, SQ} and q = 0. At
K = KFB the debtor would choose SC in state L but lowering K below the ﬁrst
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best level costs her less than the expected cost of veriﬁcation she would have to pay
the bank in the form of interest rate.
3. Probabilistic Veriﬁcation, {K < KFB, r = pcq
K
, SQ} and q > 0. Without veriﬁ-
cation the debtor would choose SC and a probabilistic veriﬁcation (0 < q < 1) is
suﬃcient to induce her to choose SQ. This is the case when full repayment is possi-
ble after quitting the project, i.e., the debtor still receives a certain payoﬀ following
the choice of SQ. K < KFB because the marginal cost of increasing K is higher
than in the social planner's problem by c ∂q
∂K
. The bank has to be compensated for
the expected veriﬁcation cost pqc, thus r = pqc/K > 0. If the debtor reports H,
the bank veriﬁes with probability q which is set endogenously in such a way that
the debtor never lies. He reports state H only when it really occurs, which happens
with probability p. Thus, the ex ante probability that the bank will need to bear
the veriﬁcation cost c is pq.
4. Full Veriﬁcation, {K = KFB, r = pc+(1−p)[(1−γ)K−V ]
pK
> 0, SQ} and q = 1. If full
repayment is impossible after the choice of SQ in state L, the debtor would choose
SC for any q < 1. In order to induce the debtor to choose SQ we therefore need
to have q = 1. At this level of q, the marginal cost of increasing K is the same as
in the social planner's problem (since ∂q
∂K
= 0) and we will have K = KFB. The
interest rate will again compensate the bank for the veriﬁcation cost and also for
the risk of less than full repayment if state L occurs.
5. No Veriﬁcation, Continuation, {KFBC < KFB, r = 1−[p+(1−p)pi]p+(1−p)pi
(
1 − V
KFBC
)
, SC}
and q = 0. The debtor may always oﬀer a contract involving the choice of SC in
state L if she compensates the bank for the risk of less than full repayment in the
case of project failure and keeps her participation constraint satisﬁed.
From these alternatives, the debtor will propose a contract that yields her the highest
expected payoﬀ and is feasible. Cases 1, 2 and 5 are the same as under tough law without
veriﬁcation. In what follows, we analyze problems 3 and 4 in more detail. Before that,
however, we make some comments common to both of them.
First, we assume that the creditor can credibly commit to verifying with the proba-
bility q∗(K, r) ex ante.19 Otherwise, the creditor would have an inconsistency problem:
19This is a realistic assumption in the sense that the banking business is based on reputation and, thus,
the bank's commitment is actually enforced by the other business it has. Committing to veriﬁcation and
then not doing it would have a reputational cost for the bank.
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he would like to commit to verifying with probability q∗ but  once this commitment is
made and the debtor adapts his behavior in the desired way  to renounce this commit-
ment and save the cost c. We would then have mixed-strategy equilibria which would
complicate the analysis and lead us away from the point of our interest.
Second, unlike in the situation without veriﬁcation, the expected payment of the
ﬁrm to the bank is K + pcq∗(K, r) > K. If there is veriﬁcation, the interest serves to
compensate the bank for the actual veriﬁcation cost that it incurs, not (or not only)
for the risk of less than full repayment. Compared with the social planner solution, the
veriﬁcation cost is therefore a source of ineﬃciency.
Finally, note that the creditor will not want to increase q above q∗(K, r) because this
increases his cost without any increase in return  for q = q∗(K, r) the debtor will choose
SQ anyway. Note also the discontinuity in the returns to increasing the veriﬁcation
probability q  for some q < q∗(K, r) the bank will only ensure the choice of SQ if it
actually veriﬁes, while for q = q∗(K, r) the debtor will always prefer SQ. Because of this
discontinuity, the bank will either verify with probability q = q∗(K, r) or not verify at
all. Any intermediate level of q cannot be optimal.
3.5.1 Probabilistic veriﬁcation
Consider ﬁrst the problem when full repayment is possible after the project is quit, which
means that for the optimalK and r we have V +γK ≥ (1+r)K. In this case, probabilistic
veriﬁcation is suﬃcient to induce the debtor to quit in state L. In other words, q may
always be set to such a level that the debtor prefers the sure payoﬀ from quitting to the
lottery induced by continuation.
The ﬁrm's maximization problem is then
max
K,r
{V + pB ln (K + 1) + (1− p)γK − (1 + r)K} (3.29)
s.t.
V + γK − (1 + r)K ≥ (1− q)pi[V +B ln (K + 1)− (1 + r)K], (3.30)
rK ≥ pcq. (3.31)
Equation (3.30) is the incentive compatibility constraint which ensures that the debtor
will prefer SQ. It is the analogue of (3.11) in the case without veriﬁcation, the diﬀerence
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being that the expected payoﬀ from continuation is multiplied by the probability (1 −
q) that misreporting will go through; with probability q, the bank will discover the
misreporting, will seize control, and the debtor will receive nothing. Equation (3.31) is
the participation constraint. We can express the optimal q from (3.30) held with equality
as q∗(K, r) = 1 − V+γK−(1+r)K
pi[V+B ln (K+1)−(1+r)K] , substitute it into (3.31) and solve the modiﬁed
maximization problem. This yields the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
(K) p
B
K + 1
+ (1− p)γ − (1 + r) + λ[r − pcq∗K(K, r)] = 0, (3.32)
(r) −K + λ[K − pcq∗r(K, r)] = 0. (3.33)
Using (3.33) to express λ and substituting back to (3.32) yields
p
B
K + 1
+ (1− p)γ − (1 + r) + K[r − pcq
∗
K(K, r)]
K − pcq∗r(K, r)
= 0. (3.34)
From equation (3.34) and from the participation constraint (3.31) holding with equality
we can obtain the optimal levels of K and r for the situation in which the creditor veriﬁes
the ﬁrm's report in period 1 with probability q ∈ (0, 1), i.e., KVp (q) and rVp (q). Here, the
superscript V denotes veriﬁcation, while the subscript p denotes that the veriﬁcation is
partial.
Denote FC the ﬁrm's payoﬀ if the project ends successfully and FQ the ﬁrm's payoﬀ
if the project is quit in period 1. Diﬀerentiating q∗(K, r) with respect to K and r, we
obtain
q∗K =
[(1 + r)− γ]FC − [(1 + r)− BK+1 ]FQ
pi(FC)2
≥ 0, (3.35)
q∗r =
K(FC − FQ)
pi(FC)2
≥ 0. (3.36)
Because q∗r ≥ 0 and from (3.33) λ = KK−pcq∗r , we have λ ≥ 1. The shadow cost
associated with the participation constraint (in which q is endogenously determined to
satisfy the ICC) is in general higher than one. This means that, in this regime, increasing
the amount borrowed, K, by one dollar increases the expected costs (here the value of the
debt) by more than one dollar because the veriﬁcation probability q needs to be increased
as well. This formally shows what we have already mentioned before, namely the fact
that with probabilistic veriﬁcation we will have K < KFB.
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The optimal probability of veriﬁcation, q∗(K, r), does not depend on c, but c aﬀects
whether veriﬁcation will or will not be used. If the creditor veriﬁes with probability
q∗(K, r), the debtor will always choose SQ and the bank will always be repaid in full.
The gain from veriﬁcation for the bank is (1 − p)(1 − pi)[(1 + r)K − V ] and the cost is
pcq∗(K, r). The bank will, therefore, want to verify the ﬁrm's report if
c ≤ (1− p)(1− pi)
p q∗(KVp , rVp )
[(1 + rVp )K
V
p − V ]. (3.37)
3.5.2 Full veriﬁcation
Consider now the case when after quitting the project in state L full repayment is impos-
sible. Because SC oﬀers her a positive payoﬀ with at least some probability, the debtor
would never choose SQ for q < 1 and, therefore, we need to have q = 1. In this case the
ﬁrm's maximization problem can be written as
max
K,r
p[V +B ln (K + 1)− (1 + r)K] (3.38)
s.t.
p[(1 + r)K − c] + (1− p)(V + γK)−K ≥ 0. (3.39)
Because the bank always veriﬁes the debtor's report (q = 1) the expected veriﬁcation
cost is pc. The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
(K)
pB
K + 1
− (1 + r)p+ λ[p(1 + r) + (1− p)γ − 1] = 0, (3.40)
(r) − pK + λpK = 0. (3.41)
From the FOC for r we have λ = 1. The marginal cost of borrowing an additional dollar
is just one dollar. Using this in the FOC for K, we can obtain the solution for K,
KVf =
pB
1− (1− p)γ − 1 = K
FB. (3.42)
The intuition for this result is that in this regime, the veriﬁcation probability is ﬁxed,
q = 1, and therefore the veriﬁcation cost that the bank needs to be compensated for
incurring is ﬁxed as well at rK = pc. Therefore, if the cost does not change with K, the
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optimal K will be the one maximizing the overall surplus, which is KFB. Substituting
KFB into the participation constraint (3.39) holding with equality we obtain the following
solution for r:
rVf =
c
KFB
+
1− p
p
(
1− γ − V
KFB
)
. (3.43)
Because the gain from veriﬁcation for the bank is (1−p)[V +γK−pi(1+r)K−(1−pi)V ]
and the cost of full veriﬁcation is pc, the bank will want to verify the ﬁrm's report if
c ≤ 1− p
p
{
piV +
[
γ − pi(1 + rVf )
]
KFB
}
. (3.44)
3.5.3 Optimal contract under the possibility of veriﬁcation
In the previous sections, we have shown the optimal contracts under tough and soft
bankruptcy laws, assuming the creditor cannot verify the state of the world in period 1.
In other words, we have implicitly assumed the cost of veriﬁcation to be prohibitively
high. Under these circumstances, the feasible investment (K) was at social optimum
until a certain level of the project upside (B), but fell short of the eﬃcient level for
higher upsides.
Once the cost of veriﬁcation falls below a critical threshold, it starts to pay oﬀ for
the creditor to verify the state of the world and the under-investment problem starts to
diminish. For zero veriﬁcation cost, the socially optimal investment level becomes feasible
for all values of the project upside.
Figures 3.13 through 3.16 in Appendix 3.A.2 illustrate these ﬁndings by means of
simulations.
3.6 Allowing for renegotiation
So far, we have assumed away the possibility of renegotiation. Now, although we believe
and argue below that this is not an unreasonable assumption, we will consider how the
situation changes when renegotiation is allowed.20 The ﬁrst argument for not including
renegotiation in the basic setup is that the bank may want to build a reputation of not
being willing to renegotiate in order to prevent strategic defaults by other debtors. In our
model, the bank does not need such a reputation because the debtor has nothing to gain
from defaulting in the good state (we assume all the ﬁrm's value consists of veriﬁable
20For a general analysis of debt-renegotiation in bankruptcy see, e.g., Janda (2002).
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assets, so the bank could turn to court to enforce the payment). However, in reality,
strategic default may be an issue for the bank and it may have an incentive to develop
such a reputation. The second reason is that under renegotiation, the bank eﬀectively
forgives part of the debtor's non-contingent payment speciﬁed in the contract. Although
this may actually be more proﬁtable for the bank than doing nothing and allowing the
debtor to continue the project, relevant laws may treat such debt forgiveness by bank
oﬃcers as illegal.
We describe the eﬀects of renegotiation for the case of tough law and then only mention
the diﬀerences under soft law. The only node in the game where renegotiation can take
place is state L in period 1. In addition, considering renegotiation only makes sense in
the suboptimal case when the ﬁrst best cannot be reached, i.e., for B > B1. In this case,
the debtor has an incentive to continue the project although the action maximizing the
ﬁrm's value is to quit the project. Therefore, there is room for a mutually advantageous
renegotiation of the initial contract.
The bargaining situation is shown in Figure 3.17 in Appendix 3.A.3. The x-axis
denotes the debtor's payoﬀ, the y-axis the bank's payoﬀ. The maximum payoﬀ for both
is V + γK and the line connecting these payoﬀs on the x- and y-axis is the Pareto
frontier, with the slope −1. In the status quo point without renegotiation, the debtor's
expected payoﬀ is pi[V + B ln(K + 1) − (1 + r)K] and the bank's expected payoﬀ is
pi(1 + r)K + (1− pi)V . These payoﬀs also determine the threat points of the debtor and
the bank denoted by Pd and Pb, respectively. The bargaining takes place between these
two points on the Pareto frontier.
In state L, the debtor can contact the bank, reveal that state L occurred, and oﬀer
to quit the project if she receives a certain payoﬀ. The maximum payoﬀ the debtor can
obtain depends on the bargaining powers of the debtor and the bank. We analyze two
cases  ﬁrst, when the debtor has all the bargaining power, and second, when the bank
has all the bargaining power.
3.6.1 Diﬀerent allocations of bargaining power
Suppose ﬁrst that the debtor possesses all the bargaining power within the renegotiation
process, i.e., that the debtor is able to hold the bank down to its threat point Pb where
its payoﬀ is pi(1 + r)K + (1 − pi)V . The debtor's payoﬀ from renegotiation in state L
is, therefore, V + γK − pi(1 + r)K − (1 − pi)V . The bank's and debtor's payoﬀ in the
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good state are the same as without renegotiation, i.e., V + B ln(K + 1) − (1 + r)K for
the debtor and (1 + r)K for the bank. The debtor's maximization problem in period 0
can thus be written as
max
K,r
[p+ (1− p)pi][V − (1 + r)K] + pB ln(K + 1) + (1− p)γK (3.45)
s.t.
PC: [p+ (1− p)pi](1 + r)K + (1− p)(1− pi)V −K ≥ 0. (3.46)
If, alternatively, the bank has all the bargaining power, the debtor is held down to her
threat point and her payoﬀ from the renegotiation in state L is therefore the same as from
continuation, i.e., pi[V +B ln(K+1)− (1+r)K]. The bank captures the rest of the ﬁrm's
value after quitting the project, which is equal to V +γK−pi[V +B ln(K+1)−(1+r)K] <
(1 + r)K.21 In state H the payoﬀs are again the same as without renegotiation and the
debtor's maximization problem can be written as
max
K,r
[p+ (1− p)pi][V +B ln(K + 1)− (1 + r)K] (3.47)
s.t.
PC: p(1 + r)K + (1− p){V + γK−
pi[V +B ln(K + 1)− (1 + r)K]} −K ≥ 0. (3.48)
21The inequality can be explained as follows. As mentioned above, renegotiation will only take place
in the suboptimal case where the debtor would prefer to continue the project at K = KFB , while the
optimal strategy is to quit the project. This means that the debtor's expected payoﬀ from continuation
is higher than from quitting and paying the bank in full. Therefore, if after quitting the debtor receives
as much as she expects to gain from continuation, the bank cannot be repaid in full.
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3.6.2 Optimal contract under renegotiation
The solutions to the two alternative maximization problems are
KTRd = K
T
Rb =
pB
1− (1− p)γ − 1 = K
FB, (3.49)
rTRd =
1− [p+ (1− p)pi]
p+ (1− p)pi
(
1− Vp
1−(1−p)γB − 1
)
, (3.50)
rTRb =
1− [p+ (1− p)pi]
p+ (1− p)pi
[
1− Vp
1−(1−p)γB − 1
(3.51)
−
γ − piB ln ( p
1−(1−p)γB
)
(1− pi)( p
1−(1−p)γB − 1
)] < rTRd, (3.52)
where subscripts Rd and Rb denote the treatment with renegotiation when all the bar-
gaining power resides with the debtor (Rd) or the bank (Rb), respectively; T indicates
the tough law regime (α = 0).
We see that when renegotiation is possible, then irrespective of whether the debtor
or the bank is in the position of making the take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer, the ﬁrst best can
be attained. The optimal investment level in both cases is K = KFB and the debtor
follows strategy SQ in state L. The distribution of the bargaining power only aﬀects, in a
predictable way, the interest rate. The intuition behind having rTRd > rTRb is the following.
Because the bank is supposed to just break even in period 0, then a higher payoﬀ from
renegotiation in state L enables it to decrease the payoﬀ in state H, which means to
decrease the interest rate.
Under the soft law, renegotiation would also occur only in state L and only if the
debtor would, without renegotiation, prefer to continue the project. The situation would
be similar as under tough law; only the status quo payoﬀs and therefore the threat points
of the parties would shift. Renegotiation would again enable the parties to attain the
ﬁrst best. The interest rate would be higher than under tough law because the debtor's
threat point is higher and the bank's threat point is lower, which increases the debtor's
and decreases the bank's payoﬀ from renegotiation. This holds irrespective of who has
more bargaining power.
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3.7 Conclusion
Soft bankruptcy laws are believed to mitigate the gambling on resurrection problem by
not fully wiping out the existing shareholders in the case of ﬁnancial distress. Our model
conﬁrms this stylized fact; our main conclusion is, however, that the degree of softness
needs to be suﬃciently high to achieve this result. If the law is not soft enough, the
situation reverses to the tougher, the better.
We see two practical issues with the soft law. First, although a suﬃciently soft law
outperforms a completely tough one, it can be very diﬃcult to ﬁnd the optimal degree
of softness for a given economy  there is no one-size-ﬁts-all solution both in terms of
diﬀerent projects and diﬀerent creditor types. Hence it might seem reasonable for the
policy maker to fully preserve APR, rather than trying to ﬁnd the optimal degree of APR
violation. Moreover, could the optimal degree be found, it might still be impossible to
reach it in practice. Even the best-known example of a clearly soft law, Chapter 11, is
empirically documented as being substantially tougher than the optimal degree of softness
found in our paper.
This paper deals with the situation in which the debtor can stop a project at a time
when substantial value can still be recovered. The practical beneﬁts of the APR violation
may occur once the bankruptcy procedure has been started, by motivating the debtor to
cooperate. How these beneﬁts compare with the drawbacks identiﬁed in our paper is a
question which deserves further research.
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3.A Appendix  extensive form representations and
graphical simulations
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3.A.1 Extensive form representations
Tough law
Figure 3.1 provides the extensive form representation of the tough law regime as analyzed
in section 3.4.1. If state H occurs, the debtor continues for sure in order to get the upside
payoﬀ V +B ln (K + 1)− (1+r)K (because quitting would yield him V +γK− (1+r)K,
which is lower) and the creditor is repaid in full. However, if state L occurs, the debtor
can either misreport and choose a risky continuation to get the upside with probability
pi or safely quit. If she quits, then either she can repay full (1 + r)K to the bank and
keep V +γK− (1+ r)K or the residual value is insuﬃcient for full repayment so that the
debtor gets nothing and the bank gets back less than what was speciﬁed in the contract.
If the debtor misreports in state L and follows SC , the creditor gets full repayment with
probability pi and a partial repayment V with probability (1− pi). The creditor's payoﬀ
from rejecting the oﬀered contract in the beginning, 0, represents the outside option from
which the participation constraint is derived.
Figure 3.1: Extensive Game under Tough Law
When analyzing the tough law regime, we assumed V +γK ≥ (1+r)K so that quitting
of the project in state L does not lead to bankruptcy. Had this assumption been violated,
there would be no way to induce truth-telling and choice of SQ in state L. However, as
we show in the following paragraph, that assumption did not limit our analysis in any
way  whenever our solution in Proposition (2) implies KT = KFB, the assumption that
V + γK ≥ (1 + r)K always holds.
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Soft law
The extensive form representation of the soft law regime with exogenous α analyzed in
section 3.4.2 is shown in Figure 3.2. The game with endogenous determination of α as
analyzed in section 3.4.2 would look the same with α being added as the fourth parameter
of the contract oﬀered by the debtor to the creditor in period 0.
Figure 3.2: Extensive Game under Soft Law
When state H occurs, the ﬁrm remains solvent and the payoﬀs are the same as under
tough law. What changes are payoﬀs from both strategies after state L is observed by the
debtor. The debtor's payoﬀ from continuation is increased at the expense of the creditor
by (1 − pi)αV . The debtor's payoﬀ from quitting becomes either V + γK − (1 + r)K
with full repayment (1 + r)K to the creditor or α(V + γK) with partial repayment
(1− α)(V + γK)−K to the creditor.
Tough law with veriﬁcation
Finally, Figure 3.3 depicts the game under the tough law regime with veriﬁcation. In
addition to the situation depicted in Figure 3.1, the bank has a chance to verify the state
of the world if the debtor claims to be in state H and continues. Thus the veriﬁcation
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cost cq enters the bank's payoﬀs. The debtor's payoﬀ from misreporting is decreased by
fraction q which represents the probability of being caught lying.
Figure 3.3: Extensive Game under Tough Law with Veriﬁcation
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3.A.2 Graphical simulations
Endogenous degree of softness
We consider the following parameter values: V = 1, γ = 0.65, and pi = 0.2. We further
consider three diﬀerent values of p, namely 0.5, 0.6, and 0.7. Given these parameter
values, we consider the dependence of K, α and r on the project upside B. Figure 3.4
depicts the dependence of K on B. In the whole range, the dependence of the investment
level K on the project upside B is positive and K is higher for higher probability of high
state p.
Figure 3.4: Optimal investment level under endogenous degree of softness
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More interesting are the functions for α and r, which are depicted in Figure 3.5 and
Figure 3.6. They both equal zero as long as the ICC (3.5) can be satisﬁed for K = KFB,
r = 0, α = 0; they both jump up discontinuously when this is no longer possible. The
discontinuous jump in α is necessary to satisfy the ICC. For B ≤ B1 the amount that
remains to the debtor after quitting and paying back in full is suﬃcient to induce her to
quit because it is larger than the expected payoﬀ from continuation. For B > B1 this no
longer holds and the debtor must receive more than after full repayment to be induced
to quit, which is achieved by setting α to such a level that α(V + γK) is larger than the
expected return from continuation. When α jumps up then r must jump up as well to
satisfy the creditor's PC.
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Figure 3.5: Degree of softness consistent with the optimal strategy
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Figure 3.6: Interest rate under endogenous degree of softness and optimal strategy
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Exogenous degree of softness, tough law
For a given K higher B increases the payoﬀ from continuation while leaving the pay-
oﬀ from quitting unchanged (Figure 3.7). Thus, the higher B is the lower level of K
compatible with the strategy to quit.
Figure 3.7: Debtor's payoﬀ from continuation and from quitting
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The dependence of K on B is illustrated in Figure 3.8. Assuming p = 0.6, pi = 0.2,
γ = 0.65, and V = 1, the ﬁrm is able to ﬁnance the project on the eﬃcient level K = KFB
for B ≤ B1 = 4.56. At B = B1, KT = KFB = 2.70. For values of B > B1, KT
is decreasing in B to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint (3.11). It reaches a
minimum of 2.17 at B2 = 5.52. At this point the ineﬃciency from further decreasing K
exceeds that from choosing strategy SC and, thus, SC becomes the optimal strategy for
the debtor. K jumps up discontinuously to 3.77. At this point, the interest rate also
becomes positive, in particular, at B = B2, r = 0.11. At the level of B2, the expected
proﬁts of the debtor from both SC and SQ are the same and equal to 4.21.
Figure 3.9 then illustrates the debtor's expected proﬁt in period 0 as a function of B.
As we assume the credit market to be perfectly competitive, the debtor's expected proﬁt
represents the whole social surplus generated by the project. For B ≤ B1, the proﬁt is
the same as the ﬁrst best social gain and the debtor follows SQ. For B1 < B ≤ B2, the
proﬁt falls short of the ﬁrst best social gain but the debtor still follows SQ. For B > B2,
the debtor prefers SC and the proﬁt falls short of the ﬁrst best, but with B increasing
the gap attenuates.
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Figure 3.8: Investment level under tough law
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Figure 3.9: Debtor's proﬁt under tough law
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Exogenous degree of softness, soft law
Simulations of the dependence of optimal K, r, and the debtor's proﬁt on B and α are
provided in Figures 3.10 through 3.12. Figure 3.10 shows that if α is high enough, the
ﬁrst best can be achieved. This is the case for α = 0.5 which is suﬃcient to induce the
debtor to choose SQ for all levels of B. If α is not high enough to make the debtor choose
SQ, K essentially follows the same pattern as under tough law. For suﬃciently low B′s,
K is identical with the ﬁrst best and the debtor chooses SQ. For B′s above a certain level
(B1), choosing SQ is made credible only by decreasing K below KFB. When ensuring
SQ by further decreasing K becomes too costly, SC becomes the strategy to be chosen
in state L and optimal K is adjusted accordingly, i.e., it jumps upward to KFBC , the
optimal level given the choice of SC in state L. The diﬀerence is, as already mentioned
above, that SC is now more attractive due to the APR violation after the project failure
(the payoﬀ from SC rises by the term (1− pi)αV ), so the constraint making SQ incentive
compatible starts to bind for lower upsides, and K needs to drop below the eﬃcient level
at a lower B.
Figure 3.10: Investment level under soft law
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Figures 3.11 and 3.12 then show the optimal interest rate and corresponding debtor's
expected payoﬀ, respectively.
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Figure 3.11: Interest rate under soft law
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Figure 3.12: Debtor's proﬁt under soft law
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Tough law, veriﬁcation
When veriﬁcation is possible, then for B ≤ B1, the solution is the same as without
veriﬁcation and is identical with the ﬁrst best. This represents the ﬁrst part of the line
in Figure 3.13 common to all levels of c. Above this level of B, quitting the project for
K = KFB is not incentive compatible. For B′s only slightly above B1 it is less costly to
induce the debtor to quit by decreasing K below KFB than to use veriﬁcation. The lower
the veriﬁcation cost c, the lower the level of B at which veriﬁcation starts to be used.
From this point on, K is increasing in B although lower than KFB as long as q < 1. For
c = 0.2 and c = 0.3 the payoﬀ from SC eventually exceeds that from SQ at a certain level
of B. From this point on, the debtor will oﬀer a contract assuming continuation in state
L and K will be adjusted accordingly  it will be equal to KFBC , the optimal level given
the project is always continued.
Figure 3.13: Investment level with veriﬁcation possibility
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The interest rate, depicted in Figure 3.14, becomes positive at the level of B at which
veriﬁcation starts to be used. As mentioned above, it compensates the bank for the
veriﬁcation cost and, therefore, is lower for lower c. When SC becomes the debtor's
optimal strategy, the role of the interest rate changes  it compensates the bank for the
risk of less than full repayment, as under the case without veriﬁcation. At this point, the
interest rate jumps upward.
The debtor's payoﬀ, depicted in Figure 3.15, is the same for all levels of c as long as
veriﬁcation is not used. From this point on, the lowest c, naturally, is associated with the
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Figure 3.14: Interest rate with veriﬁcation possibility
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highest expected payoﬀ. When SC becomes the optimal strategy, c does not aﬀect the
expected payoﬀ any longer and, therefore, from this point on, it is the same for c = 0.2
and c = 0.3.
Figure 3.15: Debtor's proﬁt with veriﬁcation possibility
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As Figure 3.16 shows, higher c means that veriﬁcation starts to be used (q > 0) at
higher B and that SC becomes the optimal strategy at lower B. The range of B′s for
which veriﬁcation is used attenuates.
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Figure 3.16: Probability of veriﬁcation
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3.A.3 Renegotiation
Figure 3.17: Renegotiation
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